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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis argues that a particular version of equal opportunity for welfare is the best way of 
meeting the joint demands of three liberal egalitarian ideals: distributional equality, 
responsibility, and respect for individuals’ differing reasonable judgements of their own 
good. It also examines which social choice rules best represent these demands. Finally, it 
defends the view that achieving equal opportunity for welfare should not only be a goal of 
formal public institutions, but that just citizens should also sometimes be guided by it in their 
everyday life. 
The version of equal opportunity for welfare it defends differs from some well-known 
contemporary versions in the following ways. First, it rejects a definition of welfare as the 
degree of satisfaction of a person’s preferences, because, it argues, this conception of welfare 
cannot adequately deal with preference change. Instead, it suggests that we should adopt a 
conception of welfare based on a list of goods and conditions that are recognised as valuable 
from the perspective of a variety of different conceptions of the good.  
 Second, it argues that individuals’ prima facie claim to an equally valuable share of the 
world’s resources—a claim which is based on their equal moral worth—is limited to 
situations in which giving one person a more valuable share means that someone else ends 
up with a less valuable share. It also argues that in situations where we can improve at least 
one person’s situation without worsening anyone else’s, we generally do not fail to respect 
each person’s equal moral worth by doing so, even if this leads to inequalities. 
 Third, it defends a distinct view of responsibility, which justifies social arrangements 
that give people certain options with reference to the value that individuals can achieve (but 
don’t necessarily achieve) through their choices from these options. 
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“What, besides binge drinking—so harmful to one’s mind and health—does 
Holland have to offer you? Go to Britain, that country made famous by the 
writings of its many scholars. Time spent with its great thinkers, its extraordinarily 
cultivated men, will civilise you, and make you worldly-wise.”1  
 
I received this advice from an elderly Erasmus to a Dutch student of his day upon 
my graduation from the University of Rotterdam, just before my move to Britain. A 
friend had given me a collection of Erasmus’s letters as a going away present. These 
letters contained little to encourage me to take up a scholarly career. Erasmus 
complained to his friends about dull students and boring colleagues, about the 
poverty that forced him to supplicate the Church for scholarships, and reported how 
philosophical disagreements turned colleagues into bitter enemies. I soon discovered, 
however, that the tone changed whenever he wrote about Britain. “If you knew what 
was good for you”, he wrote a Parisian friend, Fausto Andrelini, during his first trip 
to Britain in the Spring of 1499, “you’d come here as soon as possible. Why should a 
man of your calibre grow old in French muck? (...) If you knew the true nature of 
Britain’s enjoyments, you’d make your way here on winged feet!”2  
The benefits of living in Britain that the young Erasmus described to Fausto 
were not just the educational ones he mentioned many years later to the Dutch 
                                                 
1 ‘Letter to Nicolaas Cannius of Amsterdam, May 29, 1527’, in Erasmus (1960, p. 46). 
2 This quotation and the following one are from the ‘Letter to Fausto Andrelini, Summer 1499’, in 
Erasmus (1960, pp. 39-40). 
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student. First among them was Britain’s “abundance of young girls, attractive and 
friendly, with the prettiest of faces, who you’d readily value above the Muses, and 
who bestow kisses upon you at meeting and parting.” To other friends, Erasmus also 
praised the English food, and the “extraordinarily pleasant and healthy climate”.3 
Even in his youth, however, he valued the “delicious” company of English 
philosophers above all: their learning—“not timeworn and tired, but mature and 
refined”—their openness and easy conviviality, and, especially, their ability to carry 
on a debate over dinner or in the pub without falling into a “drunken orgy”.4 
After five years in London, I have found no reason to disagree with Erasmus 
about British philosophers. The Philosophy Department at UCL, especially, merits 
Erasmian terms of praise. The staff’s and graduate students’ love of philosophy, of 
open discussion, and of a good drink were revealed to me the first day I arrived—the 
day of the annual graduate conference and dinner—and shaped my time as a 
graduate student there. The staff/student seminars taught me how to approach 
philosophical texts: critically, of course, but also much more patiently and carefully 
than I was inclined to, with respect for the text and a sense that what is good or 
powerful in it might be subtle or elusive. In spite of their superior learning, the staff 
made these seminars into a project in which we all felt ourselves equal participants.  
Many people made the years at UCL good ones; but four people especially 
helped make them so. Jo Wolff was an extraordinarily encouraging supervisor: open-
minded and interested in my interdisciplinary work and supportive in times when I 
struggled with my writing. Jo often took the time during supervisory meetings to 
                                                 
3 ‘Letter to Robert Fischer, London, December 5, 1499’, in Erasmus (1960, p. 46). 
4 Ibid. and ‘Letter to Johannes Sixtinus’, Oxford, November 1499, in Erasmus (1960, p. 40). 
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discuss a wide range of topics in egalitarian thought, but was also always careful to 
direct my attention towards the overall structure of my argument.  
Véronique Munoz-Dardé impressed upon me, in discussion, and by example, 
that moral and political philosophy requires much more than cleverness, a delight in 
solving puzzles or in finding out where important authors went wrong: it requires a 
realisation of which issues really matter, and, however tentatively held or expressed, a 
philosophical perspective of one’s own. 
Mike Otsuka, more than anyone, has taught me how to do analytical philosophy. 
His careful criticism of my writing, and our long discussions in Central London pubs 
about a variety of philosophical puzzles and positions showed me the care and 
precision required for good philosophical argument. The impressive array of 
counterexamples which he offered to the consequentialist moral thinking to which I 
was prone when I arrived in London, and the moral and political contractualism to 
which I am now attracted, have made it all the more difficult to achieve what 
Véronique has convinced me is so necessary. Should I, one happy day, be able to 
formulate a moral and political position that both rings true to me and that can 
withstand his criticism, then I will be pretty sure it will be worth believing.  
Ken Binmore has only himself to blame for the failure of his avowed ambition 
to make me abandon philosophy for something more useful. His supervisions were 
extraordinarily challenging and helpful, and inspired me to stick to my chosen path. 
His patient explanation of the central concepts of rational and social choice theory, 
and his work with me on some philosophical challenges to rational choice theory, 
greatly contributed to my understanding of these disciplines.5  
                                                 
5 See Binmore and Voorhoeve (2003) and Voorhoeve and Binmore (forthcoming) for our work on 
these topics. 
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Introduction 
 
 
In the following chapters, I offer a critical examination and qualified defence of the 
view that equal opportunity for welfare is the best way of meeting the joint demands 
of three liberal egalitarian ideals: distributional equality6, substantive responsibility7, 
and respect for individuals’ differing reasonable judgements of their own good. I also 
examine which social choice rules best represent the demands of equal opportunity 
for welfare and the related demand to maximise the opportunities for welfare of the 
least advantaged. Finally, I examine whether this conception of distributive justice 
should be pursued by means of the organisation of the major formal institutions of 
society only, or whether individuals should also adopt it as one of their aims in their 
everyday life. 
                                                 
6 I follow Ronald Dworkin (2000) in using the term ‘distributional equality’ to denote issues pertaining 
to the distribution of non-political resources that individuals can use to pursue their particular 
conceptions of the good life. It contrasts with political equality, since it is neither concerned with the 
distribution of political power, nor with political rights. It is a disputed question whether distributional 
equality should be concerned only with resources that individuals can use to pursue their own good, 
or whether it should also be concerned with people’s ability to pursue non-political, non-self-regarding 
aims. In what follows, I will be concerned only with people’s ability to pursue their self-regarding 
aims. I do not thereby mean to suggest that this is all that distributive justice should be concerned 
with. 
7 I follow Thomas Scanlon (1998) in defining substantive responsibility as the way a person’s claims 
on others, others’ claims on her, and the quality of her situation should depend on the opportunities 
she has and the choices she makes. It is distinct from moral responsibility, which is concerned with 
when it is appropriate to take a person’s attitudes or actions as the basis for moral appraisal. 
 9 
The easiest way to introduce my main arguments is through a short discussion of 
the views which I take as my point of departure and the debates to which I 
contribute. In the first three chapters, I have taken Richard Arneson’s (1989, 1990a, 
1990b, 1990c, 1997) version of equal opportunity for welfare as a starting point for 
my analysis. Arneson was among the first to argue for an ideal of distributional 
equality which required that individuals be in a position to achieve equally valuable 
outcomes through their choices. Distributional equality, in his view, did not require 
equality of outcome, but instead only the elimination of inequalities for which 
individuals could not be held responsible. (This has become known as the ideal of 
‘brute luck equality’.) This understanding of distributional equality opened up room 
within egalitarian thought for an ideal of responsibility which not only permitted, but, 
in certain circumstances, required that individuals’ achievements depend on their 
choices. Providing everyone with equal opportunities therefore appeared to offer the 
possibility of simultaneously meeting the demands of equality and responsibility. 
Arneson also argued that respect for individuals’ differing conceptions of their 
own good required that these equal opportunities should be for welfare, conceived of 
as the degree of satisfaction of the self-regarding preferences a person would after 
ideally extended and fully informed deliberation. For, he argued, only this conception 
of welfare would always fully respect each individual’s rational judgement of her own 
good. Moreover, in using this conception of welfare, the state would not be 
endorsing any particular view of the good life as superior to any other. This view of 
welfare would therefore allow the state to be appropriately neutral between differing 
substantive views of the good life. 
In the first three chapters, I discuss these conceptions of welfare, equality, and 
responsibility in turn. Initially, I planned in chapter 1 to offer a qualified defence of a 
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degree of preference satisfaction conception of welfare. For it seemed to me that 
Arneson was right to hold that so long as the individual in question was rational and 
well-informed and had thought the matter over carefully, only certain very significant 
moral concerns, such as a concern about the quality of the conditions under which 
her preferences were formed, might permit the state’s assessment of her good to 
depart from her own view of her good. Since the degree of preference satisfaction 
measure alone among potential conceptions of welfare promised to fully respect each 
individual’s informed, well-considered view of her good, this seemed to me an 
important reason to try to develop a defensible version of it. 
I have come to believe, however, that the degree of preference satisfaction 
measure cannot fulfil this promise, and chapter 1 is now devoted to arguing for this 
conclusion. In brief, the argument proceeds as follows. I first point out that people 
care not just about the satisfaction of whatever preferences they end up having, but 
also about the values, aims, and attachments, and therefore the preferences that they 
have. (Someone might care, for example, not just about being a successful artist, but 
also about having what one might call ‘artist’s preferences’: an appreciation of art, 
and a desire to be involved in its production.) This means, I argue, that we should 
take the satisfaction of what I call a person’s ‘extended preferences’—her preferences 
over cases in which she is in a particular situation with particular preferences—as our 
measure of her welfare. I then point out that the possibility of a change in a person’s 
extended preferences makes it impossible for this measure of welfare to always 
respect a person’s view of her good. For, I argue, if we evaluate a potential change in 
a person’s extended preferences from the perspective of the degree to which her 
future, post-preference change preferences would be satisfied, then we do not 
respect her current view of which preferences it would be best for her to have. If, by 
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contrast, we evaluate a potential change in a person’s preferences from the 
perspective of her current extended preferences, then we implausibly disregard the 
view of her own interests that she would have if the preference change occurred. In 
sum, whichever method of evaluation we choose, we cannot always respect a 
person’s view of her own good. This conclusion leads me to suggest that we should 
adopt an alternative conception of welfare, which is based on a list of goods and 
conditions that are recognised as valuable from the perspective of a variety of 
different conceptions of the good. 
In chapter 2, I offer a qualified defence of the ideal of brute luck equality. I argue 
that brute luck equality is an important ideal, but that it applies only to situations of 
‘distributional conflict’, in which improving someone’s opportunities involves 
worsening at least one other person’s opportunities. In such situations, I argue, each 
person’s equal moral worth gives him a claim to an equally valuable share of 
resources, where this value is measured in terms of the welfare these resources allow 
him to achieve. By contrast, in situations where we can improve at least one person’s 
opportunities without worsening anyone else’s, we generally do not fail to respect 
each person’s equal moral worth by doing so, even if this leads to inequalities. The 
one exception to this rule are cases where maintaining brute luck equality is required 
to symbolically affirm individuals’ equal worth in the face of injustices which deny it. 
In the same chapter, I also discuss the relationship between brute luck equality 
and a social and political ideal of equality. Social and political egalitarians stress the 
need to maintain the social and material conditions which prevent domination, which 
support individuals’ sense of their equal worth as citizens, and which support the 
attitudes that are required for just social co-operation. Though some have argued that 
brute luck equality conflicts with the ideal of social and political equality, I argue that 
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the relationship between the two ideals of equality is better seen as a complementary 
one. The social and political ideal of equality, by focusing on the relationships 
between individuals in society and their character and attitudes, identifies important 
concerns that extend beyond those that are addressed by brute luck egalitarianism. It 
also has distributive implications, so that only a subset of the distributions that are 
compatible with brute luck equality may be permissible from the perspective of social 
and political equality. In turn, the ideal of brute luck equality identifies a way in which 
inequalities may be objectionable that is missed by the ideal of social and political 
equality.  
In chapter 3, I develop a view of substantive responsibility that is compatible 
with the ideal of brute luck equality. Following Dworkin (2000, chapter 2), several 
opportunity-egalitarians have endorsed something like the following idea of 
responsibility for the economic realm: the choices open to individuals, and their 
concomitant benefits and burdens, should, as far as possible, be those that would 
obtain in an Arrow-Debreu type laissez-faire market if individuals entered it with 
equally valuable bundles (see Eric Rakowski (1991, chapter 3) and Will Kymlicka 
(2002, pp. 72-73)). This view of responsibility and its relation to brute luck equality 
have been analysed in detail by Marc Fleurbaey (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1998), 
amongst others.    
 Partly because of the difficulties with this view of responsibility that Fleurbaey’s 
analysis has revealed, and partly because of independent doubts about the normative 
force of the distribution that would obtain in a laissez-faire market in which everyone 
entered with equally valuable bundles, I choose to approach the issue of 
responsibility from a different perspective. Through a critical analysis of Scanlon’s 
(1998) work, I develop two views of substantive responsibility, which I call the 
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Realised Value of Option Set view and the Potential Value of Option Set view. Both 
views focus on the ways in which giving people certain choices can be valuable for 
them. The difference between the two views is that, on the Realised Value of Option 
Set view, the justification of arrangements that give people certain choices is based 
entirely on how well people end up under these arrangements, whilst under the 
Potential Value of Option Set view, the justification of such arrangements is based 
on the value that individuals can achieve (but don’t necessarily achieve) through their 
choices. I argue that the Potential Value of Option Set view is best suited to the ideal 
of brute luck equality and conclude that we should understand the opportunity-
egalitarian ideal as requiring that we provide everyone with the most valuable equal 
option set, and that this value should be determined by the Potential Value of Option 
Set view. 
In chapter 4, I examine how we can represent this requirement in social choice rules. I also 
examine the theoretically more difficult question which social choice rule we should use if we 
replace brute luck equality by absolute priority to those who are most disadvantaged by brute 
luck. 
Two ways of determining who is most disadvantaged by brute luck have been discussed in the 
responsibility-sensitive egalitarian social choice literature. One way is to take the most 
disadvantaged to be all individuals who are least well off compared to others who have chosen 
comparable options (see John Roemer (1993, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2003)). For example, if we are 
considering returns to education, then we might count the individuals who have the lowest 
returns to a given educational choice (say, dropping out of high school) as among those who are 
most disadvantaged by brute luck. For others who chose a similar option (e.g. dropping out of 
high school) are better off due to no choice of their own, and this is a matter of brute luck. I will 
call the approach that aims to improve the situation of the least well off, so defined, the Leximin 
Value of Options approach. 
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A second approach starts by assessing the value of individuals’ option sets as a 
whole and then takes those who are most disadvantaged by brute luck to be all 
individuals with the least valuable option set (see Van de gaer 1993). In the previous 
example, this would involve first assessing each individual’s educational choices and 
the returns to each of these choices, and then counting those individuals whose 
overall set of educational options was least valuable as among those who are most 
disadvantaged by brute luck. I will call the approach that aims to improve the 
situation of the least well off, so defined, the Leximin Value of Option Set approach. 
I argue that under the assumption that individuals can choose among their 
options under adequate conditions of choice, brute luck inequality in the value of 
individuals’ option sets as a whole is more important than brute luck inequality in the 
value of individuals’ options. I conclude that the Leximin Value of Option Set 
approach is a better way of integrating priority for those who are disadvantaged by 
brute luck with the demands of responsibility. 
In chapter 5, I ask whether citizens of a just egalitarian society should pursue 
their egalitarian ideals through the design of equality-promoting formal public 
institutions alone, or whether they should also sometimes be guided by egalitarian 
ideals in their choices within the space permitted for free individual choice by these 
formal public institutions. On first consideration, it may seem natural to assume that 
egalitarian justice requires both equality-promoting formal public institutions and an 
egalitarian ethos. For why should the pursuit of justice be limited to formal public 
institutions and the behaviour required to support these institutions, especially if 
individuals’ choices and attitudes in their everyday lives can have a profound impact 
on others’ prospects?  
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However, recent debates on the scope of justice in Rawls’s work have thrown up 
some challenges to this view. I review some of this debate in order to examine what 
we can learn from it about the roles of formal public institutions and principles for 
individual conduct in egalitarian justice. I conclude that an egalitarian ethos 
encompassing both certain principles which Rawls identifies—the natural duties of 
respect and mutual aid, and the principle of fidelity—and further principles 
regulating individual conduct and motivation should be seen as part of an egalitarian 
theory of justice. 
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1. Welfare8 
 
Introduction 
 
Suppose that we agree that for questions of justice in a pluralistic society, we need a 
public standard of welfare. An appropriate public standard of welfare will have to 
meet the following two requirements. First, its conception of each person’s welfare 
should, to the greatest reasonable extent, be something that each person can 
recognise as encompassing the things she wants for herself and as giving these things 
weights that reflect the relative importance she gives to them. Second, it should be 
sensitive to the fact that reasonable people hold conflicting conceptions of what 
constitutes an individual’s welfare. It should therefore, to the greatest reasonable 
extent, respect neutrality of judgement by refraining from endorsing any particular 
conception of welfare as superior to any other.  
In an influential set of essays, Arneson (1990a, 1990b, 1990c) has argued that the 
following conception of welfare is ideally suited to these requirements: equate each 
                                                 
8 This chapter will appear as ‘Preference Change and Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare’ in 
Preference Formation and Well-Being, edited by Serena Olsaretti, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the Royal Institute of Philosophy conference on 
Preference Formation and Well-Being at St. John’s College Cambridge in July 2004, in the LSE Choice 
Group Seminar in January 2005, and the ECAP 5 Workshop on Philosophy, Economics, and Public 
Policy in Lisbon in August 2005. I am grateful to those present at these meetings, and especially to 
Richard Arneson, Luc Bovens, Marc Fleurbaey, Christian List, Andrew Williams, and Jo Wolff for 
their comments. I also thank Richard Bradley, Michael Otsuka, and Serena Olsaretti for detailed 
comments on earlier versions of this chapter.  
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individual’s welfare with the degree of satisfaction of her ideally rational, self-
regarding preferences. These are the preferences she would have on behalf of herself 
if she were to engage in ideally extended deliberation with full pertinent information, 
in a calm mood, while thinking clearly and making no reasoning errors (see Arneson 
1990a, pp. 162-163). (For simplicity, in what follows, I will use the term ‘preferences’, 
to refer to these ideally rational, self-regarding preferences.) 
 Arneson argues that this standard of welfare meets the two aforementioned 
requirements in the best way possible. It meets the first requirement, he argues, 
because it comes as close as possible to adhering to a person’s own view of her 
welfare within the constraints set by the need to avoid the intuitively unpalatable 
move of considering something of value to her that she only considers to be so 
because of a lack of information or incomplete or erroneous deliberation (1990a, p. 
163). It meets the second requirement, he argues, because it does not involve any 
commitment on the part of the state to a substantive view of what is good for 
individuals. As Arneson (1990b, p. 450) puts it: “the good in this conception is an 
empty basket that is filled for each individual according to her considered 
evaluations.”9  
In this chapter, I will argue that the fact that people care about which 
preferences they have, and the fact that people can change their preferences about 
which preferences it is good for them to have, together undermine this case for 
accepting a degree of preference satisfaction conception of welfare.  
 The chapter is organised as follows. In section 1.1, I introduce three concepts of 
importance to the discussion of a preference satisfaction measure of welfare. First, a 
person’s preference type, which encompasses all the things that determine how she 
                                                 
9 See also Otsuka (2003, pp. 110-112). 
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would evaluate, after ideally rational and well-informed deliberation and from the 
perspective of her self-interest, her situation and her evaluative dispositions. Second, 
a person’s limited preferences, which are her preferences over alternatives in which her 
situation differs whilst her preference type remains unchanged. Third, a person’s 
extended preferences, which encompass her preferences over alternatives in which either 
her situation, or her preference type, or both, differ.  
In section 1.2, I argue that the interest in having the preferences one wants to 
have is of central importance in human life, and that the degree of preference 
satisfaction approach should therefore attempt to judge a person’s welfare by the 
degree to which her extended preferences are satisfied.  
In section 1.3, I argue that the possibility of a change in a person’s extended 
preferences creates great difficulties for a measure of welfare based on the degree of 
satisfaction of a person’s extended preferences. For if we evaluate a potential change 
in a person’s extended preferences from the perspective of the degree to which her 
future preferences would be satisfied, then we do not adequately represent each 
individual’s current interest in shaping her future preferences. If, by contrast, we 
evaluate a potential change in a person’s preferences from the perspective of her 
current extended preferences, then we implausibly disregard the view of her own 
interests that she would have if the preference change occurred. In sum, it seems that 
any degree of preference satisfaction measure will have significant drawbacks, since it 
will involve either neglecting individuals’ current interests in shaping their future 
preferences, or, in their future, judging their welfare by a set of values which might 
be very alien to them. 
In the final section, I argue that this should prompt us to develop alternative 
measures of welfare. I suggest that one promising candidate is a substantive measure 
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of welfare based on a list of goods and conditions that are recognised as valuable 
from the perspective of a variety of different conceptions of welfare.  
 
 
1.1. Preference-based interpersonal comparisons of welfare 
 
Let us start with a simple description of what is involved in preference-based 
interpersonal comparisons of welfare. For simplicity, I will limit the discussion to 
cases where, from the perspective of his self-interest, a person cares only about his 
own situation, and is indifferent to other people’s situations and their attitudes 
towards him. Let us begin by introducing the notion of a preference type. A preference 
type encompasses all the things that determine how a person would evaluate, after 
ideally rational and well-informed deliberation and from the perspective of his own 
self-interest, his situation and his own evaluative dispositions. (From now on, I will 
drop reference to a person’s evaluations being those he would have after ideal and 
fully informed deliberation and from the perspective of his self-interest, and take 
them to be so.) A person’s preference type therefore tells us how he would rank each 
combination of his personal situation and evaluative dispositions, and also which 
evaluative dispositions he has. In a terminology which will shortly be introduced, this 
is equivalent to saying that two people have the same preference type just in case 
what I will be calling their ‘limited preferences’ and their ‘extended preferences’ over 
states of the world in which they occupy positions that are the same in all relevant 
respects are identical.  
Let },{ BA be the set of preference types consisting of artist’s preferences )(A  
and banker’s preferences )(B . Let S  be the set of all possible states of the world. A 
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state of the world is a description of all relevant aspects of each person’s situation. 
Let S be a state of the world in S . Let tiu  be a Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
utility function defined on the set S , representing the preferences of a person with 
preference type t who occupies person i ‘s position in all possible states of the 
world. It assigns a real number )(Stiu  to being in person i ‘s position in state of the 
world S  and is bounded both above and below.10 Because this function only 
represents a person’s preferences over states of the world while keeping his 
preferences fixed at type t , I will refer to the preferences it represents as a person’s 
‘limited preferences’. 
 The set },{ BA×S stands for the set of all pairs ),( tS  with S  in S  and t in 
},{ BA . Let tiv  be a Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function defined on the 
set },{ BA×S . The function tiv  represents the preferences of a person with 
preference type t over (state of the world, preference type) pairs in which he 
occupies person i ’s position. It assigns a real number )',( tv ti S  to each pair 
)',( tS in the set },{ BA×S and is bounded both above and below. Because the 
function tiv  represents how a person with preference type t would order a set of 
options that involve occupying person i ’s position in either different states of the 
                                                 
10 The fact that the utility function is bounded both above and below means that there exists some 
numbers a  and b  such that bua ti ≤≤ )(S  for each S  in S . This means that in no case is being 
in person i ‘s position ascribed a utility of negative or positive infinity. This assumption avoids certain 
decision-theoretic paradoxes that arise when utilities of negative or positive infinity are permitted. See 
Binmore (1991). 
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world or with different preference types or both, I will refer to the preferences it 
represents as this person’s ‘extended preferences’.  
 To write that )()( DC ti
t
i uu >  means that, keeping his preference type fixed at 
type t , a person with preference type t  will prefer occupying person i ’s position in 
state of the world C to occupying person i ’s position in state of the world D . To 
write that ),(),( BvAv ti
t
i DC >  means that keeping his preference type fixed at type 
t , a person with preference type t  will prefer occupying person i ’s position in state 
of the world C  with preference type A  to occupying person i ’s position in state of 
the world D  with preference type B . By way of illustration, suppose Paul has artist’s 
preferences. Suppose that in C , Paul is a struggling artist, and in D , he is a 
successful banker. Then )()( DC APaul
A
Paul uu >  means that, keeping his artist’s 
preferences constant, Paul prefers being a struggling artist to being a successful 
banker. This preference will be relevant to his choice of career, so long as his choice 
of career does not change his preference type. By contrast, 
),(),( BvAv APaul
A
Paul DC >  means that Paul prefers being a poor artist with his 
current artist’s preferences to being a rich banker with banker’s preferences. This 
preference would determine, for example, his choice between going to art school 
(which, let us assume, will maintain his artist’s preferences and lead to a career as a 
struggling artist) and going to business school (which, let us assume, will lead to a 
preference change to banker’s preferences followed by a successful career in 
banking). We can imagine he holds this preference because he believes that a life 
devoted to art is superior to one that is not, no matter how successful the latter is. 
He therefore values having his artist’s preferences to such a degree that he would not 
want to be rid of them and have them substituted by banker’s preferences (which, let 
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us suppose, involve a desire to compete and succeed in the world of high finance and 
no appreciation of artistic values), even at the cost of being poor and unrecognised in 
the work he would do as an artist as opposed to wealthy and successful in the career 
he would choose if he were to acquire banker’s preferences. 
 Both individuals’ limited preferences and their extended preferences may differ. 
Suppose for simplicity that like Paul, Rob is a struggling artist in C  and a successful 
banker in D . Suppose, further that Rob has banker’s preferences, and that, keeping 
his banker’s preferences constant, this means he would rather be a successful banker 
than a struggling artist: )()( DC BRob
B
Rob uu < . In addition, suppose Rob is committed 
to the competitive values that underlie his preference for banking, so that he would 
not accept an opportunity to acquire artist’s preferences, especially not at the cost of 
then having to live as a struggling artist, so that ),(),( BvAv BRob
B
Rob DC < . In sum, in 
contrast to Paul, Rob believes it is worse to be a struggling artist with artist’s 
preferences than to be a successful banker with banker’s preferences.  
 It is worth noting that it is not necessarily the case that when individuals’ 
preference types differ, both their limited and extended preferences differ. Two 
individuals with different preference types might have the same limited preferences, 
but different extended preferences, or the same extended preferences, but different 
limited preferences.  
 As an example of the former, consider the case of two gourmands who both 
enjoy exactly the same dishes to an equal extent: in environments in which they face 
only choices about what to eat, they will evaluate all options in exactly the same way, 
so that (at least in these environments) their limited preferences are the same. 
However, one of the two would prefer, if given the chance, to give up his taste for 
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fine dining and develop a taste for music instead, so long as he would have an 
adequate opportunity to enjoy music with his new tastes. The other, by contrast, 
would not prefer to develop such tastes, so that their extended preferences are 
different.  
 As an example of the latter, consider two hedonists, who both rank all (person’s 
position in a state of the world, preference type) pairs in the same way, viz. according 
to the pleasure they yield, so that their extended preferences are identical. However, 
one of them likes music, but takes no pleasure in eating, whereas the other takes no 
pleasure in music, but enjoys a good meal, so that their limited preferences differ.  
 Let us now turn to preference-based interpersonal comparisons of welfare. A 
preference-based standard of welfare involves making judgements about whether 
occupying Paul’s position in state of the world C  with preference type A  is better, 
worse, or just as good as occupying Rob’s position in state of the world D  with 
preference type B . More precisely, let the function iw  be a Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern utility function representing this public standard of welfare. The 
function iw  then assigns a real number ),( tw i S  to each pair ),( tS  in the set 
},{ BA×S  and is bounded both above and below. This ),( tw i S  stands for the 
value of occupying person i ’s position in state of the world S with preference type 
t . In attempting to determine these values with reference to a person’s degree of 
preference satisfaction, we face two questions. First, whether we should use the 
degree of satisfaction of a person’s limited or extended preferences in determining 
his welfare. Second, how we should evaluate options that involve preference change. 
I address the first of these questions in the next section, and the second one in 
section 1.3. 
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1.2. Extended preferences and welfare 
 
As mentioned, people typically do not just care about having the world conform to 
their preferences; they also care about which values, aims, attachments, and therefore 
preferences they have. This interest in having the preferences one wants to have is, 
moreover, an important one. Considering people who could be said not to care, or 
not to care deeply, about their values and aims can illustrate this importance.  
 Consider first what the life would be like of someone who was completely 
indifferent about his values and aims. This person’s life would be devoid of the kind 
of commitments and relationships that are a central part of most people’s lives. This 
is evident in cases of commitments to moral ideals: being committed to a cause like 
eradicating world poverty, for example, involves more than having a particular 
pattern of desires connected to that cause, such as that it should be realised; it also 
involves wanting to maintain one’s desire for its realisation. But is it also a feature of 
other commitments that are a central part of people’s identity. Being committed to 
being an artist, for example, does not just involve trying to succeed as an artist, but 
also to want to maintain and develop one’s appreciation of art. 
 Furthermore, deep friendship involves not just caring about one’s friend, 
enjoying her company, and being ready to help her out when she needs help, but also 
being prepared to take steps to maintain these attitudes towards her. Similarly, being 
a loving partner involves not just desiring to share one’s life with one’s partner, 
desiring to see him do well, etc. but also to actively maintain and, when necessary, 
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reinforce these desires (see Frankfurt (2004)).11 In these cases, a person does not just 
desire to have certain preferences because having them would be instrumental to 
some other end that she has (eradicating world poverty, being a successful artist, 
furthering the welfare of one’s friend or lover), but also because she regards these as 
the right preferences for her to have. 
 More generally, the life of someone who was completely indifferent about his 
values and aims would be devoid of a particular kind of agency: action directed not 
merely at shaping his environment to satisfy his desires, but also at shaping himself, 
in the sense of shaping his values and aims (see Frankfurt (1982, p. 83)). As a 
consequence, if his life showed any unity of purpose, it would not be the product of 
any action on his part intended to give his life any particular direction, but rather the 
product of causes in which he played no active part, or the unintended by-product of 
his actions. 
 Similar conclusions apply in the case of a person who, though she has 
preferences about which preferences she has, ranks her present and potential 
preferences only on the grounds of the ease with which they can be satisfied (see 
Dworkin 2000, pp. 292-293). Such a person would also lack the particular attitudes 
necessary for being substantively committed to any particular cause, relationship, or 
set of values. As a consequence, she would not purposefully shape her life and 
herself in accordance with the demands of such commitments. 
 In sum, the interest in having the preferences one wants to have is essentially the 
interest in one’s ability to shape oneself and one’s life in accordance with the 
demands of the causes, values and relationships to which one is devoted. Given the 
importance of this interest, we should attempt to base a degree of preference 
                                                 
11 See also Voorhoeve (2003) for a discussion of Harry Frankfurt’s views on love. 
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satisfaction measure of welfare on the satisfaction of a person’s extended 
preferences, since these represent both a person’s interests in his situation and his 
interests in his preferences. 
 
 
1.3. Preference change and the degree of satisfaction of a person’s extended 
preferences 
 
Let us now turn to the method for determining the degree of satisfaction of a 
person’s extended preferences. Suppose there are four states of the world: one in 
which Paul is a struggling artist )(C , one in which he is a successful banker )(D , 
one in which he is an unsuccessful banker )(E , and one in which he is a successful 
artist )(F . For any Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function, we are free to 
fix the zeros and units.12 Once we do so, the utilities of all states of the world are 
fixed. In order to be able to interpret the number )',( tv ti S  as the degree to which 
occupying person i ‘s position in state of the world S  with preference type 't  
satisfies the extended preferences of someone with preference type t , we therefore 
proceed as follows. We set the value of what, from the perspective of type t is the 
best possible (occupying person i ’s position in a state of the world, preference type) 
pair to one, and the value of the worst pair to zero. For example, suppose that, from 
the perspective of his current artist’s preferences, Paul would consider being a 
struggling artist with banker’s preferences the worst possible pair, and being a 
                                                 
12 For an introductory discussion of Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility functions and their 
properties, see Binmore (1991, chapter 3). 
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successful artist with artist’s preferences the best possible pair. We then take 
0),( =Bv APaul C , and 1),( =Av
A
Paul F .  
 The value of all other (occupying his position in a state of the world, preference 
type) pairs will then be determined as follows. We take the number assigned to any 
other pair to be equal to the probability p  that would render Paul indifferent 
between accepting that pair and a lottery with probability )1( p−  of ending up in his 
position in C  with preference type B and probability p of ending up in his position 
in F  with preference type A . In this way, each (occupying his position in a state of 
the world, preference type) pair is assigned a number between zero and one, which 
we can call the degree to which this pair satisfies Paul’s current type A  extended 
preferences over (occupying his position in a state of the world, preference type) 
pairs. For example, if with artist’s preferences Paul would be indifferent between 
being a struggling artist with artist’s preferences and a lottery with a probability of 0.2 
of ending up in his position in C  with preference type B and a probability of 0.8 of 
ending up in his position in F  with preference type A , then 8.0),( =Av APaul C .  
 Now, we face a difficulty in deciding how to move from the degree to which 
each pair would satisfy Paul’s current extended preferences to an assessment of how 
well off he would be if each of these pairs were realised. The difficulty is that if we 
assess each pair by Paul’s current, type A  extended preferences, this assessment may 
differ from his own assessment of these pairs once he is in the situation characterised 
by this pair. For when these pairs involve a preference change to preference type B , 
then though Paul will now regard this change as making him worse off, once he has 
preferences of type B , he may regard this change in his preferences as making him 
better off. For example, from the perspective of his current, artist’s preferences, he 
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might assign the situation in which he is a successful banker with banker’s 
preferences a value of 0.3: 3.0),( =Bv APaul D . But if he ended up in this situation 
through a process of preference change that, from the perspective of his new 
preferences, he does not regard as in any way a bad one to have undergone, then we 
may suppose that from the perspective of his new preferences, he would assess this 
situation as the best possible one: 1),( =Bv BPaul D . The question is, then, whether we 
should take Paul’s pre-preference change, or post-preference change evaluation as 
determining his welfare in such cases. 
 Before we attempt to deal with this question, we should note that in order to 
assess the impact of a change in a person’s extended preferences on his welfare, it is 
important to assess the conditions under which it takes place. If the preference 
change was a result of the subversion of Paul’s cognitive capacities, or of coercion or 
oppression, or was a response to an unduly limiting environment, then this might 
discredit Paul’s post-preference change view of his own welfare. I will assume, 
however, that all preference changes under consideration are not the result of the 
subversion of a person’s cognitive capacities, of coercion, oppression, or unduly 
limiting circumstances. Preference changes of this kind can occur throughout 
people’s lives; one might, for example, have artist’s preferences and through contact 
with one’s friends or one’s social environment, or simply through the passage of 
time, find one’s preferences changed to banker’s preferences. I will also assume that 
from the perspective of preference types A  and B , having had one’s preferences 
change in this way is not viewed as a bad or a good thing in itself.  
 Now, the possibility of this change in an individual’s evaluation of a particular 
(occupying his position in a state of the world, preference type) pair means we have 
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at least two possible ways of judging an individuals’ welfare by the degree of 
satisfaction of his extended preferences. The first is to equate the welfare level of 
each pair with the degree of satisfaction of the extended preferences that he has in 
that pair. The second is to equate the welfare level of each pair with the degree to 
which this pair satisfies his current the extended preferences. I will discuss each 
method in turn. 
 The first method involves using the extended preferences of type A  to evaluate 
a situation that involves Paul occupying his position in a state of the world with 
preference type A , and the extended preferences of preference type B  to evaluate a 
situation that involves Paul occupying his position in a state of the world with 
preference type B . This would mean taking ),( AwPaul C  to be equivalent to 
),( Av APaul C  and ),( BwPaul C  to be equivalent to ),( Bv
B
Paul C , and so on. 
 Doing so means that at every point in time, our standard of welfare will agree 
with each individual’s own assessment of his welfare at that time. Moreover, this 
standard of welfare will always respect each individual’s preferences over options that 
do not involve changes in his extended preferences. However, this standard will not 
always agree with an individual’s pre-preference change assessment of the value of 
options that involve a change in his extended preferences. For this measure will 
count a change from a situation in which Paul is a struggling artist with artist’s 
preferences to a situation in which he is a successful banker with banker’s 
preferences as an improvement in Paul’s welfare, since the degree of satisfaction of 
the extended preferences he has after the change is larger than the degree of 
satisfaction of his extended preferences before the change: 
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1),(),(8.0),(),( ==<== BvBwAvAw BPaulPaul
A
PaulPaul DDCC . But from the 
perspective of his current, artist’s preferences, Paul will disagree with this judgement. 
 It follows that this measure does not adequately represent Paul’s interest in 
having the preferences he wants to have: it will not consider the goods and 
conditions that enable him to sustain his preferences, or develop them in the 
direction he wants, as contributing to his welfare, unless his sustaining or developing 
these preferences will contribute to a higher degree of satisfaction of whatever 
preferences he ends up having. For example, so long as Paul has artist’s preferences, 
this measure will regard the resources and conditions that help him sustain his artist’s 
preferences as of less value to him than the resources and conditions that would lead 
him to develop banker’s preferences, when the latter could be more easily satisfied. 
Given the importance of the interest in shaping one’s tastes, values and aims in the 
direction one wants, this represents a severe drawback of this version of the degree 
of satisfaction measure of welfare.  
 The second method assesses each (occupying his position in a state of the world, 
preference type) pair from the perspective of his current preferences. To illustrate 
this method, suppose again that Paul’s current extended preferences are those that go 
with type A . We regard these extended preferences as determining the welfare of all 
future (occupying Paul’s position in a state of the world, preference type) pairs. We 
would then take ),( AwPaul C  to be equivalent to ),( Av
A
Paul C , ),( BwPaul C  to be 
equivalent to ),( Bv APaul C , and so on.  
 This method obviously represents Paul’s current interests in his future 
preferences. However, it does so at the cost of not always respecting Paul’s post-
preference change extended preferences. Suppose Paul’s preferences at time 0 are 
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artist’s preferences. Suppose further that we take the degree of satisfaction of his 
extended preferences at time 0 as the measure of his current and future welfare. 
Then we will evaluate a change from a situation at time 0 in which he is a struggling 
artist to a situation in which at time 1 he is a successful banker as making him worse 
off. As noted, after this change, Paul will disagree: at time 1 he will regard his new 
situation as the best possible one. Now, suppose this change does take place, and at 
time 1 we can present Paul with an opportunity to change his preferences back to 
artist’s preferences at time 2. From the perspective of Paul’s extended preferences at 
time 0, this would be an opportunity to increase his welfare. But from the perspective 
of his extended preferences at time 1, taking this opportunity would make him worse 
off. By making his preferences as time 0 normative throughout these periods, we 
would not be respecting his judgements at time 1. We thus can represent Paul’s 
interests in his future preferences at time 0 only at the cost of disregarding his 
extended preferences at time 1. 
 Now, in some cases of preference change, we might have reason to regard a 
person’s initial preferences in sequences of this kind as normative; an example might 
be a case in which the preference change between time 0 to time 1 was a result of the 
subversion of Paul’s cognitive capacities, or of coercion or oppression, or was a 
response to an unduly limiting environment. But we have assumed that the process 
of preference change was not of this sort. In such cases, it does not appear 
appropriate to judge Paul’s welfare at time 1 from the perspective of his very 
different extended preferences at time 0: this would be judging his welfare by a set of 
values that he no longer holds. 
 Though I cannot discuss all possible methods of dealing with the case of 
preference change that fall within the family of possible degree of preference 
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satisfaction measures, it seems that all possibilities that involve a compromise 
between these two approaches will suffer from some combination of the drawbacks 
of these two methods. For example, consider determining a person’s welfare in a 
given period by the degree of satisfaction of a weighted average of the extended 
preferences he has over that period, with the weights determined by the relative 
amount of time he holds certain preferences.13 This would involve both limiting the 
degree to which a standard of welfare represents a person’s interest in his future 
preferences, and assessing his welfare at some points in time by a set of values which 
he no longer holds. It would, for example, imply that if Paul had has artist’s 
preferences for 30 years, and then developed banker’s preferences later in life, then 
(re)developing his taste for art by enrolling in evening classes of art appreciation 
would improve his welfare even if he had his banker’s preferences for 10 years, and 
saw no value at all in taking these classes.  
 In sum, it seems that any degree of preference satisfaction measure will have 
significant drawbacks, since it will involve either neglecting individuals’ current 
interests in shaping their future preferences, or, in their future, judging their welfare 
by a set of values which might be very alien to them.14 
                                                 
13 Something akin to this possibility, though without the use of the distinction between limited and 
extended preferences, is discussed by Richard Brandt (1979, pp. 247-253) and Arneson (1990a, pp. 
162-167). See also the following footnote. 
14 It may be of interest to note how my discussion of the difficulties which preference change creates 
for a degree of preference satisfaction measure differs from Brandt’s. Brandt (1979) also argues that 
the possibility of preference change undermines the case for a degree of preference satisfaction 
measure of welfare. His discussion differs from mine, however, in not making use of the distinction 
between a person’s limited and extended preferences. This distinction is, I believe, crucial to the 
problem. For not just any change in a person’s preferences is generates a problem for a degree of 
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1.4. A substantive conception of welfare?  
 
This conclusion should, I believe, prompt us to consider alternative measures of 
welfare. In closing, I would like to outline one approach that strikes me as worth 
pursuing. This is to construct a public conception of welfare from a list of goods and 
conditions that can be recognised by people with divergent values as generally 
important constituents of a good life (see also Scanlon 1991). Some of its constituent 
elements will be broad categories that can be realised in different ways by people 
with different values, such as developing one’s capacities, leading the life one wants 
with family and friends, job satisfaction, and achieving success in one’s main 
endeavours. It will also include more specific goods like health, leisure, and wealth, 
which are generally judged to be important elements of a good life. Our discussion 
                                                                                                                                      
preference satisfaction metric. A change in a person’s limited preferences is not sufficient to 
undermine the degree of preference satisfaction measure; what is required is a change in a person’s 
extended preferences. To see this, consider the case of a hedonist, who ranks all (occupying his 
position in a state of the world, preference type) pairs on the basis of the pleasure they yield for her. 
Suppose that, at time 0, she wants to celebrate her birthday at time 2 with a dinner in her favourite 
fish restaurant rather than in a steak house, since her current limited preferences are for fish over 
meat, and she does not expect to undergo a preference change between now and time 2. However, 
suppose she does undergo a change in her limited preferences, so that at time 2 she prefers to dine in 
a steak house. So long as this is a change in her limited preferences only, we have no difficulty 
assessing the welfare of these two options. For we can assess the welfare associated with the four 
options (eating fish at time 2 with a taste for fish), (eating meat at time 2 with a taste for fish), (eating 
fish at time 2 with a taste for meat), and (eating meat at time 2 with a taste for meat) from the 
perspective of her unchanged extended preferences, that is to say, by equating the welfare of each 
option with the pleasure it yields. 
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also teaches us that this list should include goods and conditions that generally enable 
people to maintain or develop the tastes, values, and aims they want to have. 
 By including categories, goods and conditions that are valuable from the 
perspective of different views of the good life, this list accommodates both the 
diverse views of the good life that are held within a population, and the different 
views of the good life that a person may have during his lifetime. The standard 
objection to a conception of welfare of this kind is that by using the same list of 
goods and conditions to assess everyone’s welfare, and by using the same weights for 
these goods and conditions in each person’s case, it fails to fully respect each 
person’s view of their own welfare. The force of this objection depends on the 
assumption that there is an alternative measure of welfare—the degree of preference 
satisfaction measure—which does fully respect each person’s view of their own good. 
But our discussion makes clear that given the possibility of change in a person’s 
extended preferences, no form of the degree of preference satisfaction measure can 
fully respect each individual’s judgements of her own welfare. It may be, therefore, 
that a substantive conception of welfare of this kind meets our first requirement (to 
respect, to the greatest reasonable extent, each person’s view of their own welfare) 
because this just is the furthest we can go towards respecting each person’s view of 
their own good.  
 A standard of welfare of this kind also respects our second requirement of 
neutrality of judgement (see Scanlon 1991, pp. 39-40 and Otsuka 2003, pp. 110-112). 
For, in attempting to accommodate to the greatest extent possible different views of 
the good life, it is constructed without the assumption that any particular conception 
of the good or set of conceptions of the good is the right one to the exclusion of 
others. In sum, the difficulties that the possibility of change in a person’s extended 
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preferences causes for a degree of preference satisfaction conception of welfare 
render a substantive conception of welfare more attractive. 
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2. Equality15 
 
Introduction 
 
My purpose in this chapter is to discuss the following three aspects of the ideal of 
brute luck equality. First, its distributional implications; second, which view of the 
nature of individuals’ claims support it; and third, how its demands relate to a distinct 
social and political ideal of equality.  
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 2.1, I build on Arneson (1989, 
1997) to argue that a strict interpretation of brute luck equality requires providing 
everyone with option sets which meet a demanding set of conditions. I will call 
option sets that meet these conditions ‘equal option sets’. I also suggest that we may 
adopt a less demanding form of brute luck equality, which requires giving everyone 
equally valuable option sets. 
 In section 2.2, I argue that the central brute luck egalitarian idea is a claim about 
the fair distribution of resources among adults with certain rational capacities in 
situations in which (a) no one could reasonably be held responsible for the value of 
the resources available; (b) no one is more deserving of benefits from these resources 
than anyone else, and (c) there is distributive conflict, in the sense that giving one 
person more means that someone else ends up with less. The claim is that in such 
cases, everyone has a prima facie claim to an equally valuable share, where this value is 
measured in terms of what these resources enable people to achieve. This claim is 
based on individuals’ equal moral worth, which in turn is based on their possession 
                                                 
15 I thank Michael Otsuka and Jonathan Wolff for comments on this chapter.  
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of a moral sense, an ability to rationally form and pursue a plan of life, and an ability, 
given adequate circumstances of choice, to make choices for which they can be held 
responsible. I contrast this claim with Larry Temkin’s well-known characterisation of 
the central brute luck egalitarian idea as the claim that “it is bad, or objectionable, to 
some extent—because unfair—for some to be worse off than others through no fault 
or choice of their own” (2002, pp. 129-130; emphasis in original). I also discuss its 
relation to the levelling-down objection.  
 In section 2.3, I examine the relationship between brute luck equality and a social 
and political ideal of equality. Though some have argued that brute luck equality 
conflicts with the ideal of social and political equality, I argue that the relationship 
between the two ideals of equality is better seen as a complementary one. The social 
and political ideal of equality, by focusing on the relationships between individuals in 
society, and their character and attitudes, identifies important concerns that extend 
beyond those that are addressed by brute luck egalitarianism. It also has distributive 
implications, so that only a subset of the distributions that are compatible with brute 
luck equality may be permissible from the perspective of social and political equality. 
The ideal of brute luck equality, in turn, identifies a way in which distributive 
inequalities may be objectionable that is missed by the ideal of social and political 
equality.  
 
 
2.1 Equal option sets and equally valuable option sets 
 
Brute luck equality requires that any inequality of outcome that obtains is wholly the 
result of choices for which individuals can be held responsible. The distributive 
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principle that this ideal entails is best grasped by starting with the following simple 
case. Suppose each member of a group of individuals has to make only one choice 
out of a set of options that is available to him. All outcomes of these options are 
certain. Furthermore, all members of this group have equal and adequate opportunity 
to inform themselves about the consequences of their choice and to deliberate about 
it. Finally, their reasoning abilities, will power, and character are such that they have 
an equal ability to ‘negotiate’ their options. In this case, brute luck equality obtains 
among this group of people when (i) each of their option sets contain the same 
number of options n; and (ii) their 1st best, 2nd best, ..., and nth best options yield 
equal welfare (see also Arneson 1989, pp. 85-86). For it will then be the case that any 
inequality in welfare that results from individuals’ choices from their option sets is 
entirely due to choices for which individuals are responsible.  
 Let us now abandon this simple case and introduce consecutive choices and the 
role of chance. To discuss such cases, Arneson (1989) uses the helpful device of 
describing individuals’ option sets as decision trees (see also Roemer (1996, pp. 263-
272)). Each decision tree consists of a set of paths, each beginning at the root (the 
onset of the period from which the individual can be held responsible for his actions) 
and ending at the terminus, when the individual’s life is ‘played out’. The forking 
paths which branch out from the root represent different possibilities for that 
individual. Some forks represent different choices the individual might make. Others 
represent different possibilities for an individual that are the result of things other 
than his choices such as the vicissitudes of nature or the choices of others, both of 
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which I shall refer to as ‘chance’.16 Paths are of different kinds. A ‘pure choice path’ 
is a sequence of choices only. A ‘mixed path’ is a sequence of choices and chance 
occurrences. Figure 2.1 represents a simple decision tree. At white nodes, the path 
one follows along the subsequent fork is determined by chance. At black nodes, the 
path one travels along the subsequent fork is determined by choice. The final value 
of a path is determined at the terminus.17 The number at the end of each path 
represents the overall welfare associated with that path as given by the public 
conception of welfare. The five topmost paths are mixed paths, and the lowest two 
paths are pure choice paths. 
 
                                                 
16 Arneson makes only one reference, in a footnote, to others’ choices as impacting on one’s welfare. 
In this footnote, he argues that we compute the value of a branch with reference to “how other 
people are actually expected to behave” (1997, p. 242n.1).   
17 This does not mean that all preference satisfaction comes at the end of one’s life. It merely means 
that a person’s lifetime welfare if he were to follow a particular path can only be assessed at the 
terminus of that path. Supposing for simplicity that the welfare generated by two subsequent choices 
is additive, we might imagine the welfare associated with the bottom path in figure 2.1 to be 5 after his 
first choice and 7 after the second. This is important for the exercise of imputing the value of a node 
from the value of the choice set that follows it. For the value of the second node on this bottom path 
would then have to be computed as 5 + the value of a choice set where one choice yields –8 and 
another yields 7, and not as the value of a choice set where one choice yields –3 and another yields 12, 
as figure 2.1 might be taken to suggest. 
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Figure 2.1. A decision tree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Now, brute luck equality requires that all risk is voluntarily incurred, so that the 
results of such voluntary gambles can be classified as “option luck”, that is, luck that 
results from a deliberate and calculated gamble that the person in question should 
have anticipated and might reasonably have declined.18 Individuals’ decision trees 
must therefore include a pure choice path that is a reasonable alternative to all mixed 
paths.19 Once this condition is met, brute luck equality will obtain among a group of 
individuals when all members of this group have equal and adequate opportunity to 
inform themselves about the consequences of and to deliberate about their choice, 
                                                 
18 This definition of option luck follows Dworkin (2000, p. 73), with the addition of the word 
“reasonably”. The reason for this insertion is explained in the next footnote. 
19 This formulation, which I owe to Otsuka (2004), solves the problem of non-voluntarily incurred 
risk which plagued Arneson’s (1989) first formulation of equal opportunity for welfare. For criticism 
of this initial formulation, see Lippert-Rasmussen (1999). In response to this criticism, Arneson (1999, 
p. 491) introduced the requirement that the secure option should be “satisfactory.” This requirement 
is criticised in Lippert-Rasmussen (2001, pp. 572-573). Otsuka’s formulation is meant to address this 
criticism as well. 
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have an equal and adequate ability to negotiate their options, and face identical 
decision trees. But, at least so long as the value of risky prospects is given entirely by 
their expected value, it will also obtain among such individuals if the following, 
slightly weaker conditions are satisfied: (a) all individuals face the same pure choice 
paths; (b) if we ‘cut off’ individuals’ mixed paths at the last choice node, and assign 
any remaining risky prospects their expected value, then all individuals face the same 
‘truncated’ mixed paths; and (c) all individuals’ option sets include a pure choice path 
that is a reasonable alternative to the mixed paths. I will call circumstances that meet 
these conditions circumstances in which individuals have equal option sets. 
Might brute luck equality also obtain under less demanding conditions, when 
individuals’ decision trees differ in the number of branches, or the welfare that these 
branches yield, or individuals differ in their negotiating abilities? Peter Vallentyne 
(2002) believes that it might. He argues that one should regard the value of an 
individual’s option set as determined by the different levels of welfare she can 
achieve through her choices from that set, as well as by her ability to negotiate her 
options, and that it is sufficient for brute luck equality to obtain that (a) all 
individuals’ option sets are equally valuable, and (b) all individuals’ option sets 
include a secure option that is a reasonable alternative to the risky options. (Given his 
assumptions, equal option sets will be of equal value; providing everyone with equal 
option sets will therefore be sufficient, but not necessary to achieve brute luck 
equality.) 
Strictly speaking, providing people with equally valuable option sets is not 
sufficient for brute luck equality. For providing everyone with equally valuable option 
sets may be compatible with inequalities in welfare between individuals that are not 
entirely due to choices for which they can be held responsible. Suppose, for example, 
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that two individuals’ option sets contain two options, with the following payoffs. A’s 
first-best option yields an excellent level of welfare, while B’s first-best option yields a 
very good level of welfare, and A’s second-best option yields a low level of welfare, 
while B’s second-best option yields a moderate level of welfare. Suppose that these 
differences, coupled with A’s and B’s ability to negotiate their options, are such that 
by an appropriate measure of the value of their option sets, their option sets are 
equally valuable. Now, if they both make in some sense the ‘same’, equally prudent 
choice, then B will be worse off than A due to no choice or fault of his own, so that 
brute luck equality is violated. 
 Nonetheless, it is also true that in this case, we can say of B that he was 
advantaged by brute luck in a way that A was not. For example, if both person’s 
second-best options involved the possibility of making a tempting, self-regarding, but 
imprudent choice (like indulging in an unhealthy life-style), then B, but not A, would 
have faced less bad consequences than A if he had made this choice. This counts as a 
way in which B was advantaged over A, because, let us suppose, in this case, as so 
often in human life, it was good to enjoy some protection against the consequences 
of making an imprudent choice. Thus, though it seems to me that the brute luck 
egalitarian ideal is only completely realised when individuals have equal option sets, 
providing individuals with equally valuable option sets may be an acceptable weaker 
version of this ideal.20 
 
 
                                                 
20 See also chapter 4, where I argue that when we are concerned with maximally improving the 
situation of those who are most disadvantaged by brute luck, we should maximise the value of the 
least valuable option set. 
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2.2 The reasons supporting brute luck egalitarianism 
 
The best-known characterisation of the central idea underlying brute luck 
egalitarianism is Temkin’s claim that “it is bad, or objectionable, to some extent—
because unfair—for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of 
their own” (2002, pp. 129-130; emphasis in original; see also Temkin 1993). This 
characterisation suggests that brute luck egalitarians see brute luck equality as an 
intrinsically valuable aspect of a state of affairs, as one among the possibly many 
considerations which determine the goodness or badness of that state of affairs. A 
common response to this idea is to argue that this form of value is “mysterious”, in 
contrast with readily intelligible values like the welfare that individuals’ enjoy in a 
particular state of affairs (see, for example, Munoz-Dardé 2005, pp. 272-275). This 
supposed strangeness of attaching intrinsic value to brute luck equality is often 
pressed by considering a situation in which the only way to realise equality is through 
making some individuals worse off, and nobody better off, and asking a (potential) 
brute luck egalitarian whether in this situation he can really find a respect in which 
achieving equality through levelling down is good. If, on reflection, he believes that 
levelling down is not good in any respect, then, it is claimed, he must abandon brute 
luck egalitarianism.  
 The contemplation of cases of levelling down has indeed led some onetime brute 
luck egalitarians to abandon their commitment to this ideal. Arneson (1999, pp. 232-
233), for example, writes:    
“I find plausible the bare claim that equality, and more generally, how one 
person’s condition compares to that of others, do not matter either morally 
or intrinsically. When I contemplate cases of levelling down, in which 
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equality can be achieved by destroying the advantages now possessed by 
better-off persons without in any way improving the condition of anyone 
else, I do not judge that there is one respect in which the outcome of 
levelling down is an improvement—it creates equality—even though 
perhaps, all things considered, the change is not morally desirable. The 
levelling down seems a waste, pure and simple, and everyone’s having the 
same does not seem in any way intrinsically worthwhile.” 
 But of course, a brute luck egalitarian can also respond that achieving brute luck 
equality is one respect in which levelling down is good, because it makes things fairer, 
but that this respect may be outweighed by other considerations, so that the best 
thing overall would be not to level down. This is indeed how many brute luck 
egalitarians have responded to cases of levelling down (see Temkin 2002, p. 155; 
1993, p. 282; and Otsuka 2004).  
In sum, a common exchange of arguments leads to one of two positions: either 
one does not see anything good in achieving brute luck equality through levelling 
down, and so abandons one’s belief in brute luck equality, or one affirms that there is 
something good in achieving brute luck equality by levelling down (while judging that 
this good may be outweighed by the bad occasioned by some individuals’ welfare 
loss), thereby affirming one’s attachment to the brute luck egalitarian ideal. 
In what follows, I want to defend a view that is distinct from both of these 
positions: I want to maintain that brute luck equality is an important ideal, whilst 
simultaneously maintaining that, in certain cases, there is no respect in which 
levelling down is good.21 
                                                 
21 Tungodden (2003, p. 9) notes the possibility of this position. 
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 Let me first turn to the second part of this claim. To begin with, we should note 
that it is not true that achieving equality through levelling down is never intrinsically 
valuable in any way. In certain cases, for example, one may be moved to level down 
by a sense of solidarity with those who are worse off. Feelings of this kind are easily 
understandable in cases when the person who is better placed shares an important 
end or aim with the person who is less well placed, or where he identifies strongly 
with the less well placed person, and in which as a consequence of levelling down, 
the content of his experience will be similar in relevant respects to the originally less 
well placed person. In Roman Polanski’s film The Pianist, for example, the main 
character, Wladyslaw Szpilman, escapes from the Warsaw ghetto with the help of 
members of the Jewish resistance, who themselves stay behind to prepare their 
uprising against the Germans. He watches from an apartment in which he is hiding 
as the ghetto uprising begins and is subsequently crushed by Nazi troops. At this 
moment, Szpilman is pained by the thought that he should be with the inhabitants of 
the ghetto, to fight (and probably to die) with them. He knows that staying would 
have done no one any good: he was weak, and ill-suited to killing. Moreover, his 
escape was not a betrayal of those that stayed behind: they helped him escape, and, 
like many others who risked their lives for him during the War, wanted a man of his 
talents to survive. We may suppose that later on, he comes to believe that it was not 
wrong, all things considered, for him to escape. Nonetheless, forgoing the 
opportunity to escape and therefore remaining worse off than he could be, without 
improving anyone else’s situation, would not have been senseless; and his escape, 
even if morally justified, comes at a moral cost.22  
                                                 
22 One should note that Szpilman’s case is not, strictly speaking, a case of levelling down, since staying 
behind would mean one person forsaking an advantage that he does not yet enjoy with no benefit to 
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The type of cases in which solidarity gives one reason to level down appears 
limited by the following considerations. First, solidarity only gives people a reason to 
level down in order to share each other’s fate when there is unity in the aims and 
commitments of the people involved, and a shared sense of membership of a group, 
a membership which is, moreover, an important part of one’s identity. Second, it is 
not enough that the levels of welfare of the individuals in question will be the same 
after levelling down (and it may not even always be necessary); what is important is 
that the content of the experience of all individuals involved will be relevantly similar.  
The reasons of solidarity, however, do not exhaust the reasons to level down. 
Jonathan Wolff (2001), for example, argues that levelling down may be intrinsically 
valuable in cases where equality has the expressive function of affirming citizens’ 
equal worth in the face of injustices that deny this equal worth. As a mayor of a town 
in the segregationist South, for example, one might have good reason to close the 
local swimming pool if the only alternative was opening it to whites only, even if 
opening or closing the pool did not affect the welfare of blacks in any way.   
Levelling down might also be valuable because it maintains various valuable 
social relationships. Richard Norman (1997), for example, has suggested that 
members of a community might have a reason to refrain from a social change that 
will make all of them better off but which will introduce significant inequalities, 
because they fear that this might undermine the attitudes that are constitutive of 
                                                                                                                                      
others for the sake of equality rather than taking away from someone an advantage that he already 
enjoys with no benefit to anyone else for the sake of equality. But the moral sentiment of solidarity 
that it illustrates can equally motivate one to see at least something good in levelling down. For we can 
easily imagine a Jew who had, through good fortune, remained undiscovered in hiding outside the 
ghetto, feeling that his place was with those inside.    
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egalitarian social relations. They might fear that with greater inequality, they would 
no longer be united by a shared experience and a shared condition. They might also 
fear that the more prosperous would become disdainful and supercilious, and the less 
prosperous servile and resentful.23 
 There are cases, however, in which Arneson’s claim that levelling down is a 
“waste, pure and simple” strikes me as correct. Imagine, for example, that after a 
shipwreck, two men, who are strangers to each other, are washed up on two adjacent 
deserted tropical islands. The men are of equal health and ability, and, if neither of 
them possessed any tools, their islands would afford each an equal and adequate 
ability to live decently. The sea between these islands is swept by strong currents, 
which make it impossible for the two men to travel between them. They are, 
moreover, so far apart that one cannot discern anything but the other island’s outline 
with the naked eye. One of the men, though, has had the good fortune of being 
washed up beside a small box, containing a knife, sunglasses, and a pair of binoculars. 
With these binoculars, he can observe the man on the other island, though he 
remains unseen. He notices that his fellow survivor was less fortunate than he, in not 
having found any such tools or conveniences. Does he have any reason to destroy 
the possessions he has stumbled upon, in order to achieve equality with the man on 
the other island? I do not think so. In this case, none of the aforementioned reasons 
for levelling down apply, and it would seem to me entirely senseless for the more 
fortunate man to destroy these possessions in order to achieve equality between 
them. 
                                                 
23 As Wolff (2001) points out, however, one might argue that this is not really a case of levelling down, 
since one could include these social relations, and the attitudes constitutive of them, in one’s 
understanding of individuals’ welfare.  
 48 
 This does not mean, however, that I think brute luck equality is not an ideal with 
moral force. Should it become possible, for example, by a change of currents 
between the islands, for the more fortunate man to send over some of his 
undeserved benefits at moderate cost—say, by placing the sunglasses on a small raft 
which he knows will wash up on the other island—then he should do so to the point 
of achieving equality between them.  
 It therefore appears to me that brute luck equality is a principle that has moral 
force in some contexts, but not in others. More specifically, I believe it has moral 
force in situations of ‘distributional conflict’—situations in which making one person 
better off involves making at least one other person worse off—but no moral force 
in situations in which one person or several people can be made better off at no cost 
to anyone else. (By using the term distributional conflict I do not mean to suggest 
that there is any actual conflict between individuals involved, just that their interests 
in furthering their own welfare conflict.) Assuming I am right that brute luck equality 
does not always have moral force, this would not be something particular to equality. 
As Kamm (1996) has argued, it is true of many moral principles that they have moral 
force in some settings, but lack moral significance in others. Furthermore, regarding 
brute luck inequality as bad only in cases of distributional conflict does not rob it of 
its teeth. As Tungodden (2003) demonstrates, it retains potentially tremendous force 
in ranking distributions in such cases. 
 Let me try to say a bit more in defence of the claim that brute luck equality has 
moral force only in cases of distributional conflict. I will first argue for the 
significance of brute luck equality in cases of distributional conflict. Consider a group 
of individuals who all have a certain minimum level of the rational capacities required 
to have a moral sense, the ability to form and pursue a view of the good life, and the 
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ability, given adequate circumstances of choice (including adequate time to deliberate, 
and adequate information), to freely choose between various courses of action. 
Imagine that these individuals face a problem of division of resources in a situation 
of distributional conflict, in circumstances in which none of them could reasonably 
have been expected to influence the value of the resources available, and in which no 
one is more deserving than anyone else of the benefits these resources bring. Then it 
seems that everyone has a strong prima facie claim to an equally valuable share of 
resources, where the value of these resources is given by the value of the option sets 
they enable people to choose from. The reason everyone has a claim of this sort is 
that this is the appropriate way to recognise the fact that each person is of equal 
worth, because her rational capacities are above a certain minimum level. (This idea 
of equal worth is therefore based on what Rawls (in TJ, section 77) calls a “range 
property”. Just as all point within a circle equally have the property of being in the 
circle, all individuals who have rational capacities within a certain range—above the 
minimum required for them to have a moral sense and an ability to form and pursue 
a plan of the good life—are of equal worth.) Moreover, the fact that she is capable of 
choosing between various views of the good life and courses of action makes it the 
case that the value of her option set, rather than the value she realises through her 
choices, is the appropriate way of valuing her share of resources. (The views of 
individuals’ capacities to choose freely and of their responsibility for their choices 
that best fit these ideas are discussed in more detail in chapter 3.)  
 This judgement is, I believe, familiar and widely shared. Once we describe such 
cases—a band of travellers accidentally shipwrecked on a desert island to which no 
one has a prior claim and none of whom is more deserving than another, a group of 
hikers chancing on a bush of berries in the wild and having to decide how the harvest 
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will be apportioned, or, more abstractly, the claims on worldly resources of people 
who come into the world equally undeserving—equal division immediately suggests 
itself as the prima facie correct answer so long as we assume that these are cases of 
distributional conflict (see also Rakowski 1991, pp. 65-74). 
 What about cases in which there is no distributive conflict, so that we can 
improve the welfare of at least one person without decreasing the welfare of anyone 
else? In general, the positive worth of human beings requires us to further their 
welfare, so that we should improve the welfare of the individual(s) in question. As 
our previous discussion illustrates, this general reason may in specific cases conflict 
with the demands of solidarity, the symbolic affirmation of equal worth in the face of 
injustice, or the desire to maintain certain social relationships, all of which may make 
levelling down good, at least in one respect. But is there also a moral loss involved in 
departing from equality to improve some individuals’ welfare when these reasons for 
levelling down do not apply, because individuals’ equal worth gives them a prima facie 
claim to an equal share, a claim that will then not be met? I do not think so. It seems 
to me that in such cases, individuals’ equal moral worth is fully respected by the fact 
that we accept that if the benefits in question could be redistributed amongst 
everyone, then everyone would have a claim to an equally valuable share. Thus, in 
our example of the two men shipwrecked on adjacent islands, it seems to me that all 
that is required for the first individual to fully respect the other survivor’s equal 
moral worth is that he accepts the duty that should it be possible, at moderate cost, 
to redistribute his good fortune to the point of equality, then he should do so. There 
is, in my view, no sense in which his recognition of the other’s equal moral worth 
requires him to destroy these advantages, should this be the only way of achieving 
brute luck equality. 
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 This means that Temkin’s characterisation of the central brute luck egalitarian 
claim is correct for cases of distributional conflict. In such cases, equal distributions 
are good because they are fair, and they are fair because they satisfy each individual’s 
claim to an equally valuable share, a claim which is based in individuals’ equal moral 
worth. As mentioned, the idea that individuals have a claim to an equally valuable 
share in cases of distributional conflict seems to be a familiar and widely held 
judgement, so that there is no need to posit some mysterious value to explain why we 
should favour equality. 
 However, Temkin’s claim is incorrect for cases in which we can improve the 
situation of at least one person without making anybody worse off. Inequalities 
generated by improving people’s situation in such cases are not bad, because they are 
not unfair. They are not unfair, because individuals’ equal moral worth does not 
require us to maintain equality in such cases; it requires only that we recognise that 
should it become possible to redistribute these benefits in such a way that we can 
achieve equality, then we have a significant moral reason to do so. 
 
 
2.3 Brute luck equality and social and political equality 
 
We cannot explain all the ways in which inequality is bad with reference to the ideal 
of brute luck equality. There is a long egalitarian tradition that is concerned with the 
attitudes and material conditions that are required for members of a certain society to 
live as equal citizens and to maintain just social co-operation over time.24 From the 
                                                 
24 Classic examples are Rousseau (1988), Tawney (1964) and Rawls’s work. More recent writers in this 
tradition include Phillips (1999), Anderson (1999), and Scheffler (2004). 
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perspective of this tradition, material and social inequalities are bad when they 
undermine individuals’ ability to live as equal citizens and lead to attitudes which are 
inconsistent with just social co-operation.  
More specifically, this tradition identifies three principal ways in which inequality 
can be bad. The first is that inequality may lead to domination. Even in the face of 
equal political liberties, for example, a concentration of wealth and economic power 
in the hands of a relatively small section of society may enable this section of society 
to exercise undue political influence. But the domination in question can extend 
beyond the political sphere. Inequalities between the rich and the very needy may 
equally give the former great control over the lives of the latter in various ways, 
especially in the absence of effective legal constraints regulating their interactions.25  
Second, inequalities may lead to unwarranted feelings of inferiority on the part 
of the least well off. For example, a poor person might feel ashamed and inferior 
because he lacks the resources to participate fully and with dignity in the social life of 
his society. Furthermore, he may find it difficult not to let his judgement and the 
judgement of his peers that the majority is better off than he is in many important 
respects, such as social status, recognised achievement, income, health, leisure, 
friendships, etc., affect his sense of self-worth. 
Third, significant social and economic inequalities may encourage great vices and 
collectively harmful attitudes in both the less well off and the better off. Large 
inequalities may lead the less fortunate to be viewed by others as inferior, which 
together with their own judgement of their inferiority may lead to widespread 
attitudes of deference and servility on the side of the less well off, and arrogance and 
                                                 
25 The relationship between the construction firm owner and his employees recounted in Robert 
Tressel’s The Ragged-Trousered Philanthropists, for example, vividly illustrates this point.  
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the will to dominate on the side of the better off. Once such ideas of the moral 
inferiority of the less well off are established, the better off may cease to view others 
as equal citizens to whom justification of a society’s institutions and practices is 
owed. Richard Tawney made this point eloquently: 
“One of the (...) effects of extreme inequality is its tendency to weaken the 
capacity for impartial judgement. It pads the lives of its beneficiaries with a 
soft down of consideration, while relieving them of the vulgar necessity of 
justifying their pretensions. (...) It disposes them, on the one hand, to take 
for granted themselves and their own advantages, as though there were 
nothing in the latter which could possibly need explanation, and, on the 
other hand, to be critical to claims to similar advantages advanced by their 
neighbours who do not yet possess them. It causes them, in short, to apply 
different standards to different sections of the community, as if it were 
uncertain whether all of them are human in the same sense as themselves” 
(1964, pp. 37-38). 
Furthermore, the less well off may become envious and resentful of the 
advantages enjoyed by the better off, leading them to prefer a social world in which 
the advantages of the better off are diminished, even if this is not beneficial to them. 
Awareness of these attitudes may lead to a jealous guarding of their advantages by 
the better off, and a desire to see their own relative position maintained, even if this 
comes at a cost to themselves or to the worst off (see TJ, pp. 467-468). Now, social 
co-operation requires a willingness on the part of all those involved to propose and 
abide by fair and mutually beneficial terms of co-operation. The sense on the part of 
the well off that one need not justify one’s actions or social institutions to the less 
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well off that Tawney identifies, and the envy and jealous guarding of relative 
advantage that Rawls describes, therefore make social co-operation impossible.  
Since domination, an unwarranted sense of inferiority, and the vices and harmful 
attitudes that may accompany large inequalities are objectionable whether or not 
these inequalities are the result of people’s voluntary choices, the ideal of social and 
political equality will rule out some inequalities that are consistent with brute luck 
egalitarianism. For its part, brute luck egalitarianism rules out certain inequalities that 
are consistent with social and political equality. For the latter ideal does not regard 
inequality as bad so long as it does not undermine equal citizenship among those 
who abide by the terms of social co-operation. It does not pronounce, or example, 
on the justice or injustice of inequalities between people not involved in social co-
operation within the same society. Nor does it pronounce on inequalities between 
fellow citizens who all enjoy freedom from domination, and have a secure sense of 
self-worth and the attitudes required for maintaining a just society. In these cases, by 
contrast, brute luck egalitarianism has clear distributive implications.  
Both ideals of equality seem to me to highlight significant moral concerns, 
which it is perfectly natural to care about simultaneously. Moreover, as we have 
understood them, each implies that certain inequalities about which the other 
remains silent are objectionable. This means that the demands of the two ideals do 
not necessarily conflict: both ideals may well be fully satisfied by a non-empty subset 
of feasible social arrangements, and these subsets may show some overlap, so that 
each ideal rules out some, but not all of the arrangements that the other permits. (Of 
course, the two ideals may conflict. For example, the only way to achieve brute luck 
equality may be to offer all individuals an option set which, through individuals’ 
choices from this set, would lead to a distribution which undermined the conditions 
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of equal citizenship.) It therefore seems to me that one should be both a brute luck 
and a social and political egalitarian, and that this does not involve endorsing two 
essentially conflicting ideals.  
This conclusion, however, has been disputed by some recent defenders of the 
social and political ideal of equality. Elisabeth Anderson (1999) and Samuel Scheffler 
(2004), for example, argue that—so long as this is consistent with equal option 
sets—the ideal of brute luck equality requires that we leave individuals free to make 
choices through which they may end up so badly that it is impossible for them to 
function as free and equal citizens, even when we could make arrangements that 
would restore them to the minimum condition required at modest cost. To illustrate 
their complaint, consider the following example. Suppose that equal option sets 
among a group of well-informed and competent adults could be achieved by 
providing everyone with the same amount of money and then letting them engage in 
whatever actions they choose without any state intervention. Some of these 
individuals might end up indigent and at the mercy of others’ aid through imprudent 
choices, or simply through bad option luck. In this case, Anderson (1999) and 
Scheffler (2004) argue, the ideal of brute luck equality requires abandoning these 
individuals to their fate, even if we could, at relatively modest cost, have set up social 
arrangements in advance which would ensure that such individuals would be 
guaranteed the conditions required for equal citizenship. (The fact that these 
arrangements, and any concomitant taxes and transfers, would be set up and 
announced in advance means that they would not violate anyone’s legitimate 
expectations.) 
This criticism is, I believe, based on a misunderstanding of the implications of 
brute luck egalitarianism. Brute luck equality is consistent with, but does not require, 
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inequalities due to people’s choices. It is compatible both with equality of outcome, 
and large inequalities due to people’s choices from their equal option sets. In this 
example, therefore, brute luck equality would be consistent with an arrangement that 
set up a social safety net in advance.  
Anderson’s and Scheffler’s criticism is therefore properly directed not against 
brute luck equality, but against a view of freedom of contract and responsibility that 
leads us to a particular view of the options people should have, and the consequences 
individuals face when they choose there options. I discuss several views of 
responsibility and their relation to brute luck equality in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3. Responsibility26 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I aim to make some headway towards developing a forward-looking 
view of substantive responsibility—the way a person’s claims on others, others’ claims on 
her, and her level of welfare should depend on the opportunities she has and the 
choices she makes. I follow Scanlon (1995; 1998) in distinguishing substantive 
responsibility from two other forms of responsibility. First, responsibility for one’s 
judgement-sensitive attitudes is the sense in which people can be called on to defend their 
judgement-sensitive attitudes—beliefs, intentions, hopes, desires, and other attitudes 
like admiration, contempt, etc.—with reasons and to modify them if an appropriate 
defence cannot be provided (1998, pp. 21-22; 272 and 278). Second, responsibility as 
attributability (which Scanlon also refers to as simply ‘moral responsibility’) is the 
sense in which it is appropriate to take a person’s judgement-sensitive attitudes or 
actions as the basis for moral appraisal (1998, p. 248). In what follows, whenever I 
speak of ‘responsibility’, I will be referring only to substantive responsibility. 
 The questions I will be studying in this chapter will be of an entirely forward-
looking character: I will be focusing exclusively on the question of how we should set 
                                                 
26 I thank Cécile Fabre, Marc Fleurbaey, Michael Otsuka, and Jonathan Wolff for comments on earlier 
versions of this chapter. I have also benefited from conversations with Tim Scanlon. Earlier versions 
of this chapter were presented at the Popper Seminar at LSE in November 2004, and at the 
Workshop on Law and Economics at the World Congress of Legal and Social Philosophy in Granada 
in May 2005. I am grateful to participants in these sessions for their comments.  
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up arrangements that will make people’s claims, obligations and situation depend on 
their options and choices.  
 
Substantive responsibility and opportunity-egalitarianism  
 
A view of substantive responsibility is an essential component of an opportunity-
egalitarian conception of justice. Brute luck equality demands the absence of 
inequalities for which individuals cannot be held responsible. It therefore permits, 
but does not demand, inequalities due to choices for which individuals can be held 
responsible. Brute luck equality is consistent with equality of outcome; it is also 
consistent with large differences in welfare that are due to choices for which 
individuals can be held responsible. We need a principle of substantive responsibility 
to decide which differences in welfare due to individuals’ choices are permissible, or 
even required. 
 The issue can also be put as follows. In the previous chapter, we saw that brute 
luck equality requires providing everyone with equal option sets. Now, we may be 
faced with several possible ways of providing people with equal option sets. For 
example, we might be able to provide everyone with either option set 1, consisting of 
two options, one which yields an excellent level of welfare, and one which yields a 
very low level of welfare, or with option set 2, also consisting of two options, both of 
which yield reasonably good levels of welfare. We would then need a principle of 
responsibility to choose which of these two option sets to provide everyone with, 
and thereby determine the content of people’s option sets. (Of course, welfare 
outcomes might not be the only relevant aspect determining the choice between two 
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option sets. Among other things, the degree of autonomy they allow might play a 
role as well.) 
 
The role of options and choice in justification 
 
A central question that arises when discussing responsibility is about the role that a 
person’s opportunities to choose and his choices play in the process of justification 
of arrangements. A person’s options and choices can play at least two kinds of 
justificatory roles. First, a person’s options and his choices can be an important 
determinant of various ways in which his situation is a valuable one for him. (We will 
look at these ways more closely in section 3.1.) I will call this role of a person’s 
options and choices their ‘derivative role’, since their role in the justification of 
arrangements derives from the value that options and choices have for a person.  
 Second, the very fact that a person has certain options and makes certain choices 
can play a justificatory role independently of the value that a person achieves by 
having these options and choices. Consider, for example, someone with adequate 
capacities of decision-making and decision-implementation, who is well-informed 
about the options open to her, and who faces an option set with a reasonably good 
option with a certain outcome which she passes up in favour of an option through 
which she ends up badly. One might say that in this case, what matters morally is not 
just the value this person achieves when faced with this option set, but also the value 
she could have achieved by choosing differently. I will call this role of a person’s 
options and choices in justification their ‘fundamental role’. 
 There are theories of substantive responsibility that give a derivative, but not a 
fundamental role to a person’s opportunities to choose and his choices in the 
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justification of arrangements. Equality of welfare is an example of a theory of this 
kind.27 At the fundamental level—the level of justification of arrangements—a 
welfare egalitarian of this kind is only concerned with the degree of inequality in 
people’s welfare, and not with how this welfare came about. This means that a 
person’s options and choices play no fundamental justificatory role. As a 
consequence, a welfare egalitarian would justify practical arrangements that make 
people’s claims on others and their obligations to others and the quality of their 
situation depend on their opportunities and choices by appealing only to the fact that 
these arrangements brought about the least possible inequality of welfare.  
 But one might also hold that a person’s options and choices should play a 
fundamental justificatory role. The precise form this justificatory role can take may 
be different across different moral theories, of course. But the key idea would be that 
arrangements which offered people various options under adequate conditions of 
choice might not only be justified by an appeal to how people end up under these 
arrangements, but also with reference to the quality of the options they had, but 
possibly did not choose.  
 The contrast between theories that do and theories that do not give a 
fundamental justificatory role to people’s options and choices can be illustrated by 
the following example, involving the removal of hazardous material from a town. 
(The example is a modification of an example in Scanlon (1998, chapter 6).) This 
hazardous material is present in the soil of a particular site through natural causes, 
and no one could have known about it until its recent discovery. The consequences 
of leaving it where it is would be very serious—involving, say, the death of a 
significant number of inhabitants. The material can be removed to a different 
                                                 
27 There are, of course, many other examples of theories of this kind; utilitarianism and prioritarianism 
among them. 
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location; once it is deposited there, the health risks will be eliminated. The digging up 
of the material and its transportation will, however, inevitably release pollutants into 
the air, which would cause severe, incurable health damage to anyone who is exposed 
to them by being near the site of excavation or outdoors during its transport. There 
is no damage to the health of people who stay away from the site and remain indoors 
during transport.  
 Given the consequences of leaving the material where it is, the town officials 
have to remove it. Suppose these officials have to choose between two possible 
courses of action. Both courses of action, let us suppose, involve significant efforts 
to limit the amount of pollutants released into the air and thereby decrease the harm 
to people—other than the workers, who are wearing protective clothing—who are 
present at the excavation site or outside during transport. But they differ in the 
following respect. The first policy involves clearly informing everyone of the danger. 
Suppose that from previous experience in such cases in towns of this size, the 
members of the town council know that it is very likely that this will mean that 
almost everyone will stay away from the excavation site, and stay indoors during 
transport. They also know that it is nearly certain that there will be one member of 
the population—whose identity cannot be determined in advance—whose 
impetuous curiosity will be piqued by the warnings, and who will visit the excavation 
site in spite of the predicted damage to her health. Let us call this person the 
Impetuous Woman. As a consequence of this policy, and through her informed 
choice, this woman will come to significant harm.  
 The second course of action is to divert some of the resources used to ensure 
that absolutely everyone is informed to building a solid and unclimbable fence 
around the excavation site. Suppose that from previous experience in such cases in 
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towns of this size, town officials know that the Impetuous Woman will now not 
come to harm, as she is barred from visiting the site and has no interest in being 
outside during the transport. They also know that it is very likely that as a 
consequence of spending less money on informing everyone, it is nearly certain that 
one person—whose identity cannot be determined in advance—will not be 
informed. Unaware of the danger, he will be outside during transport and come to 
harm. However, if he were warned, he would act prudently and stay indoors during 
the transport. Call this person the Careful Man.  
 Now, suppose that the health damage to both the Impetuous Woman, under the 
first policy, and the Careful Man, under the second policy, is the same, and that their 
welfare outcomes under each policy are given in table 3.1. Suppose further that 
everyone else’s situation and options are identical under both policies.    
 
Table 3.1 Two individuals’ welfare under two possible arrangements  
Policy 
Individuals 
Inform Everyone Unclimbable Fence 
Careful Man 10  6 
Impetuous Woman 6 10 
 
 Now, in this case, a theory like welfare egalitarianism, which does not give a 
fundamental justificatory role to people’s options and choices, and which cares only 
about the distribution of individuals’ welfare, will be indifferent between both 
policies. (Note that this of course need not mean that, at the level of practical 
arrangements, there is no substantive responsibility: under both arrangements, 
people’s outcomes depend on their choices.) By contrast, a theory that does give a 
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fundamental justificatory role to people’s options and choices might discern a 
morally relevant difference between the two arrangements. For a theory of this kind 
might say that under the Inform Everyone policy, the Impetuous Woman would 
have the option of avoiding the bad outcome she would suffer through informed 
choice. By contrast, under the Unclimbable Fence policy, the Careful Man would not 
in be a position to avoid the bad outcome he suffered through his informed choice. 
Given this difference between the conditions in which the two people are placed 
under the different policies, such a theory might prefer the Inform Everyone policy 
to the Unclimbable Fence policy. (We will examine various ways in which this 
preference might be justified in sections 3.1 to 3.3.) 
 
Scanlon on substantive responsibility 
 
The central sections of this chapter focus on two questions. First, what exactly 
explains the appeal to a person’s options and choices in theories that give them a 
fundamental justificatory role? Second, what are the reasons for favouring a theory 
that gives a person’s options and choices this fundamental role over one that only 
gives it a derivative role?  
 My investigation will proceed through a critical examination of Scanlon’s (1995; 
1998, chapter 6) views on substantive responsibility. In discussing his views, I will 
diverge from his own presentation of them in one respect. Scanlon is, I believe, 
concerned with defending a forward-looking view of substantive responsibility and in 
addressing the question of the justificatory role of a person’s options and choices. 
However, Scanlon’s presentation of his central example—which is very close to the 
aforementioned case of hazardous waste removal—is not ideally conducive to these 
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aims. For he starts out by assuming that the town council has done all it can 
reasonably be expected to do to warn and protect people, and that nonetheless, 
certain people have come to harm, for different reasons: because, moved by 
impetuous curiosity, they visited the excavation site, or because they were 
uninformed in spite of the council’s efforts, or because they simply forgot the 
warnings they were given. He then asks how we should defend the arrangements the 
council has made to the people who have come to harm, and what role their options 
and choices play in this defence. This way of presenting the example is not entirely 
satisfactory, since by focusing on after the fact analysis, it draws attention away from 
the central issue, namely how the town council should decide when faced with 
different possible courses of action, and what role people’s options and choices 
should play in making this decision. I have therefore re-cast Scanlon’s example as a 
decision problem for a town council which is trying to decide between different 
arrangements under which different people, through different processes, will come to 
harm. 
 In the introduction to What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon claims that  
“the force of a person’s reasons for rejecting a principle that would require 
him to bear a certain burden can be reduced by the fact that this burden is 
one he could have avoided by choosing appropriately” (1998, p. 9)  
And again, in introducing his discussion of substantive responsibility, he writes: 
“the force of a person’s objection to a principle imposing a burden on her, or 
permitting others to act in a way that would impose such a burden, can be 
diminished by the fact that she could avoid that burden by choosing 
appropriately” (1998, p. 249).  
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From the outset, Scanlon therefore appears to accept that a person’s options and 
choices should play a fundamental role in justifying moral principles for the 
regulation of our behaviour. For this reason, his discussion focuses not on whether a 
person’s options and choices should play this role, but on the precise nature of this 
role. He advances two contrasting theories of this justificatory role of a person’s 
options and choices, which he calls the Value of Choice view and the Forfeiture 
view, and argues in favour of the former. Very roughly, Scanlon draws the contrast 
between the two as follows. On the Value of Choice view, what matters is the 
general quality of a person’s opportunities to choose. By contrast, the core idea of 
the Forfeiture view is that someone placed in adequate conditions of choice (with the 
requisite information and decision-making and decision-implementing capacities, 
etc.) who has an accessible, secure and prudent option, and who makes a conscious 
choice to pass up this option, cannot complain if she ends up badly as a result of her 
choice: volenti non fit iniuria. 
 
Outline of the chapter 
  
My discussion will proceed as follows. In section 3.1, I discuss the Value of Choice 
view. I argue that Scanlon offers no good reason for evaluating a person’s option set 
by the general goodness or badness of that option set, rather than how valuable it is 
for that person, given her personal characteristics. I also discuss an alternative 
method of evaluating a person’s option set, which I call the Realised Value of Option 
Set view, which equates the value of an option set with the value a person actually 
realises by having that option set. I show that this method gives a person’s choices 
and options a derivative, but no fundamental justificatory role. 
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 In section 3.2, I discuss the Forfeiture view. I argue that though it gives a 
person’s choices and options a fundamental justificatory role, it is unattractive 
because it pays insufficient attention to the value of removing disadvantageous 
options from a person’s option set.  
 In section 3.3, I present an outline of a view of responsibility that gives a 
person’s options and choices a fundamental justificatory role whilst avoiding the 
Forfeiture view’s problems. I call this perspective the Potential Value of Option Set 
view. Very roughly, this view proposes that when considering a person’s claims, we 
consider the value of her option set. The value of her option set is a function of the 
various values which she can achieve by choosing from it. It is also a function of the 
ease or difficulty with which she can achieve these values by making different choices 
from her option set.  
 Since I argue that we should reject the Value of Choice view and the Forfeiture 
view, we are left with the question whether we should adopt the Realised Value of 
Option Set view, and give a person’s options and choices a derivative role only, or 
adopt the Potential Value of Option set view, and give them a fundamental 
justificatory role as well. In section 3.4, I tentatively suggest that an important 
consideration in this regard is the truth or falsity of determinism: the thesis that “the 
prevailing laws of nature are such that there do not exist any two possible worlds 
which are exactly alike up to some time, which differ thereafter, and in which those 
laws are never violated” (Lewis 1973, p. 559). For it seems that giving a person’s 
options and choices a derivative role only is compatible with the truth of 
determinism, whereas giving it a fundamental role in justification may not be.  
 In section 3.5, I consider the implications of the forgoing for an opportunity-
egalitarian conception of justice. 
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3.1 The Value of Choice account  
 
The ways in which choice can be valuable 
 
The Value of Choice account, in Scanlon’s words, focuses on “the positive reasons 
that people have for wanting opportunities to make choices that will affect what 
happens to them, what they owe to others, and what others owe to them” (1998, p. 
251). Scanlon distinguishes three generic reasons for wanting what happens to us to 
depend on our choices. The first is what he calls the instrumental value of choice: the 
value choice has in securing states of affairs that we seek. This value of choice is 
conditional on the degree to which for a given object of choice, a person’s capacities 
and conditions of choice will help him achieve his ends. It is also relative: it depends 
on the usefulness of his being given a choice as compared to other means of 
achieving his ends.  
 The second is the representative value of choice. This is the value we put on seeing 
features of ourselves manifested in our actions and their results. Examples are gifts, 
where the significance of the gift is determined by having chosen it oneself, and 
creative work, where part of the point of the work is that it reflects its author’s 
attitudes and abilities.  
 The third is the symbolic value of choice. We may want outcomes to depend on 
our choices not merely because this will be a more efficient way of achieving our 
ends, or because we want our choices to reflect our values, thoughts and capacities, 
but also because not making such choices ourselves would be taken as an indicator 
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that we are not competent or do not have the standing of a normal adult member of 
society. 
 Scanlon (1998, p. 253) does not take this list to be exhaustive, and I think it is 
important to add at least two other ways in which choice can be valuable. Choice can 
be valuable because of its contribution to a person’s autonomy. Having a range of 
different choices and responsibility for the concomitant outcomes is valuable because 
is it one of the necessary conditions for an autonomous life (Raz 1986, p. 369ff). The 
ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should be (part) 
authors of their own lives. The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people 
controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive 
decisions through their lives. It is opposed to a life of coerced or manipulated 
choices. It contrasts with a life with no choices, either because of lack of options or 
simply because one drifts through life without ever consciously considering one’s 
options and exercising one’s capacity to choose. Autonomy, then, places certain 
demands on people’s range of options. Firstly, they must be sufficiently diverse. An 
individual faced with very similar options will have no incentive to consider different 
aims and pursuits; consequently, he will also be unlikely to develop his capacities of 
evaluation and choice. For the same reason, the range of options must involve 
several reasonable options. If all but one of a person’s options involve horrible 
consequences, then again, he will have no reason to seriously consider different 
alternatives and no real ability to shape his life according to his judgements. 
 These four forms of value represent ways in which facing a certain option set and 
making a particular choice can be valuable for the person with this option set. But of 
course, giving people certain options with certain payoffs can have value for others, too. 
It may be to the advantage of someone’s employers, for example, to have her pay 
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depend on her choices, like the amount of hours she works, and the dedication she 
brings to the job, independently of whether this would be to her own advantage. 
Similarly, removing certain choices may be costly for some. A case in point is the 
previously mentioned policy of placing an unclimbable fence around the site of the 
excavation of hazardous material. This would remove the choice of visiting the 
excavation site, at the cost of resources that could be used for other purposes, like 
informing everyone of the danger of being outside during the transport of the 
hazardous material. In this case, getting very close to the excavation site could not be 
seen as a valuable activity for anyone, no matter how curious they were. Therefore, 
not placing the fence because of its cost to others, and thereby giving people the 
option of getting too close to the site would be a form of assigning substantive 
responsibility not because of the value of this choice to the chooser, but because of 
the benefits that giving people this option would bring others. 
 Of course, identifying these different ways in which a person’s having certain 
options and making certain choices can be valuable for her or for others is not 
enough. We also have to make intrapersonal tradeoffs between the first four values: 
giving someone a choice in one set of circumstances may have positive symbolic 
value for her, for instance, but also have negative instrumental value for her. 
Consider again the case of hazardous waste site. Suppose that building an 
unclimbable fence were not an option, but that instead we could spend the same 
resources on profiling certain types of people whom we know would be likely to be 
foolish enough to get too close to the site. Suppose we could prevent their coming to 
harm by requiring that they be accompanied by others on their daily outings during 
this period. (This is, of course, what is often done for children and teenagers, who 
are sometimes placed under curfew and have to be accompanied by responsible 
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adults during activities in which they might come to harm through their tendency to 
risky behaviour.) Compared to the Inform Everyone policy, which involved no such 
restrictions on a particular group of people, this Profiling Policy might have negative 
symbolic value for these people, since they would not be singled out for their likely 
imprudent behaviour. But if they would indeed come to harm under the alternative 
Inform Everyone policy, then the Profiling Policy would have positive instrumental 
value for them. 
 We also have to consider tradeoffs between how different people are affected by 
particular arrangements. In our comparison between the Inform Everyone and 
Unclimbable Fence policies, for example, we have to trade off the welfare of the 
Impetuous Woman against that of the Careful Man.  
 Here, I want to leave aside questions about how to make the tradeoffs between 
the different ways in which having options and making choices can be valuable for a 
person, and questions about how, in general, we should weigh different individuals’ 
claims. Instead, I want to focus on just one question: on the Value of Choice view, 
what is the nature of the justificatory role of a person’s options and choices? 
 
The role of options and choices in justification in the Value of Choice view 
 
As we saw, Scanlon appears to give a person’s options and choices this fundamental 
justificatory role. Scanlon argues that the Value of Choice account can do so by tying 
justification to the value of the option set that a person is presented with: 
“On the Value of Choice account what matters is the value of the 
opportunity to choose that the person is presented with. If a person has been 
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placed in a sufficiently good position, this can make it the case that he or she 
has no valid complaint about what results (...) ” (1998, p. 258). 
How does Scanlon determine the value of a person’s option set? One way of determining 
the value of a person’s option set is simply to equate it with the value it yields for her—the value 
she will achieve both by having the option set and by choosing the option she does from his 
option set. Let us call this the Realised Value of Option Set view. Let us suppose for simplicity 
that in our example, choice has only instrumental value, and that we judge an option’s 
instrumental value by the welfare it yields, so that only the welfare outcomes of these choices are 
relevant to the evaluation of the quality of her option set (Scanlon (1998, p. 257) also makes this 
assumption in this case). This means that we set the value of individuals’ option sets to the value 
of their welfare outcomes, so that the information relevant to evaluating the two policies is given 
by table 3.1.28 
 Now, on the Realised Value of Choice view, a person’s options and choices 
obviously only have a derivative role in justification. Given that Scanlon is attempting 
to provide an explanation for the fact that, as he puts it, “the force of a person’s 
objection to a principle imposing a burden on her (...) can be diminished by the fact 
that she could avoid that burden by choosing appropriately” (1998, p. 249), he must 
not mean to regard the value of a person’s option as equivalent to the value the 
person achieves when she has the option set.  
 Indeed, Scanlon does not tie the evaluation of a person’s option set to how good 
it is for each individual. He argues that we can distinguish between the value we put 
on a person’s option set and the value it has for that person by attending to the 
distinction between “the generic reasons on which the justifiability of a moral 
                                                 
28 Obviously, on this approach, we might not always take the value of a person’s option set to be 
equivalent to the value of the option she chooses. For being given an option set, rather than just 
obtaining the welfare associated with the chosen option, may itself have value for the person; it may, 
for example, enable her to be more autonomous. 
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principle must rest and the reasons that a specific individual may have, given all the 
facts about his or her situation” (1998, p. 263). These “generic reasons” are reasons 
“that we can see that people have in virtue of certain general characteristics” (1998, 
p. 205). Applied to the hazardous waste removal case, this means that since it is 
generally in people’s interest to be warned of the dangers of visiting the excavation 
site, receiving this warning will count as improving everyone’s circumstances of 
choice, even if they are the idiosyncratic type of person whose tendency to commit 
imprudent acts is thereby increased. As Scanlon writes of the case of the Impetuous 
Woman under the Inform Everyone policy:  
“The reason why it is important that this woman was informed of the danger, 
and thus given the chance of avoiding it, is not that this is necessarily 
advantageous to her but rather that it is something that people in general 
have reason to value and hence to demand that an acceptable principle insist 
on” (1998, p. 263). 
 Scanlon argues that this evaluation of a person’s option set in terms of generic 
reasons allows us to register an important moral difference between the situation of 
the Impetuous Woman under the Inform Everyone policy and the situation of the 
Careful Man under the Unclimbable Fence policy. Of the case of the Careful Man 
when he is uninformed, he writes that his option set is less good than that of the 
Impetuous Woman when she is informed but is not effectively prevented from 
visiting the excavation site, because he does not receive the benefit of being 
informed, while she does:  
“because we did not succeed in making him aware of the danger, we did not 
make what happened to him depend on his response to this information. 
Given that this dependence is something we all would reasonably want to 
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have under the circumstances, we did not succeed in making this person as 
well off as he would reasonably want to be. The [Impetuous Woman], 
however, did have the benefit of being informed, even though this turned out 
to be worth less as protection than it would have been to most other people” 
(1998, p. 259). 
 Now, as mentioned in this chapter’s introduction, Scanlon does not explicitly 
consider the choice between two policies, under one of which the Impetuous 
Woman comes to harm, and under another of which the Careful Man suffers the 
same harm. But given his comments on the quality of their respective circumstances 
of choice, we appear to be able to draw the conclusion that we should choose the 
Inform Everyone policy. For the value of the Careful Man’s option set under the 
Inform Everyone Policy and the Impetuous Woman’s option set under the 
Unclimbable Fence policy would appear to be equal (both people are well-informed 
and well-placed to achieve the best outcome, that is, staying indoors during 
excavation and transport). But, according to Scanlon, the value of the option set of 
the Impetuous Woman under the Inform Everyone Policy exceeds that of the 
Careful Man under the Unclimbable Fence policy, since she is informed and he is 
not, and being informed amounts to a benefit. (Below, I will question Scanlon’s view 
that being informed amounts to a benefit to the Impetuous Woman. At this point, I 
am simply examining the conclusions we can draw from Scanlon’s discussion.) This 
means that, if we assess individuals’ situations in terms of the value of their option 
sets determined in this way, the Inform Everyone policy is unambiguously better, 
since the most valuable option set under this policy is as valuable as the most 
valuable option set under the Unclimbable Fence policy, and the least-valuable 
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option set is more valuable. This evaluation of individuals’ option sets is represented 
in table 3.2. The discussion of this paragraph has established that x > y and z > y. 
 
Table 3.2 A Scanlonian evaluation of individuals’ option sets under two 
possible policies 
Policy 
Individuals 
Inform Everyone Unclimbable Fence 
Careful Man x  y 
Impetuous Woman z  x  
 
 
Criticism 
 
Scanlon’s method of evaluating a person’s option set, and his ability to distinguish 
between the claims of the Careful Man when he is uninformed and the Impetuous 
Woman when she is able to visit the excavation site depend crucially on his appeal to 
what are generally good circumstances of choice as opposed to the value that these 
circumstances of choice have for each specific individual. We also saw that Scanlon 
justifies his use of generally good circumstances of choice by appealing to the fact 
that moral evaluation has to make use of what he calls “generic reasons”. I will now 
argue that this appeal to generic reasons cannot justify his method of evaluation. 
 Scanlon has three reasons for appealing to generic reasons in evaluating a 
person’s situation. The first reason is that taking into account specific variations in 
people’s needs and circumstances would be more demanding than just paying 
attention to general characteristics; it would lead to greater uncertainty about whether 
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everyone’s claims had been met and require everyone to gather more information in 
order to know what a principle gives to and requires of them (1998, p. 205). Since 
this uncertainty and information gathering are costly, we are permitted to refer to 
generic reasons in the justification of our actions and principles of action.  
 In my design of the hazardous waste removal case, I supposed that by ordinary 
methods (research into what happened in comparable situations elsewhere), town 
officials would know that it was virtually certain that under the Inform Everyone 
policy, there would be a person like the Impetuous Woman who would come to 
harm in this way, and that under the Unclimbable Fence policy, there would be a 
person like the Uninformed Man, though I also assumed that they did not know who 
these people would be (or, indeed, whether they would be male of female). Given 
this assumption, the argument from the cost of information cannot explain why we 
should consider the Impetuous Woman as having received a benefit by being 
informed in the Inform Everyone case. For there is no additional cost involved in 
evaluating her option set by the value it yields for her, which is, as we know, just that 
it leads to health damage. 
 Scanlon offers a second reason for attending to generic reasons in an early paper, 
‘Preference and Urgency’ (1975). There, he argues that not all of a person’s 
preferences give rise to moral claims on us. The case of the Impetuous Woman 
might offer an example of that kind. For no matter how strong her desire to see the 
excavation site, one might argue that the satisfaction of this desire does not give rise 
to a claim on the council for its satisfaction that needs to be balanced against the 
harm that will befall her when she visits the excavation site. This view implies that we 
should assess the quality of a person’s options in terms of certain values, which 
might diverge from the person’s own value judgements. In evaluating the quality of 
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the Impetuous Woman’s options in the Inform Everyone case, for example, we 
would not be required to consider the fact that she satisfies her curiosity if she visits 
the excavation site as a benefit to her, which would add slightly—or even 
significantly—to her level of welfare if she were to choose this option.  
 Now, this view offers us no reason to regard the Impetuous Woman as having 
been placed in good circumstances of choice in the Inform Everyone case. For, by 
Scanlon’s own hypothesis, being given an informed choice in this case has only 
instrumental value, and in this case it has negative instrumental value for the woman, 
since, as Scanlon supposes, “the warning only aroused her impetuous curiosity, and 
she would have been better off if she had never been told at all” (1998, p. 261). So 
there is no generic reason to regard being informed as a benefit to her. Moreover, 
there is a generic reason to regard her circumstances of choice as being bad. For she 
will suffer damage to her health, and this among the ways in which a person is 
affected that Scanlon, in ‘Preference and Urgency’, regards as giving rise to legitimate 
claims.      
 On the basis of our discussion in chapter 1, we can also see that there is a third 
reason to sometimes disregard the particular reasons a person has for valuing certain 
things and taking certain actions. For I argued there that there is no plausible way of 
evaluating a person’s welfare that will always follow that person’s judgements of her 
own good. I also argued that we should follow Scanlon’s (1991) proposal and adopt a 
substantive measure of welfare based on a list of goods and conditions that are 
recognised as valuable by people with different values. This means that when we 
evaluate a person’s welfare, we must sometimes make judgements that will conflict 
with her own, and therefore must sometimes disregard her particular reasons for 
valuing or wanting something.  
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 Once again, accepting this reason for disregarding the specific reasons an 
individual may have does not offer us any grounds for regarding the Impetuous 
Woman’s option set in the Inform Everyone case as a good one. For, as mentioned 
in section 1.4, a person’s health is a good candidate for figuring in this list of goods 
and conditions that are constituents of a public measure of welfare. Thus, like the 
second reason for appealing to generic reasons, this reason justifies using a public 
standard of value that may differ from her own standard to assess the value she can 
or does obtain through her option set. But it does not justify assigning to her option 
set a value greater than the one she actually obtains from it; that, it seems, can only 
be justified by an appeal to her power to choose differently than she did.  
 In sum, we should reject Scanlon’s reasons for not evaluating a person’s option 
set by the value it yields for her. What are the alternatives to Scanlon’s method of 
evaluation? We have already encountered one such alternative: the Realised Value of 
Option Set view, which evaluates a person’s option set by the value it yields for her. 
As we have seen, this would give a person’s options and choices a derivative, but not 
a fundamental role in the justification of arrangements. It therefore cannot explain 
what Scanlon sets out to explain, namely, how “the force of a person’s objection to a 
principle imposing a burden on her (...) can be diminished by the fact that she could 
avoid that burden by choosing appropriately” (1998, p. 249). We will examine a 
different attempt to explain this role of a person’s choices and options in the next 
section.   
 
 
 78 
3.2 The Forfeiture view 
 
Scanlon characterises the central idea of the Forfeiture view as follows: 
“a person who could have chosen to avoid a certain outcome, but who 
knowingly passed up this choice, cannot complain of the result: volenti non fit 
iniuria” (1998, p. 259). 
Concerning the case of the Impetuous Woman under the Inform Everyone policy, 
Scanlon writes that a proponent of the Forfeiture view would reason as follows: 
“Since she had been warned of the danger, and chose to go to the site 
anyway, we are inclined to say that she is (substantively) responsible for her 
own injury; and it is this fact, rather than the amount that has been done to 
protect her or the cost to others of doing more, that makes it the case that 
she cannot blame anyone for what happened. By choosing, in the face of 
warnings, to go to the (...) site, she laid down her right to complain of the 
harm she suffered as a result” (1998, p. 258).  
 The core idea of the Forfeiture view, then, is that someone placed in adequate 
conditions of choice (with the requisite information and adequate decision-making 
and decision-implementing capacities, etc.) who has an adequately accessible prudent 
option which it would be reasonable for her to take, and who makes a conscious 
choice to pass up this option, cannot complain if she ends up badly as a result of her 
choice. Scanlon says little more about the Forfeiture view, so that it is not wholly 
clear which decision principle we should take to represent this view of responsibility. 
But the quoted passage suggests the following: we should base each person’s moral 
claims on the quality of her option set, which is determined as follows. If a person is 
adequately informed, and has adequate decision-making and decision-implementing 
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capacities, and her option set contains an adequately accessible prudent option which 
it would be reasonable for her to take, then take the value of her option set to be 
equal to the value she would achieve by choosing this prudent option. When the 
conditions of information and rational capacities are not met, evaluate the person’s 
option set by the value she achieves through it. This would lead to the evaluation of 
the Impetuous Woman’s and the Careful Man’s option sets listed in table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3 The Forfeiture view’s evaluation of individuals’ option sets under 
two possible policies 
Policy 
Individuals 
Inform Everyone Unclimbable Fence 
Careful Man x = 10 y = 6 
Impetuous Woman z  = 10 x = 10 
 
This evaluative procedure would obviously make Inform Everyone preferable to 
Unclimbable Fence. Thus, by basing individuals’ claims on the quality of their option 
set, and evaluating each person’s option set not by the value she achieves, but by the 
value she could achieve if she made a reasonable and prudent choice, the Forfeiture 
view clearly gives a person’s options and choices a fundamental justificatory role.  
 
Scanlon’s criticism of the Forfeiture view 
 
Scanlon offers two points of criticism of the Forfeiture view. The first is that the 
Forfeiture view places undue weight on the special legitimating force of voluntary 
action (1998, p. 260). What is important, Scanlon claims, is the opportunity to choose 
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that a person has, rather than his conscious decision to pass up specific alternatives. 
Scanlon argues that we should appeal to the former rather than the latter because 
there are cases in which it seems right to offer the options a person has as part of the 
justification of an arrangement under which he ends up badly through an action of 
his own, even if he never consciously considers all relevant aspects of this action. We 
can illustrate cases of this kind as follows. (This is a variation on an example offered 
by Scanlon (1998, p. 259).) Imagine that in our hazardous waste removal example, 
under both the Inform Everyone and Unclimbable Fence policies, the town officials 
can confidently predict that there will be a person—whose identity, again, they do 
not know—who, though informed of the risk of contamination, will simply forget 
about it. (Call this person the Forgetful Man.) As a result, the Forgetful Man will be 
outside during the transport of the hazardous material and suffer damage to his 
health.  
 Imagine further that there is a third possible policy, in which we use the 
resources that otherwise would be used to inform everyone or build an unclimbable 
fence to issue the warning in a way that is particularly easy to remember. Under this 
policy, the Forgetful Man would remember to stay inside during the transport of the 
material, though the Careful Man and Impetuous Woman would each come to harm. 
The results of the three policies are listed in table 3.4.   
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Table 3.4 Three individuals’ welfare under three possible policies 
Policy 
Individuals 
Inform Everyone Unclimbable Fence Easy to Remember 
Careful Man 10  6 6 
Impetuous Woman 6 10 6 
Forgetful Man 6 6 10  
 
 Scanlon argues that the case of the Forgetful Man illustrates that it is not active 
choice, but the quality of the circumstances in which a person was placed, that is of 
moral significance. For, he argues, the Forgetful Man does not consciously decide to 
take a dangerous action; nevertheless, if he is warned and has normal cognitive 
capacities, then, Scanlon believes, his claims should be treated like those of the 
Impetuous Woman, who makes a conscious decision to take the dangerous action 
(1998, p. 259). (This would mean, for example, that we should be indifferent between 
Unclimbable Fence and Easy to Remember.) 
 I see two problems with Scanlon’s point against the Forfeiture view. First, it is 
not clear whether the case of the Forgetful Man reveals that informed choice is not 
the crucial moral fact. If we assume the Forgetful Man has adequate decision-making 
and decision-implementing abilities, then though he does not make a conscious 
decision to engage in dangerous activity, and while we may assume that he does not 
‘choose to forget’ the relevant warnings, he does make a conscious decision about 
how to deal with the warnings. He could, for example, write the date and time of the 
transport on his calendar as soon as he hears them; or assemble other reminders. 
But, we may assume, he consciously chooses not to do so. It is this choice, one might 
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argue, that makes it right to refer to the opportunity he has to avoid coming to harm 
when deciding which policy to pursue.  
 Secondly, Scanlon’s definition of the Forfeiture view specifies that informed 
choice under certain circumstances is a sufficient, and not a necessary condition for 
not being able to complain of a result. The case of the Forgetful Man therefore does 
not constitute a counterexample to the Forfeiture view. If Scanlon is right that no 
conscious choice is involved in the case of the Forgetful Man, then all this proves is 
that under certain conditions, both informed, voluntary choice and negligence can 
give grounds for not being able to complain of a result of one’s actions. We should 
then redefine the Forfeiture view as follows: someone placed in adequate conditions 
of choice (with the requisite information and adequate decision-making and decision-
implementing capacities, etc.) who has an adequately accessible prudent option which 
it would be reasonable for him to take, and who passes up this option either through 
negligence or conscious choice, cannot complain if he ends up badly as a result. 
 Redefined in this way, the Forfeiture view still gives a person’s options and 
choices a fundamental justificatory role by evaluating each person’s option set not by 
what he achieves, but by what he could achieve if he chose reasonably prudently.  
 Scanlon’s second objection to the Forfeiture view runs as follows. He points out 
that the Forfeiture view must stress the fact that the Impetuous Woman could have 
done otherwise than she did. But, he argues, identifying this fact as the crucial one 
leads to implausible results in other cases, since, he argues,  
“there are many conditions that undermine the legitimating force of choice 
despite the fact that a person choosing under such conditions still ‘could have 
done otherwise’ in any sense that would apply in this case” (1998, p. 262).  
He gives the following example of such a case:  
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“It would, for example, be reasonable to reject a principle according to which 
a long-term contract is binding even when entered into by a fourteen-year-
old without adult guidance. What is special about the case of fourteen-year-
olds is not that they cannot choose wisely (after all, many of them do), but 
rather that they are so likely not to do so” (1998, p. 262; emphasis in 
original). 
   The challenge Scanlon puts to the Forfeiture view is essentially to explain what 
makes it the case that informed, voluntary choice does not play a justificatory role in 
the case of fourteen-year-olds when it does play this role in the case of the 
Impetuous Woman, while not referring to the fact that fourteen-year-olds are 
unlikely to choose wisely—for that is true too of the Impetuous Woman. 
  A defender of the Forfeiture view could respond that the Impetuous Woman, 
like other normal adults, is assumed to have a certain amount of knowledge, 
experience, and certain cognitive capacities, like the ability to reflect coolly on what 
she will do and fully appreciate the potential consequences, and a degree of will-
power that fourteen-year-olds typically lack. This knowledge and these capacities are, 
like the availability of a reasonable and prudent option, necessary conditions for 
choice to have the moral force the Forfeiture view accords to it. Though, as the 
Forfeiture view theorist will readily acknowledge, these conditions usually make it 
likely that a person will choose well, their import is not reducible to their 
contribution to a person’s choosing well, or to any other value that choice has. They 
simply make it reasonable for us to ask of people that they ‘look out for themselves’; 
and if they do not, that need not be of concern to us. 
  In sum, Scanlon’s second objection lacks force because a defender of the 
Forfeiture view can happily agree with Scanlon that “there are many conditions that 
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undermine the legitimating force of choice despite the fact that a person choosing 
under such conditions still ‘could have done otherwise’ ”. 
 
Further criticism of the Forfeiture view 
 
A more forceful objection to the Forfeiture view, I believe, begins with the 
observation that on this view, so long as the people involved are adequately informed 
and have adequate decision-making and decision-implementing capacities, and have 
adequate access to a prudent option which it would be reasonable for them to 
choose, we are free to disregard the quality of the other options in their option set. 
For this view of responsibility takes the slogan volenti non fit iniuria literally: it 
completely disregards the value of the options in a person’s option set other than the 
prudent one. Applied consistently, this view of responsibility would have very 
unappealing consequences. It would not allow anyone to object to a bad outcome 
that they could have avoided through reasonable and prudent action, no matter how 
easy or cheap it would have been for others to prevent this bad outcome from 
occurring. In the initial specification of the hazardous waste removal example, I 
supposed that under both policies, significant efforts are made to lessen the amount 
of pollutants released into the air, so that those exposed by visiting the site or by 
being outside during transport would be less severely harmed. But it seems that so 
long as the harm of exposure is reasonably avoidable by everyone, the Forfeiture 
view, as we have spelled it out, would not require these efforts. Even if, for example, 
the cost of reducing the harm of exposure was in fact very small in comparison with 
the harm prevented (say, minimal extra expenditure to reduce the harm to anyone 
exposed from death to emphysema), the Forfeiture view would not require reducing 
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the harm, so long as exposure was due only to people’s informed, voluntary choices, 
and they had adequate decision-making and decision-implementing abilities.  
 As formulated, the Forfeiture view would even permit giving people option sets 
containing options that it is in no one’s interest to have. Imagine a population in 
which everyone has equal option sets containing at least one good option which it is 
reasonable to choose. Suppose also that the outcome associated with the worst 
option these sets contain is very bad, but that we could costlessly remove this option 
from each person’s option set. Suppose also that there is no sense in which being 
granted the opportunity to choose this option is of value to anyone. Suppose that we 
know that some people, in spite of being well informed and generally having 
adequate choice-making abilities, may nonetheless choose the worst option in their 
set. In this case, the Forfeiture view, which only pays attention to the value of the 
prudent option, would nonetheless permit not removing this option. For if we take 
the principle volenti non fit iniuria literally, people would have no complaint if they 
were given this extended option set and chose their worst option.  
 This view of responsibility is unappealing because it seems perfectly reasonable 
to demand some expenditure of resources, even at the cost of diminishing the value 
of people’s prudent options, to eliminate tempting but bad options from people’s 
option sets, or to make the outcomes associated with choosing these options less 
bad.29 To some extent, this may well be to everyone’s advantage. For each person 
knows that, on occasion, he may choose unwisely, and it is therefore generally in his 
interest to be protected against (the consequences of) making bad choices (cf. 
Scanlon 1998, p. 263). But even when in it not to everyone’s advantage, some such 
expenditure is warranted. For we are generally not permitted to let others come to 
                                                 
29 The Lord’s Prayer, after all, runs “Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.” 
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great harm through their choices when this harm is easily preventable at 
comparatively little cost. 
 
 
3.3 The Potential Value of Option Set view 
 
So far, we have reviewed three ways of evaluating a person’s option set: the Value of 
Choice view, the Forfeiture view, and the Realised Option Set view. We have rejected 
the first two, and established that the third gives a person’s options and choices a 
derivative role in justification only. There is, I propose, a plausible fourth way of 
evaluating a person’s option set which gives a fundamental justificatory role to a 
person’s options and choices.  
 Consider again the hazardous waste removal case. Under the Inform Everyone 
policy, both the Impetuous Woman and the Careful Man know that they have an 
option set with two options, and they also know the value of these options: ‘do not 
visit the excavation and stay indoors during transport’, with a welfare outcome of 10, 
and ‘visit the excavation site or go outdoors during transport’, with a welfare 
outcome of 6. Under the Unclimbable Fence policy, the Impetuous Woman knows 
she has an option set with two options, and knows the value of these options: ‘do 
not visit the excavation and stay indoors during transport’ has a welfare outcome of 
10, and ‘go outdoors during transport’ has a welfare outcome of 6. 
 Now, let us assume that the option sets under consideration have only 
instrumental value. Since these option sets contain an option that is strictly better 
than the least valuable option, the least we can say about the value of these option 
sets is that they are worth more than the least valuable option. This means that the 
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value of the three aforementioned option sets is larger than 6. It also seems 
reasonable to say that since they contain an option that is strictly less valuable than 
the best option, the value of these option sets is less than the value of the best 
option, so that the value of the three aforementioned option sets is smaller than 10. 
 Furthermore, it seems reasonable to hold that the ‘ease’ or ‘difficulty’ with which 
a person can make each choice in her option set is also relevant to its value. In our 
example, we know that under the Inform Everyone policy, the Impetuous Woman 
will be tempted to disregard the danger to her health and visit the excavation site. By 
contrast, under the Unclimbable Fence policy, she will experience no such 
temptation to act imprudently, so that taking the prudent action will be easy. It 
therefore seems appropriate to say that the option set she faces under the 
Unclimbable Fence policy is more valuable for her than the option set she faces 
under the Inform Everyone policy. As for the Careful Man, assuming his character is 
such that he will experience no temptation to act imprudently when he is fully 
informed of the danger, and since the number and value of the options in their 
option sets are the same, it seems reasonable to say that his option set under the 
Inform Everyone policy is of equivalent value to the option set of the Impetuous 
Woman under the Unclimbable Fence policy. Finally, under the Unclimbable Fence 
policy the Careful Man has, through no choice or fault of his own, no knowledge of 
the consequences of his options. We should therefore set the value of his option set 
to the outcome he achieves through his uninformed choice, which is 6. This 
assignment of value to individual’s option sets is given in table 3.5, where our 
conclusions imply 10 > x > z > y = 6. 
 88 
 
Table 3.5 The value of individuals’ option sets under two possible 
arrangements under the second approach to evaluating option sets 
Policy 
Individuals 
Inform Everyone Unclimbable Fence 
Careful Man x  y = 6 
Impetuous Woman z  x  
 
 Now, if we evaluate each policy in terms of the value of a person’s option set 
given in table 3.5, we should prefer the Inform Everyone policy to the Unclimbable 
Fence policy. For the distribution of the value of people’s option sets under Inform 
Everyone is unambiguously better than the distribution of the value of people’s 
option sets under Unclimbable Fence. For the least valuable option set under Inform 
Everyone is more valuable, and the most valuable option set is equally valuable.  
 Let us outline with a bit more precision and generality the five principles for 
evaluating option sets we have just used. 
If someone is adequately informed, and has adequate decision-making and 
decision-implementing capacities, and has an option set of two or more 
options, and the option set has only instrumental value, then: 
(i) an option set, which contains at least one option which is strictly better 
than the least valuable option, is more valuable than the least valuable option; 
(ii) an option set which contains at least one option that is strictly less 
valuable than the best option is less valuable than the best option; 
(iii) two option sets are of equal value if (a) these option sets contain an 
identical number of options n, (b) the 1st best, 2nd best, ..., and nth best 
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options yield equal value, and (c) the ‘ease’ or ‘difficulty’ with which the 1st 
best option in the first option set can be chosen is equal to the ‘ease’ or 
‘difficulty’ with which the 1st best option in the first option set can be 
chosen, and so on for all options;  
and  
(iv) a first option set is more valuable than a second option set when (a) these 
option sets contain an identical number of options n, (b) the 1st best, 2nd 
best, ..., and nth best options yield equal value, and (c) it is easier to avoid the 
worse options and to choose the better options in the first option set than it 
is in the second.  
On the other hand,  
(v) If a person has only one option or lacks adequate information, or lacks 
adequate decision-making or decision-implementing capacities, then his 
option set is evaluated at the value he achieves through it.     
 As the discussion of our example shows, these principles are jointly sufficient for 
giving a person’s options and choices under adequate conditions of choice a 
fundamental justificatory role. (Indeed, principles (i) and (v) together are sufficient 
for this purpose.30) Moreover, if we accept the idea of evaluating a person’s option 
set not just by the value he achieves through it, but also by what he could achieve 
through it, then they seem to be plausible principles of evaluation. However, they are 
                                                 
30 To see this, consider how, using principles (i) and (v), we would evaluate the option set of the 
Impetuous Woman under a different policy, under which she was not informed of the danger, and, as 
a consequence was outside during the transport. From the perspective of the value of the Impetuous 
Woman’s option set, this policy would be worse than the Inform Everyone policy, even though her 
level of welfare under both policies would be equal. 
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not yet sufficient to block the objections to the Forfeiture view. For example, they 
do not imply in the example reviewed in section 3.2, in which we could costlessly 
remove a bad option from everyone’s option set, that removing this option will 
increase the value of everyone’s option set. But these principles are perfectly 
compatible with further principles of evaluation which could ensure the appropriate 
judgements in such cases. Such principles should require us to give weights to the 
value of each option in a person’s option set, as well as to the ease or difficulty with 
which each option can be chosen, in such a manner that protection against choosing 
badly is considered a valuable characteristic in an option set. 
 I will not discuss such principles here.31 Instead, I hope to have provided a basic 
sketch of and a route to further development of what I will call the Potential Value 
of Option Set view. When a person has more than one option, is adequately 
informed and has adequate decision-making and decision-implementing abilities, this 
view takes the value of a person’s option set to be a function of both the various 
values which she can achieve by choosing from her option set and of the ease or 
difficulty with which she can achieve these values by making different choices from 
her option set. Contrary to the Value of Choice view, it takes into account a person’s 
specific characteristics by accounting for the ease or difficulty with which she can 
make particular choices. Contrary to the Forfeiture view, it takes the value of a 
person’s option set to be determined by the value of more than just the value a 
person achieves if she chooses the reasonable and prudent option from this set. 
Contrary to the Realised Value of Option Set view, it does not always equate the 
                                                 
31 For some introductory discussion and references see Sen (2002, especially chapters 20-22). See also 
Vallentyne (2002), and Ooghe, Schokkaert and Van de gaer (forthcoming). I discuss and criticise one 
well-known method of assigning value to option sets in chapter 4. 
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value of an option set with the value a person realises through her choice from that 
option set. It therefore provides a fundamental justificatory role for a person’s 
options and choices, without disregarding the value of protection against choosing 
badly. 
 
 
3.4  The Realised Value of Option Set view, the Potential Value of Option Set 
view, and determinism 
 
Of the four views of substantive responsibility we have examined, the Realised Value 
of Option Set view and the Potential Value of Option Set view remain as plausible 
candidates. The key difference between the two is that in assessing a person’s moral 
claims, only the Potential Value of Option Set view makes reference to what he can 
achieve through choosing appropriately. This means that if a person would end up 
badly through his voluntary choice or negligence under a certain arrangement, but he 
could have been better off if he had acted differently, he may not have the same 
grounds for complaint against this arrangement as someone who ends up equally 
badly through no choice or fault of his own. It therefore allows us to register a moral 
difference between the claims on behalf of the Impetuous Woman under the Inform 
Everyone Policy, and the Careful Man under the Unclimbable Fence policy. It also 
allows us to register a difference between the moral claims on behalf of the Forgetful 
Man under the Inform Everyone policy and the Careful Man under the Easy to 
Remember policy. In these comparisons, it allows us to say that we can advance a 
less forceful claim on behalf of the Impetuous Woman and the Forgetful Man than 
on behalf of the Careful Man, because the former would have an adequate 
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opportunity to avoid ending up badly, whereas the Careful Man would not. In this 
respect, it seems to match moral intuitions about the fundamental justificatory role of 
a person’s options and choices which Scanlon takes for granted. These intuitions 
speak in favour of the Potential Value of Option Set view, since the Realised Value 
of Option Set view cannot accommodate them. 
 It is important to note that these intuitions cannot be undermined by drawing 
attention to equally strong intuitions, which are reflected in everyday arrangements, 
that we should arrange things collectively and individually to protect individuals like 
the Impetuous Woman and the Forgetful Man. For, as we have seen, the Potential 
Value of Option Set view can accommodate the judgement that such protection is 
morally required. The Potential Value of Option Set view only holds that preventing 
harm that would befall people through their own choice, in a situation in which they 
would have the opportunity to avoid this harm, may be less of a moral priority than 
preventing equal harm to people who would not have this opportunity to avoid it. It 
in no way implies that preventing harm that would befall people through their own 
choice, in a situation in which they would have the opportunity to avoid this harm, 
may be of no moral importance; indeed, I have argued that it should accord the 
prevention of such harm significant weight.     
 I believe, however, that the intuitive attractiveness of the Potential Value of 
Option Set view might be undermined by the thought that determinism might be 
true. On this point, I take my cue from Scanlon’s remarks at the end of his 
discussion of substantive responsibility, when he characterises the sentiment he 
believes should underpin a plausible view of substantive responsibility as follows:  
“[W]hen we follow a policy that leads to some people’s being injured because 
they have ignored the warnings they were given, we may be correct in feeling 
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that what we do is justified. But we must also recognise that what separates 
us from such people is not just, as we would like to think, that we (...) choose 
more wisely, but also our luck in being the kind of people who respond in 
these ways. In this respect our attitude towards those who suffer (...) should 
not be ‘You asked for this’ but rather ‘There but for the grace of God go I’ ” 
(1998, p. 294). 
 On the face of it, there is nothing here for a proponent of the Potential Value of 
Option Set view to disagree with. For this view takes account of people’s “luck in 
being the kind of people who respond in certain ways to choices” by taking account 
of the ease or difficulty with which people can make certain choices. In the case of 
the Impetuous Woman, for example, the Potential Value of Option Set view assesses 
her option set under the Unclimbable Fence policy as more valuable for her than her 
option set under the Inform Everyone view, because it recognises the fact that in the 
latter case, she will be tempted to make a bad choice, while in the former case, she 
will not.  
 However, the expression “There but for the grace of God go I” suggests more 
than just the thought that our ‘luck’ in being the kind of people that we are plays some 
role in how we respond to our options. The source of this familiar expression is 
“There but for the grace of God goes John Bradford”, uttered by John Bradford 
(c.1510-1555), a Protestant preacher (later burned at the stake for his religious 
beliefs) on seeing a group of criminals being led to their execution. The remark 
sprung from Bradford’s commitment to a strict form of the doctrine of 
predestination, according to which man has no free will, and can be saved only by 
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the gift of God’s grace, which he is powerless to earn through his choices.32 What the 
expression therefore suggests is that it is, in some sense, wholly a matter of luck that 
we respond to our options as we do. 
 Now, a defender of the Potential Value of Option Set view would, I think, find it 
difficult to accommodate this thought. For if our choices are, in this respect, on a par 
with our dispositions to choose, then why should one make allowances for the latter, 
but not the former in evaluating our option sets? However, belief in the truth of 
determinism seems to support the thought that how we respond to our choices is, in 
some sense, wholly matter of luck. There thus seems to be a conflict between the 
truth of determinism and the plausibility of the Potential Value of Option Set view. 
 The issue can also be put as follows. The Potential Value of Option Set view 
relies on the claim that a person can do otherwise than she does—hence, if 
determinism is accepted, differently than she will in fact be determined to do. So if 
we accept the Potential Value of Option Set view and determinism, we will have to 
develop some way of understanding the idea that a person “can do otherwise” that is 
compatible with determinism.  
 By contrast, the truth of determinism does not appear to undermine the form of 
justification the Realised Value of Option Set view offers for holding people 
substantively responsible.33 For the Realised Value of Option Set view makes no 
reference to people’s ability to choose otherwise than they are caused to do by 
deterministic causal laws. Instead, it appeals only to the way offering people a choice 
                                                 
32 As Bradford put it: “[It is the] Doctrine which demands our duty, but gives us no power thereto.” 
See letter 67 ‘To certain men not rightly persuaded in the most true, comfortable, and necessary 
doctrine of God’s holy election and predestination’ in Writings of the Reverend John Bradford, 
http://www.iclnet.org/pub/resources/text/ipb-e/epl-10/web/bradford_writings.html. 
33 My comments here parallel Scanlon’s (1998, pp. 255-256) comments on the Value of Choice view. 
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realises the five values set out in section 3.1: the instrumental, expressive, and 
symbolic value of choice, the value of autonomy, and the value to others of giving a 
person a choice. None of these reasons appear to be sensitive to the truth of 
determinism; these values all seem equally worth securing whether or not our 
responses to our range of options all have ultimate deterministic causes outside us. 
What appears to be important for the first four of these values is that any such 
causes act ‘through us’, that is, they give rise to a set of judgements, aims, abilities, 
and character that exhibit the necessary coherence over time. So long as this is true, 
having a choice will sometimes be of instrumental value. Similarly, the mere fact that 
our capacities, judgements, and tastes have a causal source outside of us does not in 
itself make them any less our own; it therefore does not diminish the value of being 
given the opportunity to express them through our acts (expressive value), or of 
using them to actively shape, to some extent, our destiny through our own decisions 
(value of autonomy). Furthermore, being recognised by others as beings with the 
capacity, under certain circumstances, to make certain judgements and to act on them 
remains an important form of recognition (symbolic value). Finally, whatever causes 
others’ responses when they are faced with certain options, and whether or not a 
person’s judgements, aims, abilities, and character exhibit any coherence over time, 
the kind of response one may expect from them will sometimes make it valuable for 
one that they have certain options. 
 In sum, the truth of determinism would pose no challenge to the Realised Value 
of Option Set view, but pose significant challenges to the Potential Value of Option 
Set view. What if we possess libertarian freedom of the will—and determinism is 
therefore false? In that case, how we respond to our options is not always wholly a 
matter of luck, and the defender of the Potential Value of Option Set view can safely 
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appeal to the person’s ability to do otherwise as a reason for giving bad outcomes 
that people could have avoided by choosing appropriately less weight in our moral 
thinking than similar outcomes that people could not have avoided. Indeed, suppose 
that we sometimes have an ability to act differently than we do, even if all the facts 
about the world prior to our actions—including our capacities, dispositions, and 
situation—are unchanged. Then it would seem not just justifiable, but also required, 
that we appeal to the value of options a person can achieve through his choice, rather 
than only to what he does achieve through his choice, in assessing his moral claims. 
In sum, I suggest that the relative attractiveness of the two views of substantive 
responsibility I have outlined may depend on the truth of determinism.  
  
 
3.5 Brute luck equality and responsibility 
 
I now wish to return to our discussion of Arneson’s opportunity egalitarianism. 
Arneson gives the following characterisation the view of responsibility that he sees as 
an essential part of his opportunity-egalitarianism:  
“The idea of fair opportunity is that justice requires that a path be provided 
to each individual such that, if the individual stays on the path throughout her 
life, the outcome she reaches (...) would be fair. (...) But what happens to the 
individual if she strays off the path even by a slight amount is a ‘don’t care’ 
from the standpoint of this conception of justice. (...) A young adult may 
behave in an irresponsibly careless way (...), then encounter incredibly bad 
luck and end up facing horribly grim life prospects that we could alleviate (...) 
at modest cost. The fair equality of opportunity [for] welfare account 
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responds to such a case by insisting that justice demands no transfers of 
resources to alleviate the errant individual’s plight because any such transfer 
would diminish the fair equality of opportunity to which others are entitled” 
(2001, p. 84).  
The principle of responsibility which Arneson offers here appears to be the 
Forfeiture View’s way of assessing the value of a person’s option set, joined with the 
demand that we should choose among the class of equal option sets the option set 
which gives the highest value, thus determined. To recall, the Forfeiture View is that 
we should assess the value of opportunity sets by the value of just one accessible and 
relatively good path, which would be followed by a reasonably prudent person, and 
then choose which option set to give people by maximising the value of this path. 
This procedure involves ignoring the value of the other paths, and thereby the 
general impact on people’s well-being of giving people this option set. On this view, 
we could give people an option set which would lead a substantial proportion to end 
up very badly, even though this could be prevented at relatively small cost by 
providing people with a different option set in which certain bad outcomes were far 
less bad.  
Arneson’s example can be illustrated by figure 3.1. Imagine that we must choose 
between providing everyone with option set [i] or option set [ii]. As in chapter 2, 
black nodes denote a choice, white nodes a chance. The probability that the topmost 
path will be taken after a choice for option [a] is p. The numbers at the end of each 
path denote lifetime welfare. The difference between option sets [i] and [ii] them is 
that the value of the ‘bad luck’ path of option [b] is significantly increased at a small 
cost to the welfare of someone who takes the prudent path [a].  
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Figure 3.1 Two possible option sets 
Option set [i]: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option set [ii]: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Arneson’s suggested principle of responsibility evaluates each of these option sets by 
the value of the prudent option only, and then requires us to choose the most 
valuable option set, which is option set [i].  
 Now, in section 3.2, we criticised the Forfeiture View of responsibility as paying 
insufficient attention to the value of eliminating disadvantageous options. 
Interestingly, Arneson (2001, p. 84) agrees (see also Fleurbaey 1995a and Anderson 
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1999 for similar criticism).34 Nonetheless, he sees his proposed principle 
responsibility as an “ineliminable aspect of this ideal” of equal opportunity (2001, p. 
84).   
 I believe that Arneson is mistaken that the Forfeiture View of responsibility is an 
ineliminable aspect of the ideal of equal opportunity. For one, interpreted as a merely 
an implication of the demands of brute luck equality, equal opportunity does not 
demand any inequalities due to choices at all. Of course, the impetus for the 
development of brute luck egalitarianism, as opposed to outright egalitarianism, has 
been to allow space for a view of responsibility that gives people’s options and 
choices a fundamental justificatory role. Therefore, Arneson’s ideal of opportunity 
egalitarianism is best understood as a combination of brute luck equality and such a 
view of responsibility. Now, we have seen that the Potential Value of Option Set 
view is a view of this kind, which avoids the unpalatable consequences of the 
Forfeiture view, because it assigns some weight to the value of each option in 
determining the value of an option set as a whole. Thus, the opportunity-egalitarian 
ideal could also be understood as requiring that we provide everyone with the most 
                                                 
34 More than against the Forfeiture View, Fleurbaey’s and Anderson’s criticism is directed at a 
principle of responsibility which sees a normative role for the options and payoffs associated with 
these options that would arise in a laissez-faire economy with no market failures, and from general 
freedom to contract, against a background of brute luck equality. (As I mentioned in the Introduction 
of this thesis, a principle of this kind has been defended by Dworkin (2000), Eric Rakowski (1991) and 
Will Kymlicka (2002), and is also defended—though ultimately rejected—by Fleurbaey (1994, 1995a, 
1995b, 1995c, 1998).) I have not discussed this principle here, in part because I believe that focusing 
on the value of people’s option sets, rather than assigning normative importance to essentially 
arbitrary no-intervention market payoffs, is a better way of developing a plausible principle of 
substantive responsibility (here I agree with Vallentyne 2002). 
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valuable equal option set, with this value being determined by the Potential Value of 
Option Set view.  
 In Arneson’s example, suppose that we know that people are so constituted that, 
in spite of its being relatively disadvantageous, some significant share of people will 
choose option [b], either out of an impetuous conscious disregard for their own 
welfare, or simply because they pay insufficient attention to the likely consequences 
of choosing this option. This would merit giving option [b] some weight in assessing 
the value of the option set. Now, the value of option [b] will be larger in option set 
[ii] than in option set [i]. Therefore, if the weight given to option [b] in determining 
the overall value of an option set is sufficiently large, the Potential Value of Option 
Set view will judge option set [ii] to be better than option set [i].   
 In sum, I propose that we should see the opportunity-egalitarian ideal as 
characterised by a combination of brute luck equality and a principle which demands 
that we maximise the value of equal option sets as determined by the Potential Value 
of Option Set view. The discussion in section 3.4 suggests that the attractiveness of 
this ideal may depend on the truth of determinism. However, this version of the ideal 
is not vulnerable to the charge that it must permit choices through which people may 
end up very badly, and requires that we abandon people who make such choices, 
even when the costs of aiding them would be reasonable in comparison to the 
benefits such aid would bring them. It is not vulnerable to this criticism because it 
will count the elimination or improvement of disadvantageous options as valuable 
for people, and hence something that should be brought about when this is 
consistent with the demands of equality. 
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4. Equality, Responsibility, and Social Choice35 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we concluded that the best combination of brute luck 
equality and responsibility requires that we provide everyone with the most valuable 
equal option set.36 In this chapter, I will examine, first, how we can represent this 
requirement in social choice rules, and second, which social choice rule we should 
use if we replace brute luck equality by absolute priority to those who are most 
disadvantaged by brute luck. I will do so with the help of a hypothetical example of 
returns to education for individuals from different ethnic groups. 
                                                 
35 This chapter draws on material from my joint paper with Matthias Hild, ‘Equal Opportunity and 
Opportunity Dominance’, which appeared in Economics and Philosophy 20 (2004), pp. 117-145. The 
material from that paper has been substantially revised here. I thank Matthias Hild for the fruitful 
collaboration on that paper, and the following people for comments on that paper as it evolved: Brian 
Barry, Ken Binmore, Alex Brown, Jerry Cohen, Marc Fleurbaey, Dirk Van de gaer, Jeroen Knijff, 
Peter Postl, Michael Otsuka, John Roemer, Robert van der Veen, Peter Vallentyne, Jonathan Wolff, 
and an anonymous referee for Economics and Philosophy. Earlier versions of this chapter were presented 
at the Analytical Philosophy National Postgraduate Conference in Reading (May 2000), the Workshop 
on Equal Opportunity at the University of Bayreuth (February 2001), The Political Theory Seminar at 
Yale University (May 2002), the Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare at Caltech (June 
2002), and the Economics Seminar at London Metropolitan University (May 2003). I thank the 
participants in these meetings for their comments. 
36 Taking, as mentioned in chapter 3, the Potential Value of Option Set approach to evaluating an 
individual’s option set. 
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Before introducing this example, I cover some preliminaries. In section 4.1, I 
introduce some terminology from the relevant social choice literature. In section 4.2, 
I review solutions in the social choice literature to two difficult problems that 
typically need to be solved before responsibility-sensitive egalitarian social choice 
rules can be applied to real-world cases. The first problem is how we can infer from 
observable data the range, accessibility and quality of the options open to individuals, 
and these individuals’ ability to negotiate these options. I review John Roemer’s well-
known solution to this problem.37 I argue that Roemer’s solution is flawed because it 
wrongly equates the range of the options that are open to an individual with the 
range of options chosen by other individuals who are placed in similar circumstances. 
The second problem is how to determine the value of an option set. I review 
Dirk Van de gaer’s solution to this problem, which is to equate the value of an 
individual’s option set with the average value achieved by other individuals who are 
placed in similar circumstances.38 I argue that Van de gaer’s method is flawed because 
it ignores the possibility that the value of an option set that members of a group face 
can differ from the average value that members of that group achieve through their 
choices.  
In section 4.3, I introduce the central example of the chapter, and discuss the 
implications of providing everyone with maximally valuable equal option sets.  
                                                 
37 See Roemer (1993, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003). For applications of Roemer’s proposal to 
practical cases, see Llavador and Roemer (2001), Betts and Roemer (1999), Roemer et al (2003), and 
Van de gaer, Schokkaert, and Martinez (2001). 
38 See Van de gaer (1993), Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer (1999), and Van de gaer, Schokkaert, 
and Martinez (2001), and Ooghe, Schokkaert, and Van de gaer (forthcoming).  
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I then turn to the question of which social choice rule we should use if we 
replace brute luck equality by absolute priority to those who are most disadvantaged 
by brute luck. Two ways of determining who is most disadvantaged by brute luck 
have been discussed in the responsibility-sensitive egalitarian social choice literature. 
One way is to take the most disadvantaged to be all individuals who are least well off 
compared to others who have chosen comparable options (see Roemer (1993, 1996, 
1998, 2002, 2003)).39 For example, if we are considering returns to education, then 
we might count the individuals who have the lowest returns to a given educational 
choice (say, dropping out of high school) as among those who are most 
disadvantaged by brute luck. For others who chose a similar option (e.g. dropping 
out of high school) are better off due to no choice or fault of their own, and this is a 
matter of brute luck. I will call the approach that aims to improve the situation of the 
least well off, so defined, the Leximin Value of Options approach. 
A second way is to start by assessing the value of individuals’ option sets as a 
whole, and then take those who are most disadvantaged by brute luck to be all 
individuals with the least valuable option set (see Van de gaer 1993). I will call the 
approach that aims to improve the situation of the least well off, so defined, the 
Leximin Value of Option Set approach. 
In a recent paper, Erwin Ooghe, Erik Schokkaert, and Dirk Van de gaer 
(forthcoming) carefully analyse particular versions of these two approaches and the 
differences between them, but do not argue in favour of one of these approaches. 
                                                 
39 For completeness, we should add: when this being worse off than others is not due to the outcome 
of the option being uncertain, since in that case an individual might be worse off than another who 
made the same choice without being disadvantaged due to brute luck. For simplicity, I will assume the 
absence of uncertainty in what follows. 
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This chapter supplements their work, by further examining both approaches, and by 
arguing in favour of the Leximin Value of Option Set approach.  
In sections 4.4-4.6, I develop the Leximin Value of Options approach. In 
section 4.4 I develop a social choice rule, which I call ‘option-dominance’, which 
gives a partial ordering of policies by de-selecting all policies that are 
uncontroversially worse than some other policy on this approach.  
In section 4.5, I discuss the relationship between Roemer’s social choice rule 
and the Leximin Value of Options View. I argue that an adjusted form of Roemer’s 
rule can be used to select a single policy from the set of option-undominated policies. 
In section 4.6, I discuss the relationship between option-dominance and the 
Principle of Personal Good (or PPG for short). The PPG—that for all alternatives φ  
and ψ , if everyone is at least as well off under φ as under ψ , and someone is strictly 
better off, then φ  is better than ψ 40—is the core of welfare economics. The PPG, 
however, is not well suited to situations in which individuals’ responsibility for their 
welfare plays a role in assessing their claims. For the PPG is concerned with 
individuals’ welfare outcomes, whereas once we take account of individuals’ 
responsibility for their welfare, our attention shifts from their welfare outcomes to 
the quality of their options. It is therefore interesting to examine the relationship 
between responsibility-sensitive social choice rules and the PPG, to see whether the 
latter principle must be abandoned when we take account of individuals’ 
responsibility for their welfare. 
                                                 
40 This principle, which was introduced by Broome (1991), is structurally equivalent to the strong 
Pareto principle, except that it is not formulated in terms of preferences. Since, in chapter 1, I have 
argued in favour of a non-preference-based conception of welfare, the PPG is more appropriate for 
my discussion than the Pareto-principle. 
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I show that while option-dominance and the PPG are independent of each 
other, in the sense that one of them can express a strict preference where the other 
remains silent, they cannot contradict each other, i.e. it cannot be the case that a first 
policy dominates a second by the PPG while the second policy option-dominates the 
first. 
In section 4.7, I show that though it aids those disadvantaged by one form of 
brute luck—being worse off than others who make similar choices—the Leximin 
Value of Options approach neglects another form of brute luck: being disadvantaged 
because one’s option set is less valuable than others’ option sets, either because one 
does not have good options that others do have, or because, while one has the same 
options that others have, the outcomes of these options are all relatively low.  
In section 4.8, I argue that under the assumption that individuals can choose 
among their options under adequate conditions of choice, brute luck inequality in the 
value of individuals’ option sets is more important than brute luck inequality in the 
value of individuals’ options. I conclude that the Leximin Value of Option Set 
approach is a better way of integrating priority for those who are disadvantaged by 
brute luck with the demands of responsibility.  
The main argument of the chapter can be followed without recourse to the 
more formal arguments, which I have placed in sub-sections marked by a *. 
Calculations and proofs that are not of central importance appear in the endnotes. 
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4.1 Equal option sets and social choice 
 
Equal option sets and social choice 1  
 
Let us first introduce some terminology from the relevant social choice literature. In 
this literature, it is common practice to define the issues in the following way. We 
start by listing all the factors that influence individuals’ achievement of welfare. We 
then sort these factors into three categories. The first category consists of those 
factors that are under control of the institution or institutions that regulate the 
distribution of welfare. Call these ‘policy variables’. The second category consists of 
those factors that are the result of choices for which individuals can be held 
responsible. For each individual, these factors will take on certain values, which I will 
call individuals’ ‘responsible characteristics’. The third category consists of those 
factors for which individuals cannot be held responsible. For each individual, these 
factors will take on certain values, which I will call individuals’ ‘non-responsible 
characteristics’. Individuals then have equal option sets just in case the policy 
variables are chosen so that (a) individuals with the same responsible characteristics 
attain the same welfare outcomes, irrespective of their non-responsible 
characteristics; (b) the accessibility of each responsible characteristic is independent 
of individuals’ non-responsible characteristics; (c) individuals have an equal and 
adequate ability to negotiate the choices that lead to them acquiring these responsible 
characteristics; and (d) individuals have equal and adequate information. 
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* Equal option sets and social choice 2  
 
Somewhat more formally, we can express this definition as follows (see also Bossert 
1995 and Fleurbaey 1995a, p. 30). Let ),...,( 1 MYYY = be a vector of factors that can 
influence individuals’ level of welfare for which individuals are responsible and 
),...,( 1 NZZZ = be a vector of factors that can influence individuals’ level of welfare 
for which individual cannot be held responsible. Let Φ be a set of feasible policies. 
Then ),,( zyw φ measures the attainment of welfare under policy Φ∈φ by an 
individual with a combination yY =  of characteristics for which she can be held 
responsible and a combination zZ = of characteristics for which she cannot be held 
responsible.  
A policy φ  ensures that individuals have equal option sets just in case 
(a) )',,(),,( zywzyw φφ =  for any combination of responsible characteristics y and 
any combinations of non-responsible characteristics z and 'z (as long as some 
individual displays ),( zy and )',( zy ); (b) the accessibility of each responsible 
characteristic is independent of individuals’ non-responsible characteristics (c) 
individuals have an equal and adequate ability to negotiate the choices that lead to 
them acquiring these responsible characteristics; and (d) individuals have equal and 
adequate information. 
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4.2 Identifying and evaluating individuals’ option sets 
 
Roemer on ‘relative effort’ 
 
In real-world cases, we may have to rely only on observable characteristics and 
choices of individuals, from which we have to infer the range and quality of the 
options open to them, their ability to negotiate these options, and the relative 
accessibility of these options. This is obviously a complex matter; nonetheless, it 
typically must be solved before responsibility-sensitive egalitarian social choice rules 
can be applied to concrete cases. Roemer (1993, 1996, 1998) proposes the following 
way of identifying individuals’ option sets and of determining that these are equal. He 
selects some measure of individuals’ non-responsible characteristics, and sorts 
individuals into ‘types’ on the basis of these characteristics, with individuals with the 
same or very similar non-responsible characteristics falling into the same type. He 
then selects some choice variable that is an important contributor to the outcome for 
which we want to establish equal opportunity. Roemer calls this variable individuals’ 
‘effort’.  
Now, by construction, everyone in the same type will have equal option sets. 
The question is how we can ensure that individuals from different types have equal 
option sets. Roemer points out that ensuring that individuals in different types who 
make the same effort get the same welfare is not, as a rule, sufficient for ensuring 
that they have equal option sets. For individuals in different types may have a 
different ability to negotiate their options, or find it more or less difficult to achieve a 
given level of effort. Roemer proposes to compensate for these differences as 
follows.  
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He first ranks all individuals within a type according to their effort. This ranking 
allows him to partition individuals within each type into quantiles of effort relative to 
their type. (A person i belongs to quantile pi of relative effort exactly if a fraction 
pi of the entire population expends at most as much effort as i .) Roemer calls an 
individual’s effort quantile this individual’s ‘relative effort’.41 Roemer assumes that for 
any level of relative effort pi , the ease or difficulty with which an individual can 
choose that level of relative effort is independent of his type. Moreover, he assumes 
all individuals are equally able to negotiate the choice of a level of relative effort. It 
follows that individuals have equal option sets when all individuals who expend the 
same degree of relative effort have equal outcomes (Roemer 1998, pp. 15-16).  
 We can illustrate this procedure and one of its flaws in the following example, 
which I will call the Smoking Case.42 Suppose that at time t=0 a group of individuals 
are all of the same type, and all have equal option sets. For all individuals, welfare is 
an identical function of government tax policy and one choice variable, the number 
of cigarettes they smoke per day, with welfare decreasing in the number of cigarettes 
smoked. The population is uniformly distributed over the range of smoking 0-20 
cigarettes per day. At time t=1, with the aim of increasing sales, a cigarette 
manufacturer directs advertising at the half of the population that smokes between 0-
10 cigarettes a day. Suppose that only and all these individuals are exposed to the 
advertising campaign, and that these individuals cannot avoid exposure to the 
                                                 
41 In later work, Roemer switches to a different measure of relative effort, which he equates with the 
quantile that an individual occupies in his type’s distribution of welfare outcomes (see Roemer 2002, 
2003). The criticism expressed in the main text applies equally to this method of constructing relative 
effort. 
42 For further criticism of Roemer’s method see Fleurbaey (1998). 
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campaign. This campaign makes cigarettes more attractive to the exposed individuals; 
as a result, they start smoking more than before, and are uniformly distributed over 
the range of 5-15 cigarettes per day.  
In the Smoking Case, one should conclude that individuals who were exposed 
to the advertising campaign face a worse option set than before, as it has become 
more difficult for them to refrain from smoking, and that they therefore have a 
worse option set than non-exposed individuals. As we will see, however, Roemer’s 
method draws the opposite conclusion. On his approach, being exposed is a non-
responsible characteristic, and hence grounds for sorting the individuals who 
formerly belonged to one type into two types. Let us call them the ‘exposed’ and 
‘non-exposed’ type. Roemer’s method would have us equalise the welfare of 
individuals in the non-exposed and exposed types who are at the same relative 
position in their type’s distribution of smoking behaviour. This would mean 
equalising the welfare of an exposed individual who smokes 5 cigarettes a day with 
the welfare of a non-exposed individual who smokes 10 cigarettes a day, and so on. 
This would involve taxing exposed individuals and transferring the receipts to non-
exposed individuals. Roemer’s method thus implies that exposure gives individuals 
an unfair advantage, which needs to be eliminated by government policy in order to 
ensure equality of individuals’ option sets.  
Roemer’s method goes wrong in this case because it equates the range of 
options open to individuals within a given type with the range of choices that 
members of that type actually make. In this case, it therefore fails to identify that, by 
hypothesis, the unexposed individuals had the option of not smoking at all, even 
though they all chose to smoke.  
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Van de gaer’s method of evaluating option sets 
 
Van de gaer (1993) proposes a related method of assessing the quality of individuals’ 
option sets. Van de gaer also sorts individuals into types on the basis of their non-
responsible characteristics. He then takes all individuals with the same type to have 
the same option set, and equates the value of the option set with the average welfare 
achieved by individuals who have this option set.43 
Van de gaer’s method is open to a similar objection as Roemer’s method. In the 
Smoking Case, Van de gaer’s method mistakenly takes the value of the option set 
faced by the exposed individuals to be greater than the value of the option set faced 
by the non-exposed individuals, simply because the latter choose to smoke more, and 
hence have a lower average level of welfare. 
Of course, Roemer’s and Van de gaer’s methods are not altogether misguided; 
in many real-world cases, the actual pattern of choices and outcomes exhibited by 
individuals of a certain type may be a good first guide to identifying the options open 
to them and the relative accessibility of these options. However, it is not more than a 
first guide, and so long as we believe that two groups of individuals all of whom have 
                                                 
43 Ensuring that individuals have an equally valuable option set in Van de gaer’s sense is not a 
sufficient condition for ensuring that they have equal option sets. For two individuals with an equal 
ability to negotiate their options, and equally accessible options, might have equally valuable option 
sets, in Van de gaer’s terms, because the value of the first individual’s best option is much greater than 
the value of the second individual’s best option, and the value of the first individual’s second-best 
option is much less than the value of the second individual’s second-best option. This means that 
what they can achieve is still, to some extent, a matter of brute luck. Nonetheless, assessing the value 
of individuals’ option sets might be a good alternative to making them equal when the latter is not 
feasible; and we will see that it will be a useful approach when we opt for leximin over strict equality. 
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equal option sets might exhibit different overall patterns of choice, we cannot regard 
all differences in the pattern of choices and outcomes between these groups as 
reflecting differences in the quality and/or accessibility of their options. We cannot, 
therefore, infer the quality and accessibility of the options faced by a group of 
individuals from the pattern of choices made and outcomes achieved by that group 
in the simple ways proposed by Roemer and Van de gaer. 
 
 
4.3 Equal option sets in an example 
 
An example 
 
In the next few sections, I will illustrate various social choice rules with the help of a 
hypothetical example of the relation between schooling, ethnicity, and income. The 
‘status quo situation’ is represented in table 4.1.44 As the table makes clear, in our 
hypothetical country, Nationals earn a substantially higher mean income than 
members of immigrant minorities with the same educational qualifications. Those 
born into Immigrant Group 1 and Group 2 alternate in having the lowest mean 
income at a given educational level. Those born into Group 2 have the highest mean 
                                                 
44 The numbers in this table are in fact drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau’s database, and reflect the 
relation between mean income, schooling, and race in the U.S.A. in 1999. However, the many 
simplifying assumptions I make for the purpose of our discussion mean the example and our analysis 
of it are entirely unconnected to any actual policy or political issues, and nothing in what follows 
should be taken to suggest the desirability of any policy. To avoid any suggestion of an actual relation 
of this kind, I have used invented labels for the original racial categories, which were ‘White’, Black’, 
and ‘Other’.  
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level of schooling, while those born into Group 1 have the lowest mean level of 
schooling.  
 
Table 4.1 Median income by ethnicity and education  
 High School 
No Degree 
High School 
w/Degree 
College 
No Degree 
Associate 
Degree 
BA or 
more 
Total 
NATIONALS 
number (‘000) 
percentage 
income 
 
23,816 
12.5% 
14,885 
 
52,642 
27.7% 
23,822 
 
31,574 
16.6% 
27,930 
 
12,218 
6.4% 
32,116 
 
39,338 
20.7% 
54,208 
 
159,588 
84.0% 
31,426 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 1 
number (‘000) 
percentage 
income 
 
 
4,655 
2.5% 
11,948 
 
 
7,581 
4.0% 
19,934 
 
 
4,812 
2.5% 
24,445 
 
 
1,401 
0.7% 
29,115 
 
 
3,398 
1.8% 
42,361 
 
 
21,847 
11.5% 
23,306 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 2 
number (‘000) 
percentage 
income 
 
 
1,299 
0.7% 
13,129 
 
 
1,985 
1.0% 
20,199 
 
 
1,541 
0.8% 
22,330 
 
 
598 
0.3% 
28,769 
 
 
3,093 
1.6% 
49,966 
 
 
8,516 
4.5% 
30,919 
TOTAL 
number (‘000) 
percentage 
income 
 
29,770 
15.7% 
14,349 
 
62,208 
32.7% 
23,232 
 
37,927 
20.0% 
27,260 
 
14,217 
7.5% 
31,684 
 
45,829 
24.1% 
53,043 
 
189,951 
100.0% 
30,469 
 
Now, in any real-world case, the causes of a pattern of educational achievement 
and mean income of this kind would obviously be complex, and include factors such 
as parental income and education, the quality of the educational institutions attended, 
individuals’ abilities, and their preferences and information. 
For the purposes of our discussion, however, I will make the following 
simplifying assumptions. First, that an individual’s level of welfare is equivalent to his 
income. Second, that all individuals at a particular level of education achieve the 
mean income in of their ethnic group at that level of education. Third, that all 
individuals have the same set of options, consisting of the five educational levels, and 
that—differences in the distribution of individuals from different ethnic groups 
across different educational levels notwithstanding—all these options are equally 
accessible to all individuals, independently of their ethnic group. Fourth, that all 
 114 
individuals have an adequate and equal ability to negotiate their options, and 
adequate and equal information. These assumptions together imply that all 
individuals have equal option sets when the income associated with any given level of 
education is independent of individuals’ ethnicity.  
(In the terminology introduced in section 4.1, this example can be expressed as 
follows: individuals’ welfare is a function of government policy, a ‘responsible factor’, 
education, and a ‘non-responsible factor’, ethnicity. Individuals’ sole ‘responsible 
characteristic’ is their level of education, and their sole ‘non-responsible 
characteristic’ is their ethnicity.)  
 With respect to government policy, I assume government can intervene only by 
redistributing income, which has a constant variable cost. Thus, for each unit of 
income collected, only ρ  units are available for redistribution while the remainder 
ρ−1 covers the cost of the intervention. For concreteness, I will assume that this 
cost amounts to 0.2 per currency unit redistributed, so that 8.0=ρ .  
Finally, unless otherwise specified, I will assume that transfers do not affect 
individuals’ choices of an educational level (i.e. there are no disincentive effects of 
taxation). 
 
Determining the value of option sets 
 
Unfortunately, to my knowledge, the social choice literature contains no satisfactory 
solution to the problem of evaluating a person’s option set.45 Nor do I have a 
solution of my own. For illustrative purposes only, I will therefore assume the 
                                                 
45 For some introductory discussion and references see Sen (1999, pp. 75-79 and 2002, especially 
chapters 20-22).  
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following very simple method of determining the value of an option set: the value of 
option set of someone from a particular ethnic category is a weighted average of the 
value of the five options she faces—that is, of the income associated with each of the 
five educational levels—with the weights given by the share of the total population 
who choose each educational level.46 Since the total population is distributed 
differently across different educational choices in different ethnic categories, this 
means the value of the option set of an individual from a particular ethnic category 
will differ from the average value that individuals from that ethnic category achieve 
through their choices, as illustrated by table 4.2. The difference between the two 
reflects the degree to which individuals in a given ethnic category choose, on average, 
higher or lower levels of education than the mean of the total population. 
 
Table 4.2 Value of option sets versus mean income by ethnicity in status quo 
 
Ethnicity 
Value of option set in 
status quo 
Mean income in status 
quo 
Difference 
 
NATIONALS 
 
31,186 
 
31,426 
 
240 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 1 
 
25,676 
 
23,306 
 
-2,370 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 2 
 
27,332 
 
30,919 
 
3,587 
 
                                                 
46 Since I have assumed that all these options are equally accessible to all individuals, independently of 
their ethnicity, and that all individuals have an equal ability to negotiate their options, it is appropriate 
that the weights do not depend on the pattern of choice within each ethnic category, but are identical 
across the population. Equating the weight given to a particular educational level with the share of the 
overall population choosing that level was done because it can be seen as an—admittedly very 
rough—first indicator of the relative accessibility of these options. My conclusions about the Leximin 
Value of Option Sets approach do not depend on this simple way of judging the quality of an option 
set. 
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Equal option sets in our example 
 
Given our assumptions, if we consider income redistributions on the basis of both 
ethnicity and education, it is possible to achieve equal option sets for all individuals. 
Indeed, we can do so in many different ways. Table 4.3 shows two such ways.i One 
way is to equalise the income of all individuals at the highest possible level. This is 
outcome egalitarianism, which is, of course, consistent with the demands of brute 
luck egalitarianism. However, once we bring in the demands of substantive 
responsibility as well, we choose the policy which gives people the most valuable 
equal option set. This yields the second policy listed in table 4.3. These policies are 
also compared with the status quo distribution and with each other in figure 4.2.  
 Two things are notable in this figure and table. The first is the role played by our 
theory of substantive responsibility in justifying inequalities. Whereas brute luck 
equality alone is consistent with many different patterns of reward to education, 
including equality of outcome, the demand to maximise the value of equal option 
sets, in the context of costly redistribution, leads us to a distribution which, though it 
contains no unchosen inequalities, does yield significant inequalities due to different 
choices of education levels. The second is the fact that giving equal option sets need 
not eliminate inequalities in the distribution of income between ethnic groups: so 
long as everyone’s option sets are equal, inequalities between groups that are due to 
different patterns of choice between these groups are entirely legitimate.  
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Table 4.3 Two ways of giving people equal option sets 
 High School 
No Degree 
High School 
w/Degree 
College 
No Degree 
Associate 
Degree 
BA or 
more 
Total 
  
Outcome egalitarianism 
NATIONALS 
income 
change 
 
29,888 
14,403 
 
29,888 
  5,466 
 
29,888 
   1,358 
 
29,888 
 -2,828 
 
29,888 
-24,920 
 
29,888 
 -2,138 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 1 
income 
change 
 
 
29,888 
17,340 
 
 
29,888 
  9,354 
 
 
29,888 
  6,958 
 
 
29,888 
     133 
 
 
29,888 
-13,073 
 
 
29,888 
  5,982 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 2 
income 
change 
 
 
29,888 
16,159 
 
 
29,888 
  9,089 
 
 
29,888 
  6,958 
 
 
29,888 
     519 
 
 
29,888 
-20678 
 
 
29,888 
 -1,632 
TOTAL 
income 
change  
 
29,888 
14,439 
 
29,888 
  6,055 
 
29,888 
  2,027 
 
29,888 
 -2,396 
 
29,888 
-23,756 
 
29,888 
-1,182 
  
Maximise value of equal option set  
 
NATIONALS 
income 
change 
 
14,247 
   -638 
 
23,113 
   -709 
 
27,127 
   -803 
 
31,594 
   -522 
 
52,802 
-1,406 
 
30,551 
   -875 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 1 
income 
change 
 
 
14,247 
  2,299 
 
 
23,113 
  3,179 
 
 
27,127 
  2,682 
 
 
31,594 
   2439 
 
 
52,802 
10,441 
 
 
27,269 
  3,964 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 2 
income 
change 
 
 
14,247 
  1,118 
 
 
23,113 
  2,914 
 
 
27,127 
  4,797 
 
 
31,594 
   2825 
 
 
52,802 
  2,836 
 
 
33,865 
 2,946 
TOTAL 
income 
change  
 
14,247 
   -102 
 
23,113 
   -120 
 
27,127 
   -134 
 
31,594 
     -90 
 
52,802 
   -241 
 
30,551 
   -147 
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Figure 4.2 Returns to education in the status quo, and under two brute-luck egalitarian policies. 
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4.4 Option dominance 
 
I now turn to the question which social choice rule we should use if we replace brute 
luck equality with absolute priority to those who are most disadvantaged by brute 
luck. As mentioned, one way of determining who is most disadvantaged by brute 
luck is to compare different individuals who have chosen comparable options. In our 
example, this means comparing all individuals at a given education level, and 
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determining which individuals are least well off at that education level. We can see in 
table 4.1 and figure 4.2 that in the status quo, those born into Immigrant Group 1 are 
worst off at education levels ‘High School, No Degree’, ‘High School Degree’, and 
‘BA or more’. Those born into Immigrant Group 2 are worst off at education levels 
‘College, No Degree’, and ‘Associate Degree’. The reason for focusing on each 
option separately is that this captures the following complaint on the part of 
someone from Immigrant Group 1 who drops out of high school: ‘My ethnicity it is 
a matter of brute luck; if I had been a National or a member of Immigrant Group 2 
and made the same choice, I would have been better off. I am therefore among those 
who are most disadvantaged by brute luck’. As mentioned, I will call I will call the 
approach that aims to improve the situation of those who are disadvantaged by brute 
luck in this way the Leximin Value of Options approach. 
 On this approach, then, we should give priority to improving the situation of all 
those individuals who are less well off compared to others who have made similar 
choices. In terms of evaluating policies, this leads to the following criterion of 
betterness for each education level:  
• A policy φ  is better than a policy ψ  conditional on a particular education level 
y  exactly when the worst off individuals at education level y  under φ  are 
better off than the worst off individuals at education level y  under ψ  and, 
in the case of a tie, the second worst off individuals at education level y  
under φ  are better off than the second worst off individuals at education 
level y  under ψ , etc.  
• A policy φ  is as good as ψ  conditional on y  exactly when the worst off 
individuals at y  under φ  are as well off as the worst off individuals at y  
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under ψ  and the second worst off individuals at y  under φ  are as well off 
as the second worst off individuals at y  under ψ , etc.  
• A policy φ  is at least as good as ψ  conditional on y  exactly if φ  is as good as or 
better than ψ conditional on y .  
 This criterion only tells us whether one policy is better than another for a given 
level of education. Policies may not be best across all levels of education: a policy 
that is better than the status quo for the least well off high school dropouts might be 
worse than the status quo for the least well off college graduates. For example, if we 
confine our attention to a comparison between the outcome-egalitarian policy and 
the status quo in figure 4.2, we can see that neither is uniformly better than the other 
across all levels of education. 
 However, in some comparisons, one policy may be better than another across all 
education levels. For example, if we compare only the ‘maximise value of equal 
option set’ policy of table 4.3 with the status quo, then we can see that the former is 
better than the status quo at every education level. The following criterion of option-
dominance captures this idea of uniform superiority: 
• A policy φ  dominates a policy ψ  in the value of options, or option-dominates ψ , if 
and only if φ  is at least as good as ψ  conditional on every education level 
attained by some individuals and better conditional on some education level. 
 Suppose we now use this criterion to eliminate all policies that are option-
dominated. We then typically get an incomplete ranking of policies. All policies that 
are uncontroversially worse than some other policy from the perspective of the 
Leximin Value of Options approach will be eliminated, but we may be left with many 
policies that do not option-dominate each other. For example, if we confine 
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ourselves to the three policies represented in figure 4.2, we can see that the criterion 
of option-dominance eliminates the status quo, because it is dominated by the 
‘maximum value of option set’ policy, but does not eliminate the outcome-egalitarian 
policy. That is because the outcome-egalitarian policy is better than the maximum 
value of option set policy for some education levels, but worse for others.    
 
* A formal definition of option-dominance 
 
As before, let ),...,( 1 MYYY = be a vector of responsible factors that can influence 
individuals’ welfare and ),...,( 1 NZZZ = be a vector of non-responsible factors that 
can influence individuals’ welfare. Let Φ be a set of feasible policies. Then 
),,( zyw φ measures the welfare under policy Φ∈φ by an individual with a 
combination yY =  of responsible characteristics a combination zZ = of non-
responsible characteristics.  
Let Φ∈ψφ , , let φyN be the number if y-individuals under policy φ  and let 
ψ
yN  be the number of y-individuals under policy ψ , allowing for behavioural 
responses to policies that change responsible characteristics. Number the y-
individuals under φ  by φyN,...,1 , and number the y-individuals under ψ  by ψyN,...,1 .  
Let σ be a permutation of },...,1{ φyN  such that 
),,(...),,(
)()()1()1( φσφσσσ φφ yNyN zywzyw ≤≤  and let τ  be a permutation of 
},...,1{ ψyN  such that ),,(...),,( )()()1()1( ψτψτττ
ψψ
yNyN
zywzyw ≤≤ .  
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• Then ϕ  is better than ψ conditional on Y=y exactly when there exists some 
),min(1 ψφ yy NNi ≤≤  such that ),,(),,( )1()1()1()1( ττσσ ψφ zywzyw >  and, 
for all ),(),(,1 )(),()(),( jjjj zywzywij ττσσ ψφ =≤≤ . This strict relation is 
asymmetric and transitive.  
• When ψφ yy NN =  and φ  and ψ  are not better that each other conditional 
on y, we say that φ  is as good as ψ  conditional on Y=y, but refrain from such 
comparisons for policies that differentially affect the number of individuals 
with characteristic y.   
• We say that φ  is at least as good as ψ conditional on Y=y exactly if φ  is as good 
as or better than ψ  conditional on Y=y. This relation is transitive, but not 
complete. 
• We say that φ  option-dominates ψ  exactly if φ  is at least as good as ψ  
conditional on every value Y=y (displayed by some individual) and φ  is 
better than ψ  conditional on some value Y=y’ (displayed by some 
individual). Option-dominance is transitive, but not complete.   
• Finally, φ  is option-undominated, or option-optimal, just in case there exists no 
ψ Φ∈ that option-dominates φ . If there are only finitely many feasible 
policies, then the set of option-undominated policies is non-empty. 
 
Option-dominance further illustrated  
 
In the policy environment that we assumed at first, in which the government can 
redistribute on the basis of both ethnicity and education, there are no changes in 
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individuals’ choice of education level, and transfers have a constant cost, applying the 
leximin rule for each level of education just leads to equality at each level of 
education. To illustrate the option-dominance rule in cases where it does not select 
only policies that provide everyone with equal option sets, let us now consider 
redistribution on the basis of ethnicity alone. This means that every member of an 
ethnic group pays the same amount in tax, or receives the same transfer. An 
application of our principle of option-dominance then selects the shaded area in 
figure 4.3.ii 
 
Figure 4.3 Option-undominated policies with transfers based on ethnicity 
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This again illustrates that option-dominance typically selects a set of policies rather 
than a single policy. Of any two option-undominated policies φ  and ψ , it will be 
true that either (i) φ  is better than ψ  conditional on some level of education, and 
Best for lowest 
education level 
Best for highest 
education level 
Maximise 
weighted average 
of minima 
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worse than ψ on some other level of education, or (ii) φ is just as good as ψ across 
all levels of education, or (iii) φ  and ψ  are incomparable on some level of 
education.47 Case (i) is illustrated by the two option-undominated policies marked in 
figure 4.3 and represented in table 4.4: the ‘best for lowest education level’ policy is 
the one that makes the worst off high school dropouts as well off as possible, given 
the set of feasible policies. By contrast, the ‘best for highest education level’ policy 
makes the worst off college graduates as well off as possible.  
Since the Leximin Value of Options approach typically does not select a single 
policy, we need a further criterion to choose between option-undominated policies. 
We will examine one possible criterion of this kind in the next section.  
                                                 
47 It follows from our definitions that two policies φ  and ψ  will be incomparable on a given level of 
education y  if either (i) under φ , there are no individuals who have chosen education level y , whist 
under ψ some individuals do choose education level y ; or (ii) if there are φyN y -individuals under 
φ  and ψyN y -individuals under ψ , and the least well off, the second least well off, ... the φyN -th 
least well off −y individuals under φ  and ψ are equally well off, and ψφ yy NN < . 
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Table 4.4 Two option-undominated policies 
 High School 
No Degree 
High School 
w/Degree 
College 
No Degree 
Associate 
Degree 
BA or 
more 
Total 
  
Best for lowest education level 
NATIONALS 
income 
change 
 
14,384 
-501 
 
23,321 
  -501 
 
27,429 
   -501 
 
31,615 
 -501 
 
53,707 
-501 
 
30,925 
 -501 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 1 
income 
change 
 
 
14,384 
2436 
 
 
22,370 
  2436 
 
 
26,881 
  2436 
 
 
31,591 
2436 
 
 
44,797 
2436 
 
 
25,742 
  2436 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 2 
income 
change 
 
 
14,384 
1,255 
 
 
21,454 
  1,255 
 
 
23,585 
  1,255 
 
 
30,024 
1,255 
 
 
51,221 
1,255 
 
 
32,174 
 1,255 
TOTAL 
income 
change  
 
14,383 
35 
 
23,146 
  -87 
 
27,203 
  -57 
 
31,546 
 -138 
 
52,879 
-165 
 
30,385 
-84 
  
Best for highest education level  
 
NATIONALS 
income 
change 
 
13,018 
-1867 
 
21,955 
-1867 
 
26,063 
-1867 
 
30,249 
-1867 
 
52,341 
-1867 
 
29,559 
   -1867 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 1 
income 
change 
 
 
21,928 
9981 
 
 
29,914 
9981 
 
 
34,425 
9981 
 
 
39,096 
9981 
 
 
52,341 
9981 
 
 
33,286 
9981 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 2 
income 
change 
 
 
15,503 
2,374 
 
 
22,573 
2,374 
 
 
24,704 
2,374 
 
 
31,143 
2,374 
 
 
52,341 
2,374 
 
 
33,293 
2,374 
TOTAL 
income 
change  
 
14,548 
199 
 
22,948 
-284 
 
26,924 
-336 
 
30,707 
-997 
 
52,341 
-702 
 
30,156 
-313 
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4.5 Option-dominance and Roemer’s social choice rule 
 
When stripped of the ‘relative effort’ metric we criticised in section 4.1, Roemer’s 
(1993, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2003) social choice rule suggests a way of selecting from the 
set of option-undominated policies. For Roemer’s approach is very close to the 
Leximin Value of Options approach. Conditional on each combination of 
responsible characteristics y , Roemer uses the maximin relation of betterness 
instead of the leximin relation. Unlike leximin, the maximin relation assigns a 
numerical value to a policy for each responsible characteristic, viz., the welfare of the 
least well off individuals at y . He then maximises a weighted average of these values, 
with the welfare of the least well off individuals at the combination of responsible 
characteristics y  being given the weight of the number of individuals that are least 
well off at that combination of responsible characteristics. If N  is the number of 
individuals in the population, yzN is the number of individuals with the combination 
of responsible characteristics y  and non-responsible characteristics z , and 
),,( zyw φ  measures the welfare of an individual with responsible characteristics y  
and non-responsible characteristics z , then Roemer selects a policy φ that 
maximises: 
∑ ⋅
y
yz
z
zyw
N
N
),,(min φ  
In the context of our example, this means maximising the average welfare of all 
individuals who are least well off at each level of education. 
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Roemer’s rule has the drawback that it might select a policy that is option-
dominated, for the following reasons. First, because it ignores the welfare of 
individuals who are better off than the least well off at each responsible 
characteristic. Second, because the weighting scheme favours policies that reduce the 
number of individuals that are least well off at a relatively unrewarding combination 
of responsible characteristics (e.g. high school dropouts) in comparison with the 
number of individuals that are least well off at a relatively rewarding combination of 
responsible characteristics (e.g. college graduates).iii  However, this shortcoming can 
be remedied by using it to select from the set of option-undominated policies. Used 
in this way, Roemer’s rule provides one possible way of selecting from this set, viz. 
by maximising a weighted average of the welfare of the least well off for each 
combination of relevant characteristics. When transfers are based on ethnicity alone, 
the resulting policy is the ‘maximise weighted average of minima’ policy pictured in 
figure 4.3, and characterised in table 4.5.iv  
 
Table 4.5 Roemer’s policy 
 High School 
No Degree 
High School 
w/Degree 
College 
No Degree 
Associate 
Degree 
BA or 
more 
Total 
  
Maximise weighted average of minima 
NATIONALS 
income 
change 
 
12,945 
 -1940 
 
21,882 
 -1940 
 
25,990 
 -1940 
 
30,176 
 -1940 
 
52,268 
 -1940 
 
29,486 
 -1940 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 1 
income 
change 
 
 
21,855 
  9,907 
 
 
29,841 
 9,907 
 
 
34,352 
  9,907 
 
 
39,062 
  9,907 
 
 
52,268 
  9,907 
 
 
33,213 
 9,907 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 2 
income 
change 
 
 
16,789 
  3,660 
 
 
23,859 
  3,660 
 
 
25,990 
  3,660 
 
 
32,429 
  3,660 
 
 
53,626 
  3,660 
 
 
34,579 
  3,660 
TOTAL 
income 
change  
 
14,506 
   157 
 
22,915 
   -318 
 
27,051 
   -209 
 
31,416 
   -537 
 
52,360 
   -648 
 
30,143 
   -326 
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This weighted average of the welfare of the least advantaged provides one 
natural way (but not the only way) of selecting from the set of option-undominated 
policies. 
 
 
4.6 Option dominance and the Principle of Personal Good 
 
Option-dominance and the Principle of Personal Good 1 
 
The Principle of Personal Good—that for all alternatives φ  and ψ , if everyone is at 
least as well off under φ as under ψ , and someone is strictly better off, then φ  is 
better than ψ —is the core of welfare economics. The PPG, however, is not well 
suited to situations in which individuals’ responsibility for their welfare plays a role in 
assessing their claims. For the PPG is concerned with individuals’ welfare outcomes, 
whereas once we take account of individuals’ responsibility for their welfare, our 
attention shifts from their welfare outcomes to the quality of their options. It is then 
interesting to examine the relationship between responsibility-sensitive social choice 
rules and the PPG, to see whether the latter principle must be abandoned when we 
take account of individuals’ responsibility for their welfare. 
In this section, I will investigate the relation between the PPG and option-
dominance. I examine the relation between the PPG and the Leximin Value of 
Option Set approach in section 4.8. 
 The contrast between the PPG and option-dominance becomes apparent when 
policies differentially affect the number of individuals who have chosen a certain 
level of education. Consider, for example, a policy that whilst keeping all rewards to 
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education the same as in the status quo, excludes Nationals from education beyond 
high school. Call this the ‘exclusion policy’ (see table 4.6). Imagine that in response to 
this policy, all Nationals who previously attended higher education now only 
complete high school. On the PPG, this exclusion policy is unambiguously worse 
than the status quo, since 83 million people are now worse off, and no one is better 
off. However, on option-dominance, the two policies are incomparable. This 
establishes that a policy φ  can dominate a policy ψ  by the PPG, but not option-
dominate ψ .  
 
Table 4.6 A policy that is PPG-dominated, but not option-dominated by the status quo.   
  
Exclusion policy  
 
 High School 
No Degree 
High School 
w/Degree 
College 
No Degree 
Associate 
Degree 
BA or 
more 
Total 
NATIONALS 
number (‘000) 
income 
 
23,816 
14,885 
 
135,782 
23,822 
 
0 
n/a 
 
0 
n/a 
 
0 
n/a 
 
159,588 
25,951 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 1 
number (‘000) 
income 
 
 
4,655 
11,948 
 
 
7,581 
19,934 
 
 
4,812 
24,445 
 
 
1,401 
29,115 
 
 
3,398 
42,361 
 
 
21,847 
25,306 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 2 
number (‘000) 
income 
 
 
1,299 
13,129 
 
 
1,985 
20,199 
 
 
1,541 
22,330 
 
 
598 
28,769 
 
 
3,093 
49,966 
 
 
8,516 
30,919 
TOTAL 
number (‘000) 
income 
 
29,770 
14,349 
 
145,148 
23,232 
 
6,353 
23,932 
 
1,999 
29,001 
 
6,491 
46,469 
 
189,951 
24,429 
 
 It is also easy to see that a policy φ  can option-dominate a policy ψ  but not 
dominate ψ by the PPG. For any policy that, starting from the status quo, 
redistributes income from a relatively well off person at a given level of education to 
a less well off person at that same level of education, will option-dominate the status 
quo. (The ‘maximise value of option sets’ policy in table 4.3 is an example.) But since 
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this redistributive policy involves both gainers and losers, the PPG does not say that 
one is better than another.  
 We have therefore established that option-dominance and the PPG are logically 
independent of one another, since one principle may regard two policies as 
incomparable while the other expresses a strict preference between them. 
 Is it ever possible that the two principles conflict, in the sense that policy φ  
option-dominates ψ , while ψ dominates φ  by the PPG? As it turns out, this is 
impossible: if φ option-dominates ψ , then ψ cannot dominate φ  by the PPG. The 
proof of this result is provided below. It is not easy to provide a quick intuitive 
sketch of it, though the proof is followed by an illustration of how one proceeds in 
simple cases, which should give an idea of the overall strategy of the proof. One can 
get an initial feeling for the result by realising that for φ to option-dominate ψ , there 
must be at least one option, chosen by at least one person, for which the welfare 
under φ is larger than the welfare in ψ . If all individuals choose the same options 
under both policies, at least one person must therefore be better off under φ than 
under ψ . It is therefore clear that ψ  cannot dominate φ  by the PPG. The proof 
basically extends this simple case to cases where people choose different options 
under both policies. 
 It follows from these results that while a concern for the quality of individuals’ 
options (as formalised by the criterion of option-dominance) does not require 
accepting the PPG, it also does not require abandoning the PPG.  
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* Option-dominance and the Principle of Personal Good 2 
  
We claim that ψ  does not PPG-dominate φ , if φ  option-dominates ψ . 
Proof:  Suppose that φ option-dominates ψ , while ψ  PPG-dominates φ  
in the strong sense, i.e. ψ  is at least as good as φ  for all individuals and 
better for some. For any individual )1( Nnn ≤≤ , define 
),,(:)( nn zywnw φ=  and ),,(:)( nn zywn ψν = . We will show (*) that, for all 
)1( Nnn ≤≤ , there exist permutations τσ , of {1,…, N} such that (i) 
)()1( Nww σσ oKo ≤≤ , (ii) )()1( Nτντν oKo ≤≤ , and (iii) 
)()( kk τσ =  and )()()( nwkkw σσνσ ooo ==  for all nk ≤≤1 . We first 
show that the claim holds for n=1. Let τσ ,  be permutations that satisfy (i) 
and (ii). Let )1(: σ=j  and )1(: τ=i . By option-dominance, )()( ijw ν≥ . By 
PPG-dominance, we have )()( iwi ≥ν , and, by (i), )()( jwi ≥ν . Hence, 
)()()( jwiwi ==ν . Let 'σ  agree with σ  except for interchanging the 
position of i  and j  (i.e., except for i=:)1('σ  and ):))((' 1 ji =−σσ . 
'σ and τ  now satisfy conditions (i) through (iii).  
Assuming that the claim holds for n, we will now establish it for 
Nn ≤+1 . Let )1(: += ni τ  and )1(: += nj σ  and assume that )()( ijw ν> . 
By PPG-dominance, )()()( iwijw ≥>ν  and, by (i), there exists some 
nk <≤1  with ik =)(σ . By (iii), ik =)(τ  and, since τ  is a permutation, 
we cannot have )1( += ni τ . By reductio, we conclude that )()( ijw ν≤ . 
Option-dominance implies )()( ijw ν≥ . We thus obtain )()( ijw ν=  and, 
by PPG-dominance and (i), )()( iwi =ν . Let 'σ  agree with σ  except for 
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interchanging the position of i  and j (i.e., except for in =+ :)1('σ  and 
):))((' 1 ji =−σσ . 'σ and τ  now satisfy conditions (i) through (iii) of the 
claim. Having established claim (*), we note that it contradicts PPG-
dominance (and, for that matter, option-dominance). Hence, our 
assumption is refuted and the proof completed. ∎ 
We can illustrate this proof as follows. Consider first the case of one individual, 
A, with one and the same option under both policy φ  and policy ψ , so that he has 
the same responsible characteristic y1 under both. Suppose further that ψ  PPG-
dominates φ . In this case, it is obvious that φ cannot option-dominate ψ . 
Consider next the case of one individual, A, with two options under both policy 
φ  and policy ψ , leading to responsible characteristics y1 and y2. If A chooses the 
same option under both policies, then PPG- and option-dominance cannot 
contradict each other. If A chooses a different option under φ  than under ψ , then 
the two are incomparable by option-dominance, so PPG- and option-dominance 
again cannot contradict each other. This establishes the claim for the case of one 
individual and two options.∎ 
Consider next the case of two individuals, A and B who both have two options 
under both policy φ  and policy ψ , leading to responsible characteristics y1 and y2. 
There are now two relevant possible distributions of responsible characteristics under 
φ : (I) A and B both choose y1; and (II) A chooses y1 and B chooses y2. (Whatever we 
prove for these two possibilities holds by analogy for the other two possible 
distributions of responsible characteristics.) I will discuss these cases in turn, 
assuming again that ψ  PPG-dominates φ . 
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Case (I): Suppose (I-i) under ψ , A and B both have responsible characteristics 
y1. Then φ  obviously cannot option-dominate ψ . Suppose (I-ii) that either A, or B, 
or both have responsible characteristic y2 under ψ . Then φ  and ψ are option-
incomparable. 
Case (II): Suppose (II-i) that A chooses y1 and B chooses y2 under ψ . Then φ  
obviously cannot option-dominate ψ . Suppose (II-ii) that both A and B choose y1 or 
both A and B choose y2 under ψ . Then φ  and ψ are option-incomparable. Suppose 
(II-iii) that A chooses y2 and B chooses y1 under ψ . Then either (II-iii-a): A’s welfare 
under φ  was equal to B’s welfare under φ , or (II-iii-b) A’s welfare under φ  was 
greater than B’s welfare under φ , or (II-iii-c) A’s welfare under φ  was less than B’s 
welfare under φ .  
Now, in case (II-iii-a), given our assumption that ψ  PPG-dominates φ , either 
A’s welfare under ψ  is higher than under φ or B’s is, or both A’s and B’s welfare 
under ψ  is higher than under φ . But this means that the least well off person at 
either y1 or y2 under ψ  must be better off than under φ . So φ  cannot option-
dominate ψ .  
In case (II-iii-b) again, either (II-iii-a-1) A’s welfare under ψ  is higher than 
under φ  and B’s is the same, or (II-iii-a-2) B’s is higher while A’s is the same, or (II-
iii-a-3) both A’s and B’s welfare under ψ  is higher than under φ . If (II-iii-a-1), then 
the least well off y2 –individual under ψ  is better off than under φ , so that φ  cannot 
option-dominate ψ . If (II-iii-a-2), then the least well off y2 –individual under ψ  is 
better off than under φ , so that φ  cannot option-dominate ψ . If (II-iii-a-3) then 
again, the least well off y2 –individual under ψ  is better off than under φ , so that φ  
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cannot option-dominate ψ . This completes the proof for the case of two individuals 
and two options. ∎ 
 
 
4.7 Problems with the Leximin Value of Options view 
 
As mentioned, the core idea of the Leximin Value of Options View is that we should 
give priority to those who are less well off than others who have made the same 
choices. By focusing on comparisons between individuals who have made the same 
choices, this approach picks out one way in which an individual may be 
disadvantaged by brute luck. But is also neglects a different way: an individual may be 
disadvantaged not because the welfare outcome of the option he chooses is less good 
than that of others, but because his option set is less valuable than that of others, 
either because (case (a)) he does not have good options that others do have, or 
because, (case (b)) while he has the same options that others have, the outcomes of 
these options are all relatively low. By way of illustration of case (a), consider again 
the ‘exclusion’ policy of table 4.6. Under this policy, Nationals are intuitively worse 
off than members of other ethnic groups due to no choice or fault of their own, not 
because they are worse off compared to members of these groups who make the 
same choices—indeed, they remain better off than members of these groups who 
either drop out of high school or complete high school only—but because they do 
not have good options that members of these other groups do have.  
Now, the Leximin Value of Options view cannot register this way in which Nationals are 
disadvantaged. Instead, it sees Nationals who drop out of high school, and Nationals who 
complete high school only as being relatively advantaged. To see this, consider the ‘exclusion 
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plus transfer’ policy depicted in table 4.7. This is the same as the previous exclusion policy, 
except that in addition, a small tax is levied on all Nationals and transferred in the form of a 
1,000 unit grant to members of other ethnic groups. Now, by the criterion of option dominance, 
the ‘exclusion plus transfer’ policy will be better than the ‘exclusion policy’, because the worst-off 
at each educational level are better off than under the status quo. However, intuitively, the 
‘exclusion plus transfer’ policy is worse than the ‘exclusion policy’, since it makes individuals who 
are already worst off due to brute luck (since they are deprived of good options that others have) 
even worse off. 
  
Table 4.7 The exclusion plus transfer policy 
  
Exclusion plus transfer 
 
 High School 
No Degree 
High School 
w/Degree 
College 
No Degree 
Associate 
Degree 
BA or 
more 
Total 
NATIONALS 
number (‘000) 
income 
inc. change*  
 
23,816 
14,647 
-238 
 
135,782 
23,584 
-238 
 
0 
n/a 
n/a 
 
0 
n/a 
n/a 
 
0 
n/a 
n/a 
 
159,588 
22,249 
-238 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 1 
number (‘000) 
income 
inc. change* 
 
 
4,655 
12,948 
1,000 
 
 
7,581 
20,934 
1,000 
 
 
4,812 
25,445 
1,000 
 
 
1,401 
30,115 
1,000 
 
 
3,398 
43,361 
1,000 
 
 
21,847 
24,306 
1,000 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 2 
number (‘000) 
income 
inc. change* 
 
 
1,299 
14,129 
1,000 
 
 
1,985 
21,199 
1,000 
 
 
1,541 
23,330 
1,000 
 
 
598 
29,769 
1,000 
 
 
3,093 
50,966 
1,000 
 
 
8,516 
31,919 
1,000 
TOTAL 
number (‘000) 
income 
 
29,770 
14,509 
 
145,148 
23,431 
 
6,353 
24,932 
 
1,999 
30,011 
 
6,491 
47,469 
 
189,951 
24,429 
* compared to ‘exclusion policy’. 
 
Let us now turn to case (b), in which individuals have the same options that 
others have, but the outcomes of these options are all relatively low. The pattern of 
rewards to education listed in table 4.8 gives a case of this kind. Nationals who are 
high school dropouts, who complete only high school, or who complete high school 
but drop out of college are much better off than members of both other immigrant 
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groups who make comparable choices, while members of Immigrant Group 2 are 
worst off at these education levels. At higher levels of education, the picture is 
different: members of Immigrant Group 2 are much better off than both Nationals 
and members of Immigrant Group 1, and Nationals are now worst off compared to 
others with similar levels of education. At each education level, members of 
Immigrant Group 1 have an income that is just slightly better than the income of the 
least well off individuals at that education level.  
 
Table 4.8 A second problem case for the Leximin Value of Options View   
 High School 
No Degree 
High School 
w/Degree 
College 
No Degree 
Associate 
Degree 
BA or more 
NATIONALS 
income 
 
25,000 
 
30,000 
 
35,000 
 
40,000 
 
40,000 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 1 
income 
 
 
10,500 
 
 
20,500 
 
 
30,500 
 
 
40,500 
 
 
40,500 
IMMIGRANT 
GROUP 2 
income 
 
 
10,000 
 
 
20,000 
 
 
30,000 
 
 
50,000 
 
 
60,000 
Note: The italicised cells give the minima at each education level. 
 
Again, intuitively, when we consider the value of individuals’ option sets taken 
as a whole, it seems reasonable to consider members of Immigrant Group 1 as worst 
off. However, because the Leximin Value of Options view looks only at each 
education level separately, it registers only that members of this group are second 
least well off at each educational level. It would thus applaud a small transfer from 
each member of this group for the benefit of Nationals and members of Immigrant 
Group 2. However, from the perspective of the overall value of individuals’ option 
sets, this would involve making those who are already worst off even worse off. 
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4.8 The Leximin Value of Option Set view 
 
We have seen that a concern for brute luck disadvantage in the value of individuals’ 
options will sometimes conflict with a concern for brute luck disadvantage in the 
quality of individuals’ option sets. I believe that in cases where individuals can choose 
under adequate conditions of choice, eliminating the latter form of brute luck 
disadvantage is more important. For suppose we are in the situation characterised by 
the ‘exclusion policy’ of table 4.6, and consider the force of the possible responses to 
the two following complaints: First, consider the response of a supporter of the 
Leximin Value of Option Set view to the complaint of a member of Immigrant 
Group 1 who drops out of high school and says that he should be counted among 
those most disadvantaged by brute luck, because he is worse off than members of 
the other ethnic groups who made the same choice. To this complaint, one could 
respond: ‘Though you are less well off than others who made the same choice, you 
had good and accessible options that some others did not have. If you had chosen 
these options, you would have been better off than those who were deprived of these 
options. So though the fact that you are worse off than others is in part due to brute 
luck, it is also due to your choice. Moreover, the obstacles you faced in becoming at 
least as well off as others were not greater than those faced by others. You are 
therefore not among those who are most disadvantaged by brute luck.’48 This is a 
forceful response.  
 Consider next the response on behalf of a defender of the Leximin Value of 
Options view to the complaint of a National who says that he should be counted 
                                                 
48 A similar response can be made to a member of Immigrant Group 2 who drops out of high school 
in the case characterised in table 4.8. 
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among those most disadvantaged by brute luck, because he is was deprived of good 
options that others had: ‘Though you did not have relatively good options that others 
did have, the value of the options you did have is greater than the value of others’ 
comparable options. You are therefore not among those who are most disadvantaged 
by brute luck.’ This response obviously lacks force. 
 In sum, when individuals can choose between their options under adequate 
conditions of choice, it is appropriate to refer to the quality of options that they did 
not choose, but could have chosen, in assessing their moral claims. This conclusion 
favours the Leximin Value of Option Set view over the Leximin Value of Options 
view. It is also, of course in line with our conclusion in chapter 3 that a form of 
egalitarianism that gives individuals’ choices and options a fundamental justificatory 
role should assess individuals’ claims by the value of their option sets. 
 
The Leximin Value of Option Set view and the PPG  
 
I now want to briefly remark on the implication for the PPG of accepting a moral 
theory that assesses individuals’ situation by the quality of their option sets.  
It seems that a theory that is fundamentally concerned with the value of individuals’ 
option sets, rather than their welfare outcomes, will sometimes involve judgements 
that conflict with the PPG. For consider a case in which the value of person A’s 
option set is relatively low, because she only has options that yield relatively bad 
outcomes. Suppose we can greatly improve the value of person A’s option set by 
creating a good option for her by using resources gained by taxing individual B, who 
is relatively well-off due to brute luck. Let us suppose that this decreases B’s welfare, 
but does not make his option set less valuable than A’s will be after the improvement 
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in her option set. On the Leximin Value of Option Set view, we should tax B to offer 
A the relatively good option, even if we can foresee that person A will not choose 
this good option. This contradicts the PPG, which would require us not to tax B 
when this does not improve anyone’s welfare. I conclude that if we want to give 
substantive responsibility a fundamental role, the PPG should be abandoned. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, I have argued that when individuals can choose between the options in their 
option set under adequate conditions of choice, it is appropriate to evaluate their 
situation by the quality of their option set as a whole. A responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism that aims at improving the situation of individuals who are most 
disadvantaged by brute luck should therefore give priority to individuals with the 
least valuable option set.  
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Chapter 5. An Egalitarian Ethos?49 
 
 
“Rightly understood, these clauses [of the social contract] can all be reduced to one 
alone, namely, the total alienation of each associate with all his rights to the whole 
community (…). Furthermore, since the alienation is made without reservation, the 
union is as perfect as it can be, and no associate has anything more to claim. For if 
some rights were left to individuals, and there were no common superior who could 
decide between them and the public, each person, being in some respects his own 
judge, would soon claim to be so in every instance; the state of nature would subsist, 
and the association would necessarily become tyrannical or ineffectual. (...) It is 
agreed that each person alienates through the social pact only the part of his power, 
possessions, and liberty that is important to the community, but it must be agreed 
that the sovereign alone is the judge of what is important”  (Rousseau 1988, pp. 92-
93 and 101-102). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I want to examine to what extent egalitarian justice requires that 
individuals use the opportunities they are provided with in particular ways. My 
                                                 
49 Parts of this chapter will appear as ‘Incentives and Principles for Individuals in Rawls’s Theory of 
Justice’ in Ethics and Economics. Early versions of this chapter were presented at the Brave New World 
Conference on Political Theory at Manchester University in July 2001 and the Annual Meeting of the 
Dutch-Flemish Political Science Association in June 2002. I thank the participants in these meetings, 
and Brian Barry, Jerry Cohen, Peter Dietsch, Carina Fourie, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, Michael 
Otsuka, Robert van der Veen and Martin Wilkinson for their comments.  
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central question is: should citizens of a just egalitarian society pursue their egalitarian 
ideals through the design of equality-promoting formal public institutions only, or 
should they also sometimes be guided by egalitarian ideals in their individual choices 
within the space permitted for free individual choice by these formal public 
institutions?  
The egalitarian ideals I refer to here are the two ideals we reviewed in chapter 2: a 
social and political ideal of equality, and a brute luck egalitarian ideal. I want to 
examine whether each of these ideals requires a choice-constraining ethos, and what 
the content of this ethos might be.  
Scheffler (2003) suggests that while the social and political ideal of equality clearly 
has a place for an ethos of this kind, it is difficult to see what reason a brute luck 
egalitarian would have to advocate it. He writes:  
“There is a (...) tension between the luck-egalitarian attitude towards choice 
and the attitudes associated with what Cohen calls an “egalitarian ethos”. The 
emphasis on the importance of a choice-constraining egalitarian ethos is quite 
congenial to the social and political ideal of equality, but the [brute] luck-
egalitarian motivation for such an emphasis is less clear” (p. 37n77). 
 I believe Scheffler is mistaken on this point. It is, in fact, easy to imagine cases in 
which a brute luck egalitarian might want to introduce a choice-constraining duty of 
this kind. First, a choice-constraining ethos might be the best way to achieve brute 
luck equality. Imagine a society in which the single source of brute luck inequality is a 
genetic ailment which causes liver failure. If all members of this society live 
moderately healthy lifestyles, then upon their deaths, there will be just enough organs 
for transplantation to ensure that everyone with this ailment can be fully restored to 
health. If they do not, brute luck equality can only be achieved by cutting short the 
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lives of otherwise healthy individuals. Suppose further that because of limitations of 
public knowledge, a healthy lifestyle cannot be effectively enforced by the state. In 
this scenario, a brute luck egalitarian could endorse a choice-constraining duty for the 
purpose of achieving brute luck equality in an acceptable way. 
 Second, it is likely that the value of the least valuable option set, as well as the 
overall degree of inequality of the value of option sets, will be determined by 
individuals’ choices from their option sets. A standard example is one in which in a 
society with relatively productive and relatively unproductive individuals maximises 
the value of the least valuable option set through a tax-and-transfer scheme. Under 
certain conditions, if the more productive individuals choose to work harder than 
they would if they made their labour/leisure decisions purely on the basis of their 
own interests, then this will generate greater tax revenues which can be used to 
improve the value of the least valuable option set, whilst simultaneously decreasing 
inequality in the value of individuals’ option sets. A principle requiring choices of this 
kind might therefore be a requirement of brute luck egalitarian justice.  
Indeed, it seems natural to assume that egalitarian justice should require both 
equality-promoting formal public institutions and an egalitarian ethos. For why 
should the pursuit of justice be limited to formal public institutions, and the 
behaviour required to support these institutions? As our two simple examples 
illustrate, it is easy to think of cases in which brute equality would be well served by 
the adoption of an egalitarian ethos. Similarly, it is easy to think of cases in which the 
maintenance of egalitarian social relations may require constraints on behaviour, like 
treating others with respect in one’s everyday interactions, that are not required by 
these institutions.  
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Nonetheless, recent debates on the scope of justice in Rawls’s work have thrown 
up some challenges to this view.50 In this chapter, I will review some of this debate in 
order to examine what we can learn from it about the roles of formal public 
institutions and principles for individual conduct in egalitarian justice.  
  In section 5.1, I review Cohen’s criticism of Rawls’s limitation of the scope of 
his three principles of justice, including the difference principle—the principle 
regulating the distribution of income, wealth, and the social basis of self-respect—to 
the major legal and socio-economic institutions of society, or what he calls its “basic 
structure”.  
In section 5.2, I discuss Philippe van Parijs’s (2003, pp. 226-231) defence of 
Rawls’s restriction of the scope of the difference principle on the grounds that it 
follows from a general restriction of the scope of justice to principles for the basic 
structure, and that this general restriction, in turn, follows from the demands of 
political liberalism. In sections 5.3 and 5.4 I challenge Van Parijs’s interpretation and 
defence of Rawls by showing that Rawls’s contractualism does not restrict the scope 
of principles of justice to the basic structure, and that certain principles for individual 
conduct that go beyond individuals’ duties to establish and support just institutions 
are an integral part of Rawls’s political conception of justice. 
In section 5.5, I consider Rawls’s own reasons for not supplementing the 
principles for individual conduct that are part of his theory with further principles for 
individual conduct, such as a duty to take account of the impact of one’s economic 
                                                 
50 See Cohen (1995, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2005). For some responses to Cohen’s criticism, see Andrew 
Williams (1998), David Estlund (1998), Thomas Pogge (2000), Frank Vandenbroucke (2001), Saladin 
Meckled-Garcia (2002) and Norman Daniels (2003). Cohen’s criticism represents the revival of an 
earlier debate. For a review of this debate and a critical contribution, see Barry (1989, appendix C). 
 144 
choices on the most disadvantaged, or to promote an egalitarian and democratic 
culture in one’s everyday actions. I argue that Rawls’s theory does not contain such 
further duties for two reasons. First, a concern with the publicity of the principles of 
justice: that people know what they demand of themselves and of others, and can 
know that most people comply with their demands. Second, a concern for basic 
liberties like freedom of association, or freedom of occupational choice.  
In response to Rawls’s arguments, I argue that though publicity identifies an 
important constraint on the formulation of principles for individual conduct, it does 
not rule out adding further principles to the ones Rawls accepts. I also argue that 
principles for individual conduct do not limit liberty.  
Since the arguments from publicity and liberty fail, and in light of the beneficial 
consequences of the adoption of such an ethos, I conclude that an egalitarian ethos 
encompassing both the principles which Rawls identifies, and further principles 
regulating individual conduct and motivation should be seen as part of an egalitarian 
theory of justice. 
 
 
5.1 The scope of the difference principle and Cohen’s critique 
 
Against a background of equal basic liberties and fair opportunity for education and 
jobs, Rawls proposes that in a just society, socio-economic inequalities should be 
regulated by the difference principle: inequalities are just if and only if they are 
necessary to make the worst-off as well off as they can be.51 In several passages 
                                                 
51 See TJ (p. 72, emphasis added): “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all 
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Rawls writes that the scope of the difference principle is confined to what he calls 
the “basic structure of society”. Rawls defines the basic structure as “a public system 
of rules defining a scheme of activities that leads men to act together so as to 
produce a greater sum of benefits and assigns to each certain recognised claims to a 
share in the proceeds” (TJ, p. 74) and also as “the way in which the major social 
institutions fit together into one system, and how they define fundamental rights and 
duties and shape the division of advantages that arises through social cooperation” 
(PL, p. 258).  
Now, a public system of rules in this sense can, of course, include rules for 
individual conduct that are not formally laid down in laws or enforceable rules, as 
long as these rules of conduct are public, that is, can be understood by everyone and 
can be known to be generally followed. But, Rawls’s more concrete specifications of 
the basic structure do not mention such informal rules. Instead, as examples of 
institutions that belong to the basic structure, he offers “the political constitution, the 
legally recognised forms of property, the organisation of the economy, and the nature 
of the family” (PL, p. 258). Aside from the case of the family, these examples all 
suggest that Rawls confines the basic structure to what Frank Vandenbroucke (2001, 
chapter 7) calls formal institutions: spoken, written or tacitly understood statements 
that carry firstly, a known range of sanctions, second, a norm or rule that prescribes 
these sanctions, and thirdly, provisions for monitoring, all of which emanate from a 
public rule-making arena like a court or government. Furthermore, Rawls’s 
discussions of the sense in which the family is part of the basic structure suggests 
                                                                                                                                     
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.” For identical formulations, see also TJ (p. 245), PL 
(pp. 6-7 and 291) and CP (p. 258). Van Parijs (2003) offers an extended discussion of different 
formulations of the difference principle.  
 146 
that in this case, too, he has in mind only the formal regulation of the institution of 
the family (JF, pp. 162-168; CP, pp. 595-601).  
Taking Rawls’s understanding of the basic structure to be limited to the major 
social formal institutions allows us to make a clear distinction between the 
institutions of the basic structure on the one hand, and the possibly but not 
necessarily public, informal rules and strategies that individuals and voluntary 
associations use to regulate their conduct within the limits prescribed by the 
institutions of the basic structure. We then get a relatively clear idea of the scope of 
the applicability of Rawls’s three principles of justice, including the difference 
principle: they apply to the major social formal institutions, and not to the actions of 
individuals and associations within the limits prescribed by the institutions of the 
basic structure. As Rawls puts it:  
“Thus, the principles of justice, in particular the difference principle, apply to 
the main public principles and policies that regulate social and economic 
inequalities. They are used to adjust the system of entitlements and earnings 
and to balance the familiar everyday standards and precepts which this 
system employs. The difference principle holds, for example, for fiscal and 
economic policy. It applies to the announced system of public law and 
statutes and not to particular transactions or distributions, nor to the 
decisions of individuals and associations, but rather to the institutional 
background against which these transactions and decisions take place.” (PL, 
pp. 282-283).52 
Because individuals are left free to pursue their permissible conception of the 
good within the rules specified by the basic structure, the institutions that must 
                                                 
52 See also PL (p. 284) and JF (p. 73). 
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conform to the difference principle will offer incentives to elicit from people, 
pursuing their own ends, those kinds of choices that will enhance the position of the 
worst off. These incentives will result in inequalities, but these are just, according to 
Rawls, since institutions have been set up to maximise the level of social and 
economic benefits the least advantaged can expect, consistent with the basic liberties 
and fair opportunity being established to a sufficient degree.53 
Cohen challenges the coherence of this separation of institutions from personal 
behaviour as follows. If the difference principle countenances only necessary 
inequalities, then many incentive-based inequalities are not justified. For if people 
were motivated to base their choices in the economic and personal sphere on their 
impact on the worst-off, then they would have little need for inequality-producing 
incentives. Little need, for, Cohen (2000, p. 206n24) writes, it is reasonable to assume 
some scope for purely personal projects. (It is important to keep in mind that these 
projects need not be selfish—they may involve the fulfilment of religious obligations, 
for example, or the care for friends or family members.) But this limited scope is very 
different from the unlimited space for the pursuit of one’s goals that Rawls permits. 
The difference principle, Cohen concludes, requires a personal ethos which, with 
allowance for some personal prerogative, leads people to base their economic 
decisions about how much to work and which career to pursue (and perhaps other 
                                                 
53 See, for example, TJ (p. 68), JF (pp. 63-64). I include the phrase ‘to a sufficient degree’, since I agree 
with Van Parijs (2003) that a literal interpretation of the lexical priority of establishing a fully adequate 
scheme of basic liberties and establishing fair opportunity is implausible. Strict lexical priority would 
entail there would be no resources left to the distribution of which the difference principle would 
apply. For it is always possible to devote more resources to securing the basic liberties or fair equality 
of opportunity. Rawls recognises the approximate nature of the lexical ordering (TJ, p. 55). I return to 
this point in section 5.5. 
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personal decisions as well, such as how to treat one’s children, whom to befriend and 
marry, etc.) on how these decisions affect the least well-off.  
Cohen presents three arguments why this extended interpretation of the scope of 
the difference principle is the only one consistent with Rawls’ full theory of justice. 
First, Rawls presents a just society as one in which people affirm and uphold the 
principles of justice. In the political sphere people are required not to further their 
personal projects, but to support those policies that meet the requirements of the 
principles of justice.54 But a split personality would then seem to result between 
citizens as political actors and as actors in the economic and personal sphere (Cohen 
2000, pp. 124-125). 
 Second, Cohen claims that the inequalities caused by acting on the basis of 
unconstrained pursuit of one’s own projects in the economic, personal and 
associational spheres mean that three features of what Rawls sees as a just, or well-
ordered society cannot be maintained (2000, pp. 134-136). The first of these features 
is fraternity, which is taken to mean that citizens only wish to enjoy greater benefits 
when this is to the benefit of all their fellows. For Rawls, this fraternity is realised in a 
society which is regulated by the difference principle: 
“The difference principle, however, does seem to correspond to a natural 
meaning of fraternity: namely, to the idea of not wanting to have greater 
advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less well off. (...) 
Now wanting to act on the difference principle has exactly this consequence. Those 
                                                 
54 For this duty of citizens with regard to voting, see TJ (pp. 294 and 314). This duty is follows from 
what Rawls calls ‘the natural duty of justice’, which requires individuals to support and comply with 
existing just institutions and to further the establishment of just institutions. See TJ (sections 19 and 
51).  
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better circumstanced are willing to have their greater advantages only under a 
scheme in which this works to the benefit of the less fortunate.” (TJ, pp. 90-
91; emphasis added).  
Cohen takes the emphasised words to indicate that Rawls should believe such 
fraternity is only realised when the resulting distribution is not only a product of the 
way in which the basic structure is organised, but also of people’s attitudes and 
choices within this structure. Fraternity is thus not compatible with unlimited pursuit 
of personal goals in the economic and personal sphere.   
The second feature is the fact that those that are less well off can bear their 
position with dignity. Cohen (2000, p. 135) claims that the awareness of the least well 
off that their predicament results from the fact that those better situated cannot be 
bothered to take their interests into account in their decisions means that their ability 
to bear their situation with dignity is undermined. 
The final feature is the form of social union that Rawls believes a society 
governed by the principles of justice makes possible. In a “well-ordered” society, 
(nearly) everyone accepts and knows that others accept the principles of justice, and 
the basic social institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy these principles (TJ, pp. 
4-5 and 397ff). The members of such a society “share the goal of giving one another 
justice”: they have a generally effective desire to act as the principles of justice 
require, and to adjudicate and justify their claims on social goods and on each other 
from the shared point of view of these principles.55 Now, in such a society, Rawls 
writes, people enjoy a special form of social union: its citizens share a final end—to 
                                                 
55 See JF (p. 20) for the shared end of giving one another justice. For the adjudication of competing 
claims, see TJ (pp. 4-5 and 397ff), CP (p. 250) and JF (p. 9). For the interpersonal justifiability of 
claims, see TJ (pp. 145, 297 and 510). 
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set up institutions that accord with the principles of justice and to act as these 
principles require—and they see this end as good in itself, because it enables them to 
achieve the full realisation of their nature as social and moral beings. In addition, a 
society governed by the principles of justice allows people to pursue their diverse 
aims as individuals and within voluntary associations against a background which 
ensures that they have an acceptable amount of the goods necessary to develop their 
capacities. Because Rawls takes it as a fact of human psychology that we take 
pleasure in the development and exercise of diverse human capacities when this takes 
place in a just society, such a society must be experienced as good (TJ, pp. 462-463 
and JF, pp. 198-202). 
Now, the central prerequisite for the realisation of this form of social unity is that 
all members of society are willing and able to justify their institutions, attitudes and 
behaviour to each other from a common perspective. Cohen, however, claims that a 
society in which people, within the space permitted by the rules of the basic 
structure, are allowed to pursue their own projects without limitation must fail this 
test of interpersonal justifiability, since those placed in a favourable position cannot 
justify to the worse-off members of society demanding inequality-producing 
incentives in order to make socially beneficial choices to invest in particular ways and 
choose and perform well in useful jobs, etc. (1995, p. 350; 2000, p. 135). Cohen’s 
second argument concludes that anyone who wishes to maintain that the difference 
principle does not apply to people’s motivation and behaviour generally must give up 
these three features of a Rawlsian well-ordered society.  
 The third argument questions the foundation of what he sees as Rawls’s idea that 
justice applies only to major social institutions, and not to behaviour within these 
institutions. As we saw above, Rawls appears to limit the basic structure to the major 
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social formal institutions, or, as Cohen calls it, to the “broad coercive outline of 
society”. However, such limitation of what is meant by the basic structure falls afoul 
of Rawls’s criterion for focusing on institutions: the profound effects of these 
institutions on people’s life chances (Cohen 2000, p. 138 and TJ, p. 7). By this 
criterion, we cannot confine ourselves to the major social formal institutions, since 
many institutions and patterns of individual choice that fall outside of the basic 
structure so defined, such as role patterns in the division of labour and practices of 
favouring the education of children of one sex or level of ability over another 
obviously do have profound effects on the distribution of benefits and burdens in 
society. So, Cohen concludes, we cannot coherently maintain that people’s choices 
and motivation are not as much the subject of justice as the major social institutions 
(2000, pp. 131-136; 2003, pp. 91-92). 
 Of these three objections, Cohen considers the first ‘split-personality’ one only 
in passing, and he believes the second means only that a Rawlsian must abandon any 
homilies about fraternity, equal dignity and the realisation of social unity as so much 
icing on the cake of a well-ordered society, not that the project of separating 
institutions from personal choices must fail. It is the third objection that he sees as 
decisive against any conception of justice that excludes any element of people’s 
behaviour from its purview (2000, pp. 130 and 136). 
 I will focus on possible responses to this critique in sections 5.2 and 5.5. Before 
proceeding, a remark on fraternity and the dignity of the worst off. In the case of 
fraternity, we must note first that unlike equality and liberty, the incorporation and 
interpretation of the idea of fraternity within the theory of justice is not central to its 
justification. It is, rather, offered as one advantage among many of the difference 
principle that it seems to offer an interpretation of the concept and the principles 
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required to apply it. In addition, it is a rather idiosyncratic interpretation of the idea 
of fraternity that Rawls claims the difference principle represents. Consistent with 
Rawls’s general scepticism about the role that affective sentiments can play in 
sustaining individuals’ motivation to act justly,56 his interpretation of fraternity seems 
not to demand the affective ties which are generally believed to be part of the idea 
(TJ, pp. 90-91). Rather, it appears to apply first and foremost to “institutions and 
policies”, which must satisfy its demands. This sense of fraternity can be realised in a 
society in which people do not recognise a duty of the kind Cohen advocates. 
 Rawls’s remarks on dignity have to do with the moral worth of the worst off. In 
the context of discussing the idea that distributive justice might be taken to mean 
that people should get what they morally deserve (where moral desert is understood 
as a concept that has application prior to distributive institutions that follow from of 
a conception of justice), Rawls remarks that the inequalities sanctioned by the 
difference principle have nothing to do with such pre-institutional moral desert (TJ, 
pp. 273-277). Thus, Rawls’s point is merely that the dignity of the worst-off need not 
be undermined by inequalities that result from the application of the principles of 
justice, because these do not express unequal moral worth.  
 
 
5.2 Van Parijs’s defence of Rawls 
 
Van Parijs (2003, pp. 226-231) has argued as follows that Rawls’s restriction of the 
scope of the difference principle reflects the demands of political liberalism. In A 
Theory of Justice, Rawls presents a “complete conception of right”, which is a 
                                                 
56 See, among others, TJ (pp. 112 and 155), PL (p. 87) and JF (p. 182). 
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conjunction of “justice as fairness” applying to the institutions of the basic structure 
and “rightness as fairness” applying to individuals’ actions within the space permitted 
by these institutions. It would be natural to think that this complete conception of 
right must contain a principle requiring individuals to make their economic choices in 
ways that would improve the lot of the worst off, given the potential of such a 
principle to improve the situation of the worst-off and decrease inequality. However, 
in Political Liberalism (p. xlii) and Justice as Fairness (p. xvii), Rawls argues that political 
justice should not be seen as a complete conception of right, and instead should be 
concerned only with demands of justice as fairness. This means that the Rawls of 
Political Liberalism must confine himself to principles for the institutions of the basic 
structure. For requiring certain principles for individual conduct beyond those 
needed to support and maintain just institutions would be to cross the line from a 
political conception of justice—one that is independent of and without grounding in 
premises peculiar to metaphysical, epistemological, and general moral conceptions, 
and which can be shared by people who hold very different conceptions of these 
kinds—into a comprehensive moral conception.  
 Van Parijs worries that this means that the demands of political liberalism leave 
us with “exceedingly feeble redistributionary mechanisms” (2003, p. 230). But he also 
discerns a solution to this problem in the way institutions can affect people’s 
motivation and behaviour:  
“social policies, labour market legislation, and the regulation of credit and 
advertising may conceivably encourage or discourage, to very different 
extents, an ethos of work and thrift. (...) Promoting the work ethos of the 
more skilled and affluent [is good for the worst off], as part of their greater 
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output, as opposed to their leisure, can be used to boost the expectations of 
the worst off” (2003, p. 231). 
Thus, Van Parijs believes, without crossing the boundary between a purely political 
conception of justice and a comprehensive moral doctrine—a boundary marked by 
the distinction between principles for the basic structure of society and principles for 
individual conduct within the space permitted by the basic structure—the difference 
principle can be saved from being enfeebled by self-seeking individual conduct by 
“resolutely designing institutions that foster an ethos of solidarity, of work” (2003, p. 
231). 
  In sections 5.3 and 5.4 I will argue that Van Parijs’s idea that the ‘political 
liberalism/comprehensive moral doctrine’ divide is marked by the ‘principles for the 
basic structure/principles for individual conduct’ divide is mistaken. I do so by 
showing that certain principles for individual conduct that go beyond individuals’ 
duties to establish and support just institutions are an integral part of Rawls’s political 
conception of justice. 
 
 
5.3   Total Alienation 
 
In the opening lines of On Social Contract, Rousseau explains that he wishes to 
determine the principles of legitimate social institutions, starting from facts about 
human nature and the kinds of institutions to which human beings can conform 
(1998, p. 88). In the section quoted at the start of this chapter, Rousseau announces 
that in considering these principles, we must start from a position of “total alienation 
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by all”. I shall argue that Rawls’s contractualist enterprise also demands this “total 
alienation”. But what does the phrase mean?  
Rawls’s social contract view at the outset delimits the reasons for which we adopt 
principles of justice for institutions and individuals. For the contractualist, justice has 
a particular role. Society is marked by identity and conflicts of interests between its 
citizens. There is identity of interests because social co-operation makes possible for 
everyone a life that is much better, both in a material and moral sense, than a life 
outside of society. There is a conflict of interests because, abstracting from moral 
considerations, people all prefer a larger to a smaller share of the benefits of social 
co-operation, and because they have different moral, religious, and ideological views. 
The role of a theory of justice is to ensure that in spite of this conflict, effective and 
just social co-operation can come about. This does not merely mean the absence of 
open conflict, but the establishment of a community in which the distribution of 
benefits and burdens and the exercise of power take place in accordance with rules 
that free, equal and reasonable citizens would accept if placed in an initial situation of 
equality (TJ, section 1; PL, lecture 1, and CP, pp. 560-561). Rawls stresses the 
requirement that the general adherence to these rules can be judged. The possibility 
of such acceptance and judgement establishes a community of justification, necessary 
for the realisation of people’s moral nature. Because of the assumption that people 
have different moral views, such justification cannot be based on showing how the 
rules and institutions of society serve some communal end or ends. Society as a 
whole has no ends or ordering of ends, and principles of political justice can 
therefore not prescribe any ends to individuals or voluntary associations, except the 
end of giving others justice (TJ, p. 7; PL, p. 276; JF, pp. 10-12 and 20).  
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The social contract view, then, focuses exclusively on individuals engaged in 
social co-operation and subject to the exercise of coercive power by the state. These 
individuals are born into a society whose basic institutions and culture profoundly 
affect the development of their character and abilities, and from which it is difficult 
to exit. Rawls holds that these facts make a purely voluntary acceptance of existing 
social arrangements of society insufficient grounds for their legitimacy, which is one 
reason why the hypothetical social contract approach is necessary (PL, pp. 271-278). 
Because of this focus, Rawls’s theory of social justice does not pronounce on the 
justice or injustice of situations in which individuals are not involved in any co-
operation, such as people living in complete isolation from each other. Does this 
focus also exclude from the scope of social justice principles which govern the 
activities of individuals and voluntary associations that do not share the three key 
characteristics of the political realm (its unchosen profound influence, its 
coerciveness, and lack of a shared ordering of ends)? Particular relationships of 
individuals, such of those of love and friendship, and particular associations, such as 
sports clubs and churches, are entered into and can be left voluntarily. Any coercive 
enforcement of agreements between individuals and within associations operates 
through the state, either directly or by the state giving the rights to such enforcement 
to a person or organisation. Lastly, individuals and associations have definite ends, 
the content of which can determine which principles of morality and “local justice” 
apply to them. 
It would be a mistake, however, to think that these differences between the 
major social coercive institutions and these individual relationships and voluntary 
associations mean that the latter mark out separate spheres of life beyond the 
purview of social justice. For though the ends and ideals that shape these institutions 
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and relationships will be distinct from the end of social arrangements taken as a 
whole, the shape they take may profoundly influence the development of individuals’ 
sense of justice—their ability and willingness to understand, propose and honour fair 
terms of cooperation if others will likewise do so—and the conditions under which 
they can form and pursue their conception of the good life. The kinds of 
relationships people can engage in, and the voluntary associations there are or can be 
in society are important determinants of the range of possibilities open to people to 
realise their plan of life.57  
Furthermore, the conditions under which these relationships and associations can 
take place are determined by society’s coercive structure and the concomitant 
distribution of resources (TJ, pp. 93; 96-97; PL, p. 266). These have to ensure that 
the conditions under which people enter into their relationships and participate in 
associations do not undermine people’s status as free and equal citizens, or their 
willingness and ability to support social justice. In addition, these rules have to ensure 
that the conditions under which they can join and leave are generally conducive to 
people’s pursuit of their projects. The establishment of social justice therefore has 
priority over any principles that might apply to the non-political relationships of 
individuals and to associations (PL, p. 261, JF, pp. 10-12, 40, 162-168 and 182-183). 
These principles are bound by the restrictions specified by the principles of social 
justice. Of course, this does not mean that the principles of justice must dictate 
specific ends to these relationships and associations. For it is of great value to 
individuals that, within certain limits, individuals and associations are free to form 
and pursue their own ends (CP, p. 598).  
                                                 
57 In this sense, the civic and cultural structure of a society functions like the other primary goods, and 
should perhaps be added to Rawls’s list. See also the discussion in Kymlicka (2002, chapter 6). 
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 In sum, any space in which principles specific to individuals and associations that 
are not part of social justice apply is the product of a prior establishment of the 
demands of social justice. As Rawls writes:   
“A domain so-called, or a sphere of life, is not, then, something already given 
apart from the principles of justice. A domain (...) is simply the result, or 
upshot, of how the principles of political justice are applied, directly to the 
basic structure and indirectly to the associations within it. The principles 
defining the equal basic liberties and fair opportunities of citizens always hold 
in and through the so-called domains. (...) So the spheres of the political and 
the public, and of the not-political and the private, take their shape from the 
content and application of the conception of justice and its principles. If the 
so-called private sphere is a space alleged to be exempt from justice, then 
there is no such thing” (JF, p. 166; CP, p. 599).  
 We are now in a position to see what Rousseau’s remark about the “total 
alienation of each associate with all his rights to the community” means, and how it 
applies to Rawls’s contractualism. It means that though the principles of social justice 
are pre-contractually limited to the kind of role they are to play, they apply to all 
aspects of individuals’ lives and of social institutions that are relevant for establishing 
and maintaining just social co-operation. Insofar as we are concerned with 
establishing social justice, no aspects of people’s lives are pre-contractually excluded 
from falling under the scope of the principles to which everyone would agree in the 
initial contractualist situation of equality. Of course, at the level of application in 
social life certain parts of people’s personal and associational life may not be 
regulated by the principles of justice, but this space where the principles of social 
justice find no practical application is merely the upshot of a decision procedure 
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which at the contractual level takes no aspect of human society to be beyond the 
scope of social justice.58  
Since this space is determined by the contracting parties, it does not preclude the 
establishment of justificatory community. If, for example, the contracting parties 
would agree for certain reasons that the unlimited pursuit of one’s own projects is 
permissible within the rules specified by the basic structure, then individuals could 
justify the pursuit of their projects within these rules to each other with reference to 
this agreement. (We will discuss the reasons Rawls believes contracting parties would 
have to allow such space in section 5.5). For the same reason, citizens will not need 
to develop a ‘split personality’ to cope with the different standards of the public 
sphere on the one hand, and the economic, private, and associational spheres on the 
other. For insofar as the demands of political justice are concerned, their actions in 
each sphere can be justified from a single perspective. 
  
 
                                                 
58 Thus, the contractualist theory of Rousseau and Rawls contains two distinct ‘levels’: the contractual 
level, at which no one has any pre-established claim to any of the benefits and burdens of social co-
operation, and the post-contractual society governed by the principles of justice in which individuals 
have such claims. It seems to me that interpretations of Rousseau’s On Social Contract as totalitarian 
might in part be the result of a failure to distinguish these two levels. For the “total alienation” in the 
quoted passage does not imply that Rousseau’s society will be totalitarian. The contracting parties, 
who must agree to principles that apply equally to all, will naturally want certain rights against undue 
interference in their lives, political rights and rights to (some) private property. These rights are 
discussed in chapter 4 of book II of On Social Contract. See also chapter 8 and 9 of book I and 
Gourevitch (1997, pp. xix-xx). 
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5.4   Principles for Individuals in Rawls’s Theory 
 
Throughout his work, Rawls refers to the basic structure as the “primary”, “first”, or 
“initial” subject of social justice, but never writes that it is the sole subject of social 
justice (TJ, pp. 6 and 47; PL, pp. 11-12 and 257; JF, p. 10). Indeed, Rawls writes that 
a suitable specification of the principles that apply to the basic structure and to the 
separate and free transactions between individuals and associations is essential to a 
theory of justice (JF, pp. 53-54; TJ, pp. 93ff and 293ff). Nevertheless, the initial focus 
in Rawls’s theory is on the basic structure. Rawls gives several reasons for this focus, 
which I will only mention here.59 The first set of reasons has to do with the basic 
structure’s importance in shaping individuals’ expectations and preferences. Taken 
together, the institutions of the basic structure are the most important determinants 
of the distribution of rights, obligations, benefits and burdens of social co-operation 
(TJ, p. 7). In addition, individuals’ beliefs, attitudes and aims are shaped by the basic 
structure (TJ, p. 229; PL, p. 269). Second, Rawls argues that principles for individual 
behaviour alone cannot guarantee the requisite fairness in distribution, because 
principles for individuals alone would be epistemically too demanding to follow and 
too difficult to judge in their overall consequences (TJ, pp. 73-78; PL, p. 265 ff; JF, p. 
54). Third, he indicates that all-encompassing principles for individual behaviour 
might undermine individuals’ freedom to pursue their own conception of the good, 
while arranging the basic institutions of society to take care of background justice 
and then leaving individuals free to pursue their ends would preserve this freedom.60 
Finally, Rawls argues that since many principles for individuals presuppose some 
                                                 
59 For a detailed discussion, see Vandenbroucke (2001, pp. 239-246). 
60 See Vandenbroucke (2001, pp. 240-241).  
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institutional structure to be in place, it is easier to discuss principles of social justice 
for individuals after those for institutions have been chosen (TJ, pp. 9-10 and 93-95). 
 Four sections of A Theory of Justice (18, 19, 51 and 52) are devoted to discussing 
principles for individuals. Rawls begins the first of these sections with the statement 
that “certain principles of this type [for individuals] are an essential part of any theory 
of justice” (TJ, p. 93). The difficulty is, however, that Rawls discusses these principles 
in the context of a complete conception of right, which he calls “rightness as 
fairness”, which he later describes as outside the bounds of a purely political 
conception of justice (TJ, 15 and 95-96; PL, xlii; JF, xvii). Does this mean that these 
principles for individuals have no place in Rawls’s purely political conception of 
justice, as Van Parijs believes? I do not think so. For the principles for individuals 
Rawls discusses in A Theory of Justice at any length all belong to the domain of social 
justice.61 Rawls considers certain principles for individuals part of social justice 
because these principles play an essential role in ensuring the stability of a just 
society. As Rawls writes in A Theory of Justice when he introduces his lengthier 
discussion of principles for individuals: 
“I now wish to take up the principles of natural duty and obligation that 
apply to individuals. The first two sections examine the reasons why these 
principles would be chosen in the original position and their role in making 
social co-operation stable” (TJ 293). 
                                                 
61 For example, in A Theory of Justice, after mentioning the principle of fairness and the natural duty to 
support just institutions, Rawls writes: “I shall say very little about the other kind of principles for 
individuals. For (...) I must limit myself to the theory of social justice” (TJ, p. 100).  See also JF (p. 
xvii): “(...) the problems examined in Theory in any detail are always the traditional and familiar ones of 
political and social justice”.  
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A society ordered by the principles of justice must be stable—must reproduce its 
conditions of existence, both materially and in its institutions and the attitudes and 
behaviour of its citizens—because it would be irrational for the contracting parties to 
agree to principles that could not be adhered to, since these would not be able to play 
the role justice is designed to play, i.e. ensure effective and fair co-operation in 
society.62 Therefore, if they contribute to the establishment of social justice, the 
principles for individuals developed in A Theory of Justice must survive the shift to a 
purely political conception of justice in Rawls’s later work. Let us therefore look at 
the four principles for individuals which Rawls discusses in most detail, and trace 
their relation to the problem of stability. 
Rawls divides the principles for individuals into what he calls “natural duties” and 
“obligations”. The former hold independently of voluntary acts, whereas the latter 
depend on a voluntary act to take part in an institution or enter into a particular 
relationship with individuals (TJ, pp. 96-97). I shall first look at three natural duties: 
the duty to support and further just institutions and the duties of mutual respect and 
mutual aid. I shall then look at what Rawls calls the “principle of fairness”, and one 
of the obligations that derives from it: to keep a bona fide promise.  
The duty to support and further just institutions demands that individuals 
comply with the rules of just institutions, and aid in their establishment when this is 
not too costly. This includes the duty to vote and encourage others to vote for those 
parties and policies which best conform to the principles of justice (TJ, pp. 293-294). 
This duty is a natural complement to seeing justice as confined to the basic structure, 
                                                 
62 “They [the parties in the original position] are rational in the sense that they will not enter into 
agreements they know they cannot keep, or can do so only with great difficulty.” (TJ, pp. 125-126. See 
also section 29) 
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since it demands of us that we comply with the demands of the institutions of the 
basic structure, and that we make efforts to establish and maintain a just basic 
structure. But the duty asks nothing more of us, and is therefore consistent with the 
interpretation of Rawls that I am disputing. 
However, two further duties that Rawls discusses at length cannot be seen in this 
light. The first is the duty of mutual respect (TJ, pp. 155-156 and 297). This duty 
demands that individuals recognise and treat one another as beings with a sense of 
justice and a conception of the good. It implies a willingness to see things from 
another’s point of view, and to give reasons to others whenever their interests are 
materially affected, thereby implying that citizens should form a community of 
justification. It disallows contempt or lack of esteem for others, and asks that citizens 
treat each other courteously, and are prepared to do each other small favours. The 
second is the duty of mutual aid, which means that we are to help others who are in 
need when doing so is not too costly for us (TJ, pp. 100 and 297-298).  
Now, these two duties are not just important because of the balance of good 
over bad that would result from their being generally followed. Rather, they are part 
of the principles of social justice because of the way they affect the relations between 
individuals and individuals’ self-respect: 
“Once we try to picture the life of a society in which no one had the slightest 
desire to act on these duties, we see that it would express an indifference, if 
not disdain for human beings that would make a sense of our own worth 
impossible” (TJ, p. 298). 
It is this connection with self-respect that makes these principles part of a theory 
of social justice. Rawls writes that parties in the original position would want to avoid 
at almost any cost the conditions that undermine self-respect (TJ, p. 386). One 
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reason for this importance is that without a secure sense of self-worth, people’s lives 
become meaningless to them: they can see no point in planning and managing their 
lives, or in undertaking any activity. A second reason is the role of people’s sense of 
self-worth in establishing effective social co-operation, and it is this reason that 
concerns us here. Self-respect affects stability in two ways (TJ, p. 155). The first is 
that a society in which individuals support each other’s sense of self-worth is a 
prerequisite for the development of citizens’ sense of justice. Rawls’s view of how 
citizens acquire an effective sense of justice depends on a three-stage theory of moral 
development (TJ, pp. 429-430). At the first stage, children raised in a caring 
environment form affective ties with the members of their family. At the second 
stage, finding that institutions are just and that people generally and with evident 
intention act on principles of justice, people develop trust in these institutions and 
their fellow citizens. At the third stage, realising that their interests and the interests 
of the people they care about are furthered by the arrangements of a just society, and 
their worth is affirmed, people acquire a normally effective sense of justice. Now, the 
duties we are discussing impact either directly, or indirectly through their influence 
on the sense of self-worth, at all three stages of this development of the sense of 
justice. Firstly, Rawls argues, people with a secure sense of self-worth are more likely 
to care for their children (TJ, p. 436). Secondly, other people’s willingness to take our 
needs into account and treat us with respect contributes to the process of coming to 
trust them (the second stage) and to the fact that social arrangements are such that 
they further our good (the third stage).  
The second way that self-respect influences the stability of society is through its 
relation to envy. Envy in the sense in which it involves ill will towards the person 
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envied63 is what Rawls calls a “disruptive attitude” because it is collectively 
disadvantageous (TJ, p. 125). It leads the worse-off to wish to deprive the better off 
of their greater benefits, even at some cost to themselves. In turn, this leads the 
better off to take precautions against the hostile acts to which the worse-off become 
prone. Conscious of others’ negative attitudes towards their good fortune, they may 
even become spiteful: they become willing to give of goods of their own in order to 
deny the less well off certain benefits. People moved by envy and spite, then, will not 
have the motivation to adhere to fair and mutually beneficial arrangements.  
Envy may arise in a well-ordered society because the social and economic 
inequalities sanctioned by the difference principle may be large (TJ, p. 446). If they 
are large enough, and in addition other social arrangements and individual behaviour 
serve to undermine the sense of self-respect of the worst-off, the circumstances in 
which society places these individuals can be such that it is unreasonable to expect 
them to overcome their rancorous feelings. Indeed, under such circumstances, the 
non-moral feeling of envy may give rise to the moral feeling of resentment, since 
people may resent being made envious (TJ, p. 468).  
It is essential, then, that in a well-ordered society the conditions for strong 
feelings of the destructive form of envy do not arise. Rawls offers two reasons that 
they indeed will not. Firstly, he argues that in a competitive economy under 
conditions of fair opportunity, and subject to forms of taxation demanded by the 
difference principle, large differences in remuneration for scarce talents will not be 
permanent (TJ, pp. 136-137; JF, pp. 66-67). Secondly, he sees the main psychological 
source of envy as a lack of individuals’ confidence in their own worth: 
                                                 
63 For the distinction between ‘benign envy’, which entails wishing we were in another’s situation 
without begrudging him his advantages, and ‘disruptive envy’, see TJ (pp. 466-467). 
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“someone sure of the worth of his plan of life and his ability to carry it out is 
not given to rancor nor is he jealous of his good fortune. Even if he could, he 
has no desire to level down the advantages of others at some expense to 
himself. This hypothesis implies that the least favored tend to be more 
envious of the better situation of the more favored the less secure their self-
respect” (TJ, p. 469). 
I will return to the first claim in section 5.5, and here remark only that the 
contribution of the recognition and adherence to the demands of the duties of 
mutual aid and mutual respect to citizens’ sense of self-worth will tend to lessen the 
tendency for envy to develop in society. 
It seems natural to think that the duties of mutual aid and respect are not 
restricted to people’s actions within the institutions of the basic structure or their 
activities that pertain directly to the establishment and maintenance of a just basic 
structure. For one of their functions, to sustain mutual trust and confidence in one 
another’s intentions, cannot be fulfilled if individuals apply them so selectively. Not 
to have or act on racist attitudes, for example, follows from the duty of mutual 
respect (CP, p. 461). It would seem both very strange and in contradiction with 
Rawls’s stated purpose for taking this to be a duty to think that this requirement 
applies only when people are fulfilling their roles in one of the institutions that make 
up the basic structure of society, since racist incidents, in whatever context they 
occur, would clearly affect the quality of individuals’ relations with each other. 
Rather, it seems natural for it to hold in people’s everyday lives and therefore to 
conclude that it extends beyond the basic structure.  
Finally, let us look briefly at the principle from which Rawls believes all 
obligations derive, which he calls “the principle of fairness”. This principle holds that 
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a person is required to do her part as defined by the rules of a legitimate institution if 
she has voluntarily made use of the institution to further her interests (TJ, p. 96). 
Like the natural duty to support just institutions, this principle may seem to ask for 
nothing beyond the behaviour necessary to maintain the basic structure, and 
therefore not to demand anything in excess of what we would expect of a view that 
confined the scope of social justice to the basic structure. However, one principle 
that derives from the principle of fairness is not so restricted to the basic structure. 
What Rawls calls the “principle of fidelity” holds that promises that are made under 
the right conditions should be kept (TJ, pp. 303-306). This principle applies to all 
voluntary relationships that people enter into. It is part of a theory of social justice 
because of its role in enabling and stabilising co-operative arrangements for mutual 
advantage and in building trust among citizens. This latter consequence ties it to the 
development of the sense of justice, in ways discussed above for the natural duties.  
In sum, the natural duties of respect and mutual aid, and the principle of fidelity 
cannot be reduced to part of the basic structure in the sense that they apply only to 
actions and attitudes of individuals while they are engaged in activities that take place 
within its institutions or that support its institutions. In addition, they are essential to 
establishing social justice as Rawls conceives it. It follows, contra Van Parijs (2003), 
that Rawls’s theory of social justice applies to more than just the basic structure. This 
argument gains further support from (and in turn supports) the interpretation of 
Rawls’s thought given in section 5.3. Indeed, the connection between these principles 
and the stability of a just society show that the second part of the quote from 
Rousseau applies to Rawls’s theory as well: if personal behaviour and motivation are 
excluded from the start, a well-ordered society will not be possible. 
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5.5   Further principles for individuals? 
 
This conclusion lends more force to Cohen’s initial question. For if principles for 
individuals are not excluded from Rawls’s theory, why should it exclude a duty to act 
in ways that maximise the situation of the worst-off, subject to the constraints of 
some personal prerogative? We can also ask this question with respect to other goods 
than those regulated by the difference principle. There is at least an equally strong 
case for considering principles governing individuals’ actions that influence the 
opportunities for education, skill acquisition, and jobs of the less well off, the kinds 
of attitudes people have towards each other in society,64 and the functioning of the 
country’s democracy. 
 Theda Skocpol (2004), for example, summarising recent research on the topic, 
argues that the kind of voluntary associations people join influences society’s 
egalitarian culture and democratic participation. She documents a sharp decline over 
the last four decades in the United States in what she calls “membership 
organisations”. These are groups like the labour unions and the General Federation 
of Women’s Clubs, which emphasise and express solidarity among citizens who see 
themselves joined in shared moral undertakings, and which are largely run by 
voluntary workers and with a focus on active membership and face-to-face meetings. 
By contrast, there has been a marked increase in what she calls “professionally 
managed public interest associations”. These are single-issue organisations like the 
Wilderness Society or the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action 
                                                 
64 Such intangibles may fall under the difference principle, which applies also to the social bases of 
self-respect. 
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League, which are run almost exclusively by paid professionals, and which see 
members primarily as sources of financial contributions.  
Membership organisations are joined by people from all class backgrounds. They 
cycle people from these backgrounds through official responsibilities, providing 
training in management and leadership skills along the way, and generally contribute 
to the interaction of members of all classes with a cross-section of the population. By 
contrast, professionally managed groups are joined and mostly run by members of 
highly educated classes, and have very low degrees of active membership 
participation. As a consequence, Skocpol believes, this shift has contributed to a 
decline in cross-class fellowship and lower-class democratic participation. If 
Skocpol’s analysis is correct, and if membership organisations could not (or should 
not) be effectively promoted by the state, then there might be a case for requiring 
people to take these effects into account in choices about which kinds of voluntary 
associations they join and how the organisations they join should be run. As Skocpol 
writes: “In our activities as citizens, let each of us consider what we can do 
personally—by organising and joining together with our fellow citizens from all 
walks of life, and by imagining new modes of popular involvement that hold the 
promise of revitalising civic democracy” (2004, p. 15). 
 
Rawlsian objections to further principles 1: publicity 
 
Rawls proposes three reasons for not extending the range of principles for 
individuals or voluntary associations beyond those discussed in section 5.4. The first 
relates to considerations of publicity. Rawls’s publicity constraint has two aspects (TJ, 
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pp. 48-49 and 114-115).65 The first relates to its content. A rule satisfies the publicity 
constraint with regard to content when individuals know that this rule is the result of 
hypothetical contractual agreement; they know what it demands of them and of 
others,66 and both these facts are common knowledge. The second relates to 
compliance. A rule satisfies the publicity constraint with regard to compliance when 
nearly everyone has reason to believe that nearly everyone complies with the rule, 
and nearly everyone has reason to believe that nearly everyone believes that nearly 
everyone complies. With regard to both aspects of the publicity condition, it is 
important to note that the ways in which we ascertain whether a rule satisfies the 
condition are restricted to methods of inquiry, sources of information and ways of 
reasoning that are generally accepted to be appropriate for questions of political or 
social justice (PL, pp. 66-67). 
The reasons for which Rawls imposes this constraint are diverse.67 The one that 
most concerns us here is related to the problem of assurance. Rawls assumes that 
individuals are motivated by an ideal of fair reciprocity: they are generally willing to 
keep to fair rules if they believe others are generally doing so, whilst their desire to 
stick to fair rules will be less strong or absent when others are not generally 
complying with it. It follows that publicity with regard to compliance, and hence with 
regard to content, is essential for individuals to comply with the demands of rules 
that might be considered as rules of justice, and therefore for the feasibility and 
stability of those rules.  
                                                 
65 See also Vandenbroucke (2001, pp. 225-227).  
66 Rawls sometimes describes this epistemic limitation as a part of what he calls the “universality 
constraint”. See TJ (p. 114). 
67 See PL (p. 66ff) and Vandenbroucke (2001, pp. 262-276). 
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Now, at this point, Rawls appears to bring in a fact about human motivation, not 
under actual social conditions—since under actual conditions, people may not be 
generally motivated by fair reciprocity—but under ideal social conditions. (In this 
sense, what Rawls calls his “realistic utopianism”, or “probing of the limits of 
practical possibility” may best be captured not by the Rousseauian idea of “taking 
people as they are and laws as they might be” but as “taking people and laws as they 
might be”. See JF, p. 4.) It is a deep and difficult question whether in devising 
principles of justice, one should take facts of this kind as setting limits to which 
principles of justice one could adopt. Doing so would seem to rule out, for example, 
principles of justice which people could not generally be motivated to follow under 
ideal conditions. I will not comment on this question here, and will not question this 
aspect of the Rawlsian enterprise. I do, however, want to point out one consideration 
in support of the publicity condition that does not relate to facts about human 
psychology, but rather to the nature of what one is trying to achieve through one’s 
actions. For the aim of people who comply with the principles of justice is to achieve 
a just society, and this is something that cannot be achieved through one individual’s 
action alone. Moreover, if a sufficient share of the members of one’s society do not 
comply with the rules of justice designed for a society in which almost everyone 
complies with these rules, then complying with these rules oneself might not bring 
society any closer to justice. In such cases, reasonable assurance that there will be a 
sufficient degree of compliance with the requirements of justice is a prerequisite for 
being motivated to act on them, even if one is not motivated by reciprocity alone. It 
is noteworthy, however, that this does not apply to all principles of justice. If justice 
requires equality, for example, then promoting equality through one’s actions (say, by 
giving some of one’s money to a person who is less well off than the average person, 
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if one is better off than the average person) may bring society closer to justice, even 
if others do not adhere to just rules. 
In what follows, I will simply take the publicity condition for granted. What does 
this condition mean for the role of principles for individuals? Williams (1998) has 
argued that only principles that apply to the basic structure meet the requirement of 
publicity. The discussion in sections 5.3 and 5.4 might seem to give us reason to 
question Williams’s conclusion. For the principles for individuals that Rawls endorses 
go beyond the rules for the basic structure, and, as I will argue below, satisfy the 
demands of publicity. Though this might seem to contradict Williams’s view, the 
conflict is, I believe, superficial. For Williams appears to employ a wider 
understanding of the “basic structure” than I have adopted, which includes not 
merely, as I have supposed, formal public rules, but also informal public rules.  
To see that principles for individuals that do not apply to the basic structure (as I 
have understood the term throughout) alone can be public, let us take the content 
and compliance parts of publicity in turn. I think that the content condition must not 
be understood to require that individuals must on each occasion know exactly what it 
requires of them. For this may not be the case with rules that apply to the 
maintenance of just basic institutions, such as the requirement to vote for the party 
that one believes best upholds the principles of justice. There may be room for 
disagreement and individual judgement about which of the parties do so on a 
particular occasion, though the overall requirement is clear. Thus understood, this 
part of publicity demands simply that any rule should be able to be understood 
through paradigm cases and be able to provide general guidelines. Now, though the 
demands of the principles of mutual respect, mutual aid and the keeping of promises 
are not clear in every situation, they seem to be able to meet this requirement. The 
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principle of mutual aid, for example, demands that one help others who are in need 
when this is not too costly for oneself. Of course, it will not always be clear when 
someone is in need, or whether giving aid is so costly as to excuse us from aiding 
them. Nevertheless, there are clear cases where both kinds of conditions apply, and 
one can develop general guidelines on the basis of such cases. In addition, the 
reasoning required can be publicly shared, in the sense that it does not depend for its 
efficacy on keeping others in ignorance of one’s principle of action, or on adopting 
any particular comprehensive moral doctrine. 
The compliance condition can similarly be satisfied by norms that fall outside of 
the basic structure. For it is naturally understood as meaning that citizens have good 
grounds to believe that nearly everyone is generally complying with the rule based on 
the following kinds of information: firstly, the kinds of actions they see others 
perform and the attitudes they hear them express; secondly, the kinds of formal and 
informal sanctions they know apply in their society; and finally, their knowledge of 
human nature and the process of socialisation in their society (Vandenbroucke 2001, 
p. 276). It seems hardly more difficult to have this information and make judgements 
on the basis of it for individuals’ general adherence to the rules pertaining to the 
institutions of the basic structure, such as paying taxes, than to do so for principles 
that apply to individuals’ everyday lives such as those of mutual respect, aid and 
promise-keeping. Certainly, nothing about the nature of principles for individuals’ 
everyday conduct rules out their being capable of meeting this condition.  
 Given that principles for individual conduct can meet the publicity condition, 
why does Rawls think that it rules out further rules for individual conduct? Rawls 
argues of certain principles at least—ones governing our economic choices with the 
aim of securing a just distribution of primary goods—that the information required 
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would be too great and complex to process. In Political Liberalism, Rawls addresses the 
question whether justice can be a product of individuals acting in accordance with 
some rules for individual conduct alone, without any need for specifically regulated 
basic institutions. To ensure that the results of individual actions are just, we need to 
know when the agreements individuals make with each other are freely made in the 
context of fair background conditions. Since the pattern arising from any initial 
position of freedom and fairness through unconstrained individual choice may lead 
to future situations of unfreedom and unfairness, if we consider justice as only the 
assignment of certain moral obligations to individuals, these obligations would have 
to take into account the social ramifications of individual choices. Rawls argues that 
this would be impracticable: 
“There are no feasible rules that it is practicable to require economic agents 
to follow in their day-to-day transactions that can prevent these undesirable 
consequences. These consequences are often so far in the future, or so 
indirect, that the attempt to forestall them by restrictive rules that apply to 
individuals would be an excessive if not an impossible burden” (PL, p. 266).68  
The reason that there are no feasible rules is that such rules must not require too 
much information to be correctly applied. Rules must not exceed the capacity of 
individuals to grasp and follow them with sufficient ease, nor burden them with 
requirements of knowledge and foresight that they cannot normally meet. Individuals 
and associations cannot comprehend the ramifications of their particular actions 
viewed collectively, nor can they be expected to foresee future circumstances. Rawls 
believes that any principle enjoining people to take the effects on the situation of the 
worst off into account in their economic and personal choices must have these 
                                                 
68 See also TJ (pp. 73-78, in particular 76). 
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excessive requirements of knowledge, giving the example of the relatively simple case 
of bequests:  
“It is obviously not sensible to impose on parents (as heads of families) the 
duty to adjust their own bequests to what they estimate the effects of the 
totality of actual bequests will be on the next generation, much less beyond” 
(PL, p. 267). 
Rawls concludes that an “institutional division of labour” must be established 
between the basic structure and the rules applying directly to people’s choices in the 
economic sphere, which leaves individuals free to advance their ends within the 
framework of background institutions which carry out the operations required to 
maintain a just basic structure (PL, p. 284). 
 Now, this argument is directed at a view that only principles for individuals 
could create a just society. It is not clear how far its strictures apply to the case where 
we have a just basic structure supplemented by principles for individuals and 
associations. In the recent discussions of a duty to take the effects of one’s economic 
choices on the worst-off into account sparked by Cohen’s work, the necessary 
complexity of any such duty has been a major argument in defence of a Rawlsian 
division of labour between institutions and individuals and associations (see Williams, 
1998 and Pogge, 2000). However, these discussions have not ruled out that, with 
sufficient ingenuity, and in particular social circumstances, a duty of this kind might 
meet the demands of publicity. Moreover, it appears to be relatively easy to think of 
other principles for individuals that would meet the demands of publicity. Devoting 
some of one’s time to participation in what Skocpol calls membership organisations 
appears to be a case in point. In this case, the knowledge required to figure out what 
these duties demand would appear to be manageable. It would also seem possible for 
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people to know the general degree of compliance with this duty. As another possible 
example of an additional principle that would not demand excessive information for 
individuals to be able to understand and follow, and that might meet the other 
demands of publicity, consider a requirement to take adequate care of one’s health. If 
it is to everyone’s advantage to have free universal health care coverage, as it saves on 
administrative costs and prevents intrusive information-gathering by public 
institutions, then individuals’ choices that affect their health will influence the public 
cost of the health care system. We may think that this means that individuals should 
have a duty to take these external effects into account in their choices.69 If they 
followed this duty, more resources would be available for other purposes. Again, the 
knowledge required to figure out what such a duty demands would appear to be 
manageable, as the current public campaigns on healthy living demonstrate. It would 
also seem possible for people to know the general degree of compliance with such a 
duty—news media already keep us well informed on the relevant trends. 
 
Rawlsian objections to further principles 2: liberty 
 
I now want to address a second objection to further principles for individual conduct 
that we might glean from Rawls’s work: such principles would unacceptably limit 
people’s liberty. We must note, however, that Rawls does not focus on how 
principles for individual conduct limit liberty. Instead, he considers only coercive 
restrictions on individual behaviour and on voluntary associations. Rawls considers 
                                                 
69 The current move in Britain towards public condemnation of unhealthy living, in part on the 
grounds that this places an unfair burden on the National Health Service, shows that many people 
think so. 
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requiring democratic governance in churches with the aim of securing a more 
democratic culture (CP, p. 596), enforcing an equal division of household labour 
between men and women to secure fair opportunity (CP, p. 600), and imposing 
lump-sum taxes dependent on the assessment of people’s earning capacity to get 
them to work at their most productive profession in order to improve the lot of the 
worst-off (CP, pp. 127 and 231; JF, pp. 64 and 157-158). In each case, Rawls argues 
that the restriction on the liberty of associations and individuals would be too great. 
The force of this argument appears diminished, however, by Rawls’s focus on 
coercive intervention of the state as the way to achieve these aims. Clearly, coercive 
intervention by the state might undermine various basic liberties guaranteed by the 
liberty principle, such as freedom of association (which might be limited by the 
requirement of democratic governance in churches), and free choice of occupation 
(which might be limited by forcing people to work at their most productive 
profession).70  
                                                 
70 It is unclear whether Rawls conceives of freedom of occupation as being among the basic liberties. 
He never explicitly lists it as such, but some sections of A Theory of Justice appear to offer support for 
the thought that Rawls sees freedom of occupation as an important liberty (though perhaps not 
among the basic liberties). On TJ, p. 242, Rawls writes:  
“The ideal scheme sketched in the next several sections makes considerable use of market 
arrangements. It is only in this way, I believe, that the problem of distribution can be handled as a 
case of pure procedural justice. Further, we also gain the advantages of efficiency and protect the 
important [not necessarily basic--AV] liberty of free choice of occupation.” 
On TJ, p. 243 when defining the demands of formal equality of opportunity he writes:  
“the government (...) also enforces and underwrites equality of opportunity in economic activities 
and in the free choice of occupation.” 
And on p. 272: 
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However, as Cohen (2005) argues forcefully and in detail, an ethos that 
directs individuals who are unconstrained by government action to make 
choices that are to the benefit of the least well off does not undermine the 
freedom from being coerced to act in these ways. The liberty principle 
guarantees this freedom from coercion; an egalitarian ethos directs one to use 
this freedom in a particular way. Freedom of occupation, for example, is no 
more undermined by an ethos which requires that relatively advantaged 
individuals make their economic choices with the intention of maximising the 
prospects of the least advantaged, than one’s political liberty is undermined 
by the duty, which Rawls endorses, to support the party that best realises the 
principles of justice (TJ, p. 294; see also Vandenbroucke 2001, pp. 171-172). 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
None of the arguments for the restricted scope of the difference principle that we 
have reviewed are convincing. This leaves us with the original argument for an 
egalitarian ethos: that its adoption will improve the situation of the worst-off and 
decrease inequality. In addition, our review of the role of the principles for 
                                                                                                                                     
“It is more important [than efficiency--AV] that a competitive scheme gives scope for the 
principle of free association and individual choice of occupation against a background of fair 
equality of opportunity (...)”. 
But it does appear as a powerfully expressed afterthought in Justice as Fairness, p. 64:  
“The priority of liberty means that we cannot be forced to engage in work that is highly 
productive in terms of material goods.  What kind of work people do, and how hard they do it, is 
up to them to decide in light of the various incentives society offers.” 
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individuals that Rawls does accept reveals another reason for favouring this ethos: its 
contribution to making social co-operation stable. This contribution runs through 
two routes. First, by diminishing inequality, it directly lessens the tendency for 
destructive envy to arise in society. Second, everyone’s evident willingness to freely—
that is, without coercion of the state—act to improve the prospects of the least 
advantaged is an affirmation of each individuals’ worth, and especially of the worth 
of those individuals whose sense of self-worth might be undermined by being among 
the least advantaged in society. Thus, an egalitarian ethos would contribute to the 
stability of social co-operation through the same routes as the natural duties. 
An egalitarian ethos encompassing both the principles which Rawls identifies and 
further principles regulating individual conduct and motivation should therefore be 
part of an egalitarian theory of justice. 
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Endnotes to Chapter 4. 
                                                 
i Let Kk,...,...,1  be a list of possible values of the non-responsible ethnicity variable and Ll ,...,...,1  
be a list of the possible values of the responsible education variable. In our example, 3=K  and 
5=L . Unless mentioned otherwise, the indices k and l  range over },...,1{ K  and },...,1{ L . I is 
a LK ×  matrix with incomes in the status quo depending on combinations of responsible and non-
responsible characteristics and N is a LK × matrix with the number of the individuals possessing 
these combinations of characteristics. Policies are now of the form ∈φ ℝ LK× and the set of feasible 
policies satisfies the budget constraint ∑ =⋅⋅
kl
klklkl N 0),max( φρφ . Income under policy φ  is 
given by φφ += II : . A negative transfer ∈r  ℝ −  makes an amount of )( r−⋅ρ available for 
redistribution. The contribution of an arbitrary transfer ∈r ℝ to the budget is therefore 
),max(),min( rrrr ⋅−=⋅−− ρρ . Since under our assumptions taxing individuals who are better 
off for a given level of education always increases the budget with which we can aid the less well off at 
that educational level, equal option sets need not always be achieved through levelling down. 
Egalitarians maximise µ  within the budget constraint ∑ =−−⋅
kl
klklkl IIN 0))(,max( µρµ . 
Using non-linear optimisation algorithms, we find ≈µ 29,288. 
 To determine the distribution which yields the most valuable option set, we note that given our 
assumptions, this is equivalent to maximising the average income of the population, consistent with 
equalising the return to education for different ethnicities for each level of education. This is 
equivalent to choosing the cheapest policy that is consistent with equalising the return to education 
for different ethnicities for each level of education. We can then show that the policy that does so is 
self-financing in responsible characteristics. A policy with the latter property equalises the income among 
individuals with the same responsible characteristic by using only transfers among these individuals. In 
other words, each group of individuals with the same level of education pays to redress the inequalities 
within its own ranks: college attendees pay for college attendees, and high school dropouts pay for 
high school dropouts. In proving this result, we make use of the concept of option-dominance 
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introduced in section 4.3. In search of the cheapest policy that is option-undominated (or OD-policy 
for short), our task is to minimise ∑ ⋅−=
kl
klkl NB )0,min(:)( φφ within the budget constraint 
such that 
φφ
lkkl II ')( =+  for all lkk ,', . The budget constraint induces a non-linear boundary, thus 
compensating our optimisation problem. It is very helpful to note: The unique solution to this optimisation 
problem is identical to self-financing in responsible characteristics. 
Proof: We note that (++) neither 'φφ ≥  nor φφ ≥'  for any Φ∈', φφ  with 'φφ ≠ . 
Suppose that Φ∈'φ  is an OD-policy that minimises the budget (.)B  and differs from the 
self-financing policy φ . Let φφ ll II 1:=  and '1' : φφ ll II =  denote the income of individuals with 
responsible characteristic l under these two OD-policies. By ))((++ , there exists some l such 
that 
φφ
ll II >
'
 and some 'l such that φφ '
'
' ll II < . Clearly, some of the 'l -individuals must 
receive negative transfers under 'φ . We now define a policy ''φ  that, first, agrees with 'φ  in 
the treatment of all characteristics ''l  that differ from both l  and 'l  ' ''
''
'' :( klkl φφ =  for all 
','' lll ≠  and all )k  and, second, agrees with φ  in the treatment of characteristic 
l klkl φφ =:( ''  for all )k . Compared to 'φ , this policy redistributes 
( ) ( )[ ] kl
k
klklklkl N⋅⋅−⋅=∑ φρφφρφδ ,max,max: ''  less income among individuals 
with characteristic l  where 0>δ . We finally use these savings to increase the equalised 
income of individuals with characteristics 'l (the values of ''klφ  are fixed by )(+ ). Since some of 
these payments go to 'l -individuals who receive negative transfers under '',' φφ must have a 
lower budget )''(φB  than 'φ . Contradiction! ∎ 
The condition that a policy be self-financing in responsible characteristics requires that 
( )[ ] 0,max =⋅⋅∑ kl
k
klkl Nφρφ  for every l . By )(+ , we know that llll II 1212 φφ +−=  
and llll II 1313 φφ +−= . In the current example, a quick calculation shows that we must have 
 190 
                                                                                                                                     
01 <lφ  and 0, 32 >ll φφ . Self-financing then implies that 
( ) ( ) ( ) 03132123211 =−+−+++⋅⋅ llllllllll IINIINNNN ρφ  where 
( ) ( )
lll
llllll
l
NNN
IINIIN
321
133122
1
++⋅
−+−
=
ρ
φ . 
 
ii Policies are now of the form ∈φ ℝ K and the set Φ of feasible policies satisfies 
0),max(
1
=⋅⋅∑
≤≤
kk
Kk
k Nφρφ  where kN  is the number of individuals with non-responsible 
characteristic k. (As an aside, this restriction of feasible policies means that all policies respect Bossert 
and Fleurbaey’s (1996) axiom of ‘equal transfer for equal non-responsible characteristics’.) Income 
under policy φ  for individuals with characteristics k and l equals kklkl II φφ +=: . In our example, 
321 ,, φφφ  represent transfers to Nationals, Immigrant Group 1, and Immigrant Group 2. 
 When computing the set of option-undominated policies by brute force, we have to search the 
entire set of feasible policies when testing whether a given policy is option-dominated. The running 
time required by the brute force algorithm increases quadratically in the size of the set of feasible 
policies. Although a more sophisticated algorithm has a somewhat better performance, the calculation 
still remains difficult. In the current model, it is, however, immensely simplified by the following 
useful equivalence. A policy Φ∈φ is undominated in the value of options if and only if (*) every ethnic group is 
worst-off at some level of education (i.e. for all k there exists some l such that 
φφ
lkkkl II ''min= ).  
Proof: (a) Suppose (*) is false. We have to show that φ  is options-dominated. We know that 
there exists some k such that, for all l, 0min: '' ≤−=
φφδ lkkkll II . Let ll δδ min:= . We 
can now redistribute 0>⋅⋅ kNδρ  in a positive transfer among all individuals with non-
responsible characteristics other than k, thus increasing their income. Hence, φ  is option-
dominated.  (b) Suppose (*) is true and 'φ  differs from φ . We have to show that φ  is option-
undominated. By the budget constraint, there must exist some k such that kk φφ <' . By (*), 
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there exists some l such that 
φφ
lkkkl II ''min= . It follows that 
φφ
lkkkl II ''
' min<  and 'φ  
therefore does not option-dominate φ . ∎ 
 We note that this equivalence depends only on the following property of the set Φ  of feasible 
policies: (**) Whenever Φ∈',φϕ  with 'φφ ≠ , then neither policy dominates the other, in the 
sense that neither 'φφ ≥  nor 'φφ ≤ . For feasible sets of this nature, it follows that the use of 
maximin instead of leximin is innocuous.  
 Redistributive cost is minimised exactly when 1φ−  is minimised because all option-
undominated policies (or OD-policies for short) have positive 2φ  and 3φ (the latter is positive exactly 
if 2
1
2
1 φρφ ⋅⋅>− N
N
). By the equivalence proven above, an OD-policy φ  renders Nationals at 
some educational level worst-off. Since the difference between Nationals’ incomes and the smallest 
incomes is minimised at the lowest educational level, - 1φ  is minimised when Nationals at this level 
obtain the same income as the rest of the population at that level. The incomes of individuals in this 
category are equalised precisely when 14885 + 1φ = 11948 + 2φ = 13129 + 3φ . Equivalently, we 
must have both 2φ = 2937 + 1φ  and 
1
3
2121
3
2121 1756)
2937)(
,
2937)(
min( φ
ρ
φρφρ
+=
⋅
⋅+⋅+⋅
−
⋅+⋅+⋅
−
N
NNN
N
NNN
. 
This implies 5011 −≈φ , 1255,2436 32 ≈≈ φφ . The resulting income shows that this policy is 
undominated in the value of options (by the above equivalence). 
 
iii This rule has the unfortunate characteristic that one can increase the value of its target by making 
the worst off at a relatively low-valued combination of responsible characteristic even worse off, if by 
doing so the number of people who are worst off at that combination of responsible characteristics is 
decreased. For example, this rule evaluates the status quo, shown in table 1, at 22,635. Consider the 
alternative policy of reducing the income of members of Immigrant Group 2 at the lowest educational 
level by 1,182, making them worst off at this educational level. This money is not redistributed and no 
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further income transfers take place. Because there are fewer members of Immigrant Group 2 than 
there are members of Immigrant Group 1 at the lowest educational level, the weight of this level is 
now diminished. As a result, the above criterion evaluates this policy at 25,112, and thus prefers it to 
the status quo, even though it is option-dominated by the status quo. Cases like this are ruled out by 
the requirement of using Roemer’s rule only to select among the set of option-undominated policies. 
 
iv When income transfers are based on ethnicity alone, we find 
3660and9907,1940 321 ≈≈−≈ φφφ , using algorithms for non-linear optimisation problems. 
The resulting policy makes Nationals uniformly the worst off, and members of Immigrant Group 1 
best off for all educational levels except the highest. Though this may at first seem surprising, the 
reason is that a 1 unit transfer from members of Immigrants from Group 1 to Nationals would make 
Immigrants from Group 1 uniformly the worst off at the education level ‘BA or more’ and thereby 
greatly decrease the weight of this education level in the overall calculation of the average welfare of 
the most disadvantaged. Since this education level yields the highest welfare, this will decrease the 
average welfare of the most disadvantaged. 
